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ללומדים דף יומי בלילה - איזה דף אתם לומדים?




 

Steinsaltz

The Gemara cites another source that might resolve the issue: Come and hear a baraita that can provide a proof with regard to the meaning of Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement about a period of fitness to the priests: Rabbi Shimon says that there is a case of notar, when the blood was left overnight and was rendered unfit, where one is liable for misusing the meat of the offering, and there is also a case of notar where one is not liable for misusing it.

The baraita elaborates: How so? If the blood was left over and someone consumed the meat before the sprinkling of the blood, he is liable for misusing consecrated property. But if it was consumed after the sprinkling of the blood, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property, as the sprinkling removes the meat from being subject to the halakhot of misuse.

The Gemara notes: In any event, Rabbi Shimon teaches that if one consumes the meat before the leftover blood was sprinkled, he is liable for misusing it. Is this not referring to a case where there was time left in the day to sprinkle the blood that had already been collected in the service vessel, and therefore, if he had desired, he could have sprinkled the blood? Nevertheless, the offering is subject to the halakhot of misuse. This indicates that merely collecting the blood in the service vessel alone, without actually sprinkling it, does not remove the offering from being subject to the halakhot of misuse.

And accordingly, one may conclude from the baraita that it is fitness of consuming the meat of the offering that we learned in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna. It is the fitness of consuming the meat of the offering that removes the possibility of being liable for the prohibition of misuse, not the fitness of sprinkling.

The Gemara refutes this conclusion: No, the baraita is not referring to a case where there was time left in the day to sprinkle the blood that had already been collected. Rather, it is referring to a situation where the priest collected the blood shortly before sunset, where there was no time left in the day to sprinkle the blood while it was still daytime. Since the blood could not have been sprinkled, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse. But if there had been time to sprinkle the blood, then that blood would be considered ready to be sprinkled, and the offering would no longer be subject to the prohibition of misuse, in accordance with the opinion that the criteria is the fitness of sprinkling of the blood.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But in that case, what is the halakha in a situation where there was time in the day to sprinkle the blood? According to the above claim, so too the halakha is that he is not liable for misusing the offering.

If so, why does Rabbi Shimon specifically teach this distinction between a case before sprinkling, when the offering is still subject to the halakhot of misuse, and after sprinkling, when the offering is no longer subject to misuse? Let Rabbi Shimon instead teach a more precise distinction, between a situation where the blood was collected before sunset and there was time to sprinkle it but it was left overnight, in which case the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse, and a situation where the blood was collected after sunset, in which case it is still subject to the prohibition of misuse.

The Gemara answers that this is indeed what Rabbi Shimon meant, as he actually taught: Before it was fit for sprinkling, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse, but after it was fit for sprinkling, it is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse.

The Gemara suggests another proof from a similar baraita. Come and hear: Rabbi Shimon says that there is a case of an offering of the most sacred order that was sacrificed with piggul intent where one is liable for misusing it, and there is also a case of piggul intent where one is not liable for misusing it.

The baraita elaborates: How so? If someone consumed the meat before the sprinkling of the blood, he is liable for misusing consecrated property. If he consumed it after the sprinkling of the blood, he is not liable for misusing consecrated property, as the sprinkling removed the prohibition of misuse.

In any event, Rabbi Shimon teaches that if one consumes the meat of an offering that was rendered piggul before the blood was sprinkled, he is liable for misusing it. Is this not referring to a case where there was time left in the day to sprinkle the blood that had already been collected in the service vessel, and therefore, if he had desired, he could have sprinkled the blood? And yet Rabbi Shimon teaches that one is liable for misusing it. Once again, this would indicate that merely collecting the blood in the service vessel alone, without sprinkling, does not remove the possibility of the prohibition of misuse. And accordingly, one may conclude from the baraita that it is fitness of consuming the meat of the offering that we learned in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna.

The Gemara refutes this conclusion: No, the baraita is referring to a situation where the priest collected the blood shortly before sunset, where there was no time to sprinkle the blood while it was still daytime. Since the blood could not have been sprinkled, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse. The Gemara raises a difficulty: But if so, what is the halakha in a case where there was time in the day to sprinkle the blood? According to the above claim, the offering is indeed removed from being subject to the halakhot of misuse.

If so, why does Rabbi Shimon specifically teach this distinction between after sprinkling, when the offering is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse, and before sprinkling, when the offering is still subject to misuse? Let Rabbi Shimon instead teach a more precise distinction, between a situation where the blood was collected before sunset and there was time to sprinkle it but it was left overnight, in which case the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse, and a situation where the blood was collected after sunset, in which case it is still subject to the prohibition of misuse.

The Gemara answers that that is indeed what Rabbi Shimon is saying: Before it was fit for sprinkling, the offering is still subject to the prohibition of misuse, but after it was fit for sprinkling, it is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse.

§ The Gemara suggests another proof. Come and hear: An offering of the most sacred order which is piggul is subject to the halakhot of misuse. The Gemara analyzes this statement: What, is this baraita not referring to a case where the priest already sprinkled its blood? This would indicate that a fit offering, unlike a piggul offering, is no longer subject to the prohibition of misuse only once the blood is sprinkled. And if so, one may conclude from the baraita that it is fitness of consuming the meat of the offering that we learned in Rabbi Yehoshua’s statement in the mishna, i.e., this fitness of consuming the meat of the offering removes the prohibition of misuse. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: No, one cannot cite a proof from this baraita, as it is possible that the baraita is referring to a case where the priest did not yet sprinkle the blood.

The Gemara asks: But if so, what, then, is the halakha in a case where the priest did sprinkle the blood? Is the halakha indeed that one is no longer liable for misusing it? If so, why does the latter clause of the baraita specifically teach: Unlike an offering of the most sacred order, in the case of the sacrificial portions of an offering of lesser sanctity one is not liable for misusing it?

Let the baraita instead teach a distinction within the category of offerings of the most sacred order themselves: Here, the offering is subject to the prohibition of misuse because it is before the sprinkling of the blood, and there, the offering is not subject to the prohibition of misuse because it is after the sprinkling of the blood.

The Gemara answers: The baraita could have taught that distinction, but it chose to state a distinction between offerings of the most sacred order and offerings of lesser sanctity because it comes to teach us this following principle: In any case where the result of sprinkling brings the offering into the category of the halakhot of misuse, e.g., the sacrificial portions of offerings of lesser sanctity, to which the halakhot of misuse apply only after the blood had been sprinkled, only sprinkling the blood properly brings the offering into the halakhot of misuse.

By contrast, in any situation where the result of sprinkling is removing the offering from the halakhot of misuse, e.g., the meat of an offering of the most sacred order, which was subject to the halakhot of misuse even before the blood was sprinkled, even sprinkling the blood improperly removes the offering from the halakhot of misuse. This ruling is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav Giddel.

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
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