to say: Since a sin offering is brought for atonement, people do not distance themselves from it after it dies, as they realize that it is no longer fit to atone. Therefore, in order to ensure that people do not show disrespect, the Sages decreed that one is liable for its misuse. But with regard to other sacrificial animals of the most sacred order, since they are not brought for atonement, people still distance themselves from them after the animals die, and therefore one might think that there is no need to decree that they are subject to the halakhot of misuse. Consequently, Ulla teaches us that even other sacrificial animals that die are subject to misuse by rabbinic decree.

The Gemara asks: And is a sin offering that died subject to the halakhot of misuse? But didn’t we learn in a baraita: With regard to sin offerings that are left to die because they are no longer fit for the altar, from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, and likewise money from which one is prohibited to derive benefit, which goes to the Dead Sea to be destroyed, one may not derive benefit from them ab initio, but if one derived benefit from them, he is not liable for their misuse?

They say in response to this question: With regard to sin offerings that are left to die, since even during their lifetimes people distance themselves from them, as they are no longer fit for sacrifice, there was no need for the Sages to institute a prohibition of misuse. This is to the exclusion of a sin offering that was fit during its lifetime, as people do not distance themselves from it, and therefore the Sages saw fit to institute a prohibition of misuse after it dies.

§ The Gemara returns to the dispute with regard to offerings that were slaughtered in the wrong place and then were brought up to the altar. Rabba maintains that such offerings are removed from the altar while Rav Yosef rules that once they ascended the altar they do not descend from it and are burned. Rav Yosef raised an objection to Rabba, one source from another one, and that one from another one, i.e., his objection is based upon the combination of several sources.

The Gemara elaborates: The mishna on Zevaḥim 66b, which deals with bird offerings that were disqualified for having either the napes of their necks pinched or their blood sprinkled in the wrong place, teaches: And all of the offerings mentioned in that mishna do not render one who swallows their meat ritually impure to the extent that his garments are rendered impure when it is in the throat. Although the offering is disqualified, since the nape of its neck was pinched as part of the rite one is not rendered impure by swallowing an olive-bulk of its meat, as is the halakha with regard to a carcass of a kosher bird. And one who derives benefit from these offerings is liable for misusing them.

This is the halakha concerning all bird offerings, except for the bird sin offering that one performed below the red line, according to the procedure of a bird sin offering, and for the sake of a sin offering. Since it was sacrificed correctly, its meat is permitted to the priests and is no longer subject to the halakhot of misuse.

And it is taught in another mishna (Zevaḥim 68b) with regard to the same disqualified bird offerings: For any one of them whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area, i.e., the Temple courtyard, e.g., if the nape of its neck was pinched at night, it does not render the garments of one who swallows it impure when the meat is in the throat. And for any one of them whose disqualification did not take place in the sacred area, it does render the garments of one who swallows it impure when the meat is in the throat.

And it is taught in yet another mishna (Zevaḥim 84a): With regard to any offering whose disqualification took place in the sacred area, the sacred area renders the offering acceptable, and if such offerings ascended onto the altar they shall not descend. The first mishna establishes that birds disqualified because their rites were performed in the wrong place are subject to the halakhot of misuse. The second mishna teaches that these same birds are considered items whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area. The last mishna establishes that if items whose disqualification occurred in the sacred area ascend the altar, they do not descend. By citing all these mishnayot, Rav Yosef demonstrates that an offering that is slaughtered in the wrong place is not removed from the altar, contrary to Rabba’s opinion. The Gemara concludes: The refutation of the opinion of Rabba is indeed a conclusive refutation.

§ The Gemara notes: And that matter with regard to which Rabba and Rav Yosef disagree is obvious to Rabbi Elazar, as Rabbi Elazar says: In the case of a burnt offering consecrated to be sacrificed on a personal altar, during the period when it is permitted to do so, that one brought inside the Temple courtyard,