where the blood was separated from a person. By contrast, when Rav Sheshet said that one need not abstain from human blood even ab initio, he was referring to a case where it was not separated from a person. As it is taught in a baraita: If blood was on a loaf of bread, one may scrape off the blood and then consume the bread. If blood was between the teeth, he may suck it and swallow it without concern.

Some teach this statement of Rav Sheshet with regard to this baraita, as it is taught: One might have thought that one who consumes the milk of bipeds would violate a prohibition. And this conclusion could be derived based upon a logical inference: Just as with regard to a non-kosher animal, where you were lenient with regard to its contact, i.e., it cannot render people or items impure through contact when it is alive, you were stringent with regard to its milk, which is prohibited, so too in the case of bipeds, where you were stringent with regard to their contact, as living people can render other people and objects impure, isn’t it logical that you should be stringent with regard to their milk?

Therefore, the verse states: “And these are they which are impure to you” (Leviticus 11:29), which indicates that these animals enumerated in that chapter are non-kosher and their milk is forbidden for consumption, but the milk of bipeds is not impure but rather pure, i.e., kosher.

Furthermore, one might have thought that I should exclude only the milk of women from forbidden status, as the forbidden status of milk does not apply equally to all creatures, since the milk of kosher animals is permitted, but I should not exclude human blood from the prohibition against consuming blood, which does apply equally to all creatures, since even the blood of kosher animals is forbidden. Consequently, the verse states: “And these are they which are impure to you,” which indicates that this is impure, but the blood of bipeds is not impure but rather pure, i.e., kosher. It was in this context that Rav Sheshet said: With regard to the blood of bipeds, there is not even a command to abstain from consuming it ab initio.

§ We learned in a mishna there (Ḥullin 109a): One who wants to eat the heart of a slaughtered animal tears it and removes its blood, and only then may he cook it and eat it. If he did not tear the heart before cooking it and he ate it, he does not violate the prohibition and is not liable to receive karet for consuming blood. The Gemara comments: Rabbi Zeira says that Rav says: They taught this only with regard to the heart of a bird, since it does not contain an olive-bulk of blood. But the heart of an animal, which does contain an olive-bulk of blood, is forbidden and one is liable to receive karet for its consumption.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita cited above: With regard to blood of the spleen, blood of the heart, blood of the kidneys, and blood of limbs, all these are forbidden for consumption by a regular prohibition, punishable by lashes, but their consumption is not punishable by karet. By contrast, the blood of bipeds, i.e., human beings, and the blood of repugnant creatures and crawling things are forbidden but one is not liable for their consumption. This proves that one is not liable to receive karet for consuming the blood of the heart.

The Gemara answers that when the baraita teaches that one is not liable for consuming the blood of the heart, it is referring to its own blood, i.e., the blood absorbed in the walls of the heart. By contrast, when Rav said that one is liable to receive karet, he was referring to blood that comes from the outside, i.e., from elsewhere in the body, and which is found in the cavity of the heart.

The Gemara challenges: Its own blood is the same as the blood of limbs, which is already included in the list. What is the difference between the blood absorbed in the walls of the heart and blood absorbed in any other limb? The Gemara responds: And according to your reasoning, doesn’t the baraita teach the halakha with regard to the blood of the kidneys, and yet it also teaches the halakha with regard to the blood of limbs? Rather, the baraita teaches the halakha with regard to the blood of the kidneys, and then teaches the principle with regard to the blood of limbs. Here too, the baraita teaches the halakha with regard to the blood of the heart, and then teaches the principle with regard to the blood of limbs.

The Gemara asks: From where does blood come to the heart from outside? Rabbi Zeira said: At the time when the soul departs, i.e., when the animal is dying, the heart draws [sharif ] blood from elsewhere, and one is liable to receive karet for consuming this blood.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to blood that spurted during bloodletting with which the soul departs, one is liable to receive karet for consuming it intentionally or to bring a sin offering for consuming it unwittingly. It was stated: What is defined as the blood that spurts during bloodletting upon which the soul depends, whose consumption entails karet? Rabbi Yoḥanan says: As long as it is spurting forcefully, it is included in this category of blood. Reish Lakish says: From the last black drop and onward, i.e., even before the blood spurts out forcefully, it is included in this category. The first drops of blood are black, and once these have ended and the first red drops have begun to emerge, it is the blood upon which the soul depends.

The Gemara raises an objection from a baraita: What is defined as blood that spurts during bloodletting with which the soul departs? As long as it is spurting forcefully, it is considered this type of blood. This excludes blood of exudate, i.e., that oozes from the animal after the spurt concludes, because at this stage the blood merely flows rather than spurting forcefully. The Gemara infers: What, is it not correct to say that even with regard to the first and last appearances of blood to emerge, if it flows it is considered as blood of exudate? This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish.

The Gemara answers: No, the baraita serves to exclude only black blood; but with regard to the first and last appearances of red blood, which emerge, respectively, after the black blood but before the blood spurts and after the blood is no longer spurting forcefully, even though it flows, this is considered blood with which the soul departs.

The Gemara raises an objection from a different baraita: What is defined as the first appearance of blood? As long as it is spurting forcefully, it is considered the first appearance of blood. This excludes the first and last appearances of blood, because that blood flows. This is apparently a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Reish Lakish. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could say to you that this matter is a dispute between tanna’im, as it is taught in a baraita: What is the blood with which the soul departs? As long as it is spurting out, it is considered this type of blood; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar. Rabbi Shimon says: From the last black drop and onward it is considered blood with which the soul departs.

The Gemara mentions a related halakha involving blood. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “And drinks the blood of the slain” (Numbers 23:24). This teaches that the blood that is considered a halakhically recognized liquid, and therefore renders other items susceptible to ritual impurity, is only blood that is exuded after death. This serves to exclude blood that spurts out forcefully at the time of the slaughter, before the animal is actually dead. Consequently, this type of blood does not render seeds susceptible to ritual impurity.

§ The Gemara returns to the prohibition against consuming blood. Rabbi Yirmeya raised a dilemma before Rabbi Zeira: If one performed bloodletting upon an animal and received its blood in two cups, from which he drank, what is the halakha? With regard to the first cup, everyone agrees that he is liable, as it contains blood that spurted forcefully. With regard to the last cup, which does not contain blood that spurted forcefully from the animal, is he liable or not?

Rabbi Zeira said to him: This is a dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish, as it was stated: If one performed bloodletting upon an animal and received its blood in two cups, Reish Lakish says that he is liable to bring two sin offerings if he drank the contents of the cups in two lapses of awareness, as one is liable to receive karet even for blood that emerges after spurting; and Rabbi Yoḥanan says he is liable to bring only one sin offering, for the blood in the first cup.

§ The mishna teaches that one is not liable for consuming blood of exudate, i.e., that oozes from the neck of the animal after the initial spurt of blood concludes. Rabbi Yehuda deems one liable in the case of blood of exudate. The Gemara adds that Rabbi Elazar says: Rabbi Yehuda concedes with regard to atonement that if one sacrifices an offering and the priest sprinkles the blood of exudate on the corners of the altar, the blood does not atone. This is as it is stated: “For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the soul” (Leviticus 17:11), which teaches that blood with which the soul departs, i.e., the blood that spurts immediately upon slaughter, atones, but blood with which the soul does not depart, i.e., the blood that drains out after the initial spurt, does not atone.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We learn this in a baraita, as well, as it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “And any man from the house of Israel, or from the stranger who resides among them, who consumes any blood, I will set My face against that soul that consumes blood, and will cut him off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:10). The verse could simply have stated “blood”; what is the meaning when the verse states “any blood”?

The baraita explains: Since it is stated: “For it is the blood that makes atonement by reason of the soul,” I have derived nothing other than the fact that consuming the blood of sacrificial animals with which the soul departs renders one liable to receive karet, as this blood atones. From where is it derived that the same applies to blood of non-sacred animals and blood of exudate? The verse states: “Any blood.” Who is presumed to be the author of any unattributed baraita found in the Sifra, a collection of halakhic midrash on Leviticus, which is the source of this baraita? It is Rabbi Yehuda. This proves that according to Rabbi Yehuda, blood of exudate does not effect atonement.

MISHNA: This mishna resumes discussion of the provisional guilt offering addressed in the previous chapter. Rabbi Akiva deems one liable to bring a provisional guilt offering for a case where he is uncertain whether he is guilty of misuse of consecrated property, a transgression that renders one liable to bring a definite guilt offering (see Leviticus 5:15). And the Rabbis deem him exempt, as one brings a provisional guilt offering only in a case of uncertainty as to whether he is liable to bring a sin offering, not a guilt offering. And Rabbi Akiva concedes that one does not bring payment for his misuse until it becomes definitely known to him that he is guilty of misuse, as then he will bring a definite guilt offering with his payment.

Rabbi Tarfon said: For what purpose does that person bring two guilt offerings, one provisional and one definite? Rather, at the outset one brings the payment for misuse of consecrated property and its additional payment of one-fifth, as mandated by Torah law, and he will then bring a guilt offering worth two sela and say: If it is certain that I misused consecrated property, this is payment for my misuse and this is my definite guilt offering. And if it is uncertain whether I misused consecrated property, the money is a contribution to the Temple fund for the purchase of communal offerings and the guilt offering is provisional, as from the same type of animal that one brings a guilt offering for a case where it is known to him that he is guilty of misuse, he likewise brings a guilt offering for a case where it is unknown to him.

Rabbi Akiva says: The statement of Rabbi Tarfon appears correct in the case of minimal misuse, but in a case where he is confronted with a case of uncertainty with regard to misuse valued at ten thousand dinars, would it not be preferable for him that he will now bring a provisional guilt offering valued at two sela and he will not bring payment now for uncertain misuse valued at ten thousand dinars? The mishna concludes: Apparently, Rabbi Akiva concedes to Rabbi Tarfon in the case of minimal misuse. He agrees that at the outset one brings payment for misuse and its additional payment of one-fifth, and conditionally brings a guilt offering.