to teach the halakha in the case of his sister who is both his father’s daughter and his mother’s daughter, and this serves to say that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference. Although the verses state a punishment both for one who engages in intercourse with his half sister who is his father’s daughter and for his half sister who is his mother’s daughter, one cannot learn via an a fortiori inference that he should also be punished for engaging in intercourse with his sister from both parents, as punishments are applied only when the Torah expressly imposes them.

The Gemara notes: And Rabbi Yitzḥak, who does not interpret the verses in this manner, maintains that one administers punishment based on an a fortiori inference. And if you wish, say instead a different reason why Rabbi Yitzḥak does not require this exposition: He derives the punishment of karet for engaging in intercourse with a sister from both parents from the warning, i.e., the prohibition that is stated with regard to her. Just as the verse explicitly prohibited engaging in intercourse with a sister from both parents, so too, the same punishment of karet applies to engaging in intercourse with her as it does to engaging in intercourse with other forbidden relatives.

§ Rabbi Elazar says that Rabbi Hoshaya says: Anywhere you find two different prohibitions, and only one punishment of karet is stated for both of them, you should divide the sin offering between them, i.e., if one transgressed both prohibitions unwittingly he is liable to bring a sin offering for each. And what is this case? One who blends the anointing oil according to the specifications of the oil prepared by Moses in the wilderness, for purposes other than use in the Temple, and one who applies this anointing oil to the skin of a person, as it is written: “Upon the flesh of man it shall not be applied, neither shall you make any like it according to its composition” (Exodus 30:32). These are two prohibitions, one for applying the oil and the other for blending it, and one karet is stated with regard to both, as it is written: “Whoever compounds any like it, or whoever puts any of it upon a stranger, he shall be cut off from his people” (Exodus 30:33).

The Gemara challenges this statement: But accordingly, once there are separate prohibitions stated in the Torah with regard to engaging in intercourse with all forbidden relatives (Leviticus, chapter 18), and at the conclusion of that passage it is written: “For whoever shall do any of these abominations, the souls that do them shall be cut off from among their people” (Leviticus 18:29), it is indicated that the punishments of karet or a sin offering apply to all these prohibitions. If so, why do I need the punishment of karet that the Merciful One writes with regard to one’s sister, in a separate passage: “And they shall be cut off in the sight of the children of their people; he has uncovered his sister’s nakedness” (Leviticus 20:17)?

The Gemara explains: This verse is required to teach one halakha according to the opinion of the Rabbis, and one halakha according to Rabbi Yitzḥak, per his opinion. The Gemara elaborates: According to the opinion of the Rabbis, they require this verse to say that one does not administer punishment based on an a fortiori inference. According to Rabbi Yitzḥak, he derives that this verse comes to deem one liable to bring three separate sin offerings for unwittingly engaging in intercourse with his own sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister.

The Gemara asks: And as for the Rabbis, from where do they derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: One can say that they derive it from the term “his sister” written in the first clause of the verse: “And if a man shall take his sister” (Leviticus 20:17). And Rabbi Yitzḥak holds that one cannot derive a halakha from the term “his sister” written in the first clause, as it is the manner of the verse to describe the case in detail before stating the prohibition that applies to it. And therefore he derives from the term “his sister” written in the latter clause of the verse that this comes to separate between the prohibitions and render one liable to bring three separate sin offerings for engaging in intercourse with his own sister who is also his father’s sister and who is also his mother’s sister.

§ The Gemara returns to Rabbi Elazar’s statement that one who unwittingly blends the anointing oil and applies it to the skin is liable to bring two sin offerings. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: We learn in the mishna as well: And one who blends the anointing oil, and one who blends the incense, and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin.

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak explains his inference: Why do I need the tanna to teach the clause: One who blends the incense, in the middle, between the two cases concerning the anointing oil? Is it not correct that this is what the mishna teaches us: Just as blending the incense is an independent prohibition and one is liable to receive karet for it by itself, and to bring a sin offering for its unwitting transgression, so too, with regard to one who blends the anointing oil and one who applies the anointing oil to his skin, since they are each an independent prohibition, one is liable to receive karet for each action by itself, and to bring a sin offering for the unwitting transgression of each of them.

And if you would say the mishna uses this order because it wants to teach the two cases involving blending together, let the tanna teach those two halakhot in the reverse order: One who blends the incense, and one who blends the anointing oil, and one who applies the anointing oil. In this manner the two clauses addressing blending would be adjacent, and likewise the two clauses addressing the anointing oil would be adjacent. Why did the tanna divide the cases involving the anointing oil by teaching the halakha of one who blends the incense in between them? Is it not correct that this teaches us that there is a separation between the two prohibitions, requiring one to bring two sin offerings? The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is the case.

§ The mishna included in its list of those liable to receive karet a male who engages in intercourse with another male or one who copulates with an animal, and a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The Gemara asks: According to what criteria does the tanna of the mishna tally the prohibitions in the mishna? Rabbi Yoḥanan explained that the tally stated in the mishna serves to teach that one who violated every prohibition against engaging in forbidden intercourse in a single lapse of awareness is liable to receive punishment for each and every one. Which individual could have committed all these transgressions?

The Gemara elaborates: If he is referring to prohibitions transgressed by men, then one should remove the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and if so, one case of karet is lacking from the tally. If he is referring to prohibitions transgressed by women, one should remove from them the case of a male who engages in intercourse with another male or with an animal, and if so, two cases of karet are lacking from the tally.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Actually, the tanna is referring to prohibitions transgressed by men. One should remove the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and instead teach the mishna like this: A male who engages in intercourse with another male, and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse. And this mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, who says that one who transgresses both of these prohibitions in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: But from the fact that the mishna teaches in its latter clause the case of one who blasphemes, and we interpret this clause in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, it may be inferred that the first clause of the mishna is also in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva.

The Gemara suggests: And if you would say the entire mishna is in fact in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, and with regard to the halakha listed in the first clause he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, that is not tenable, as doesn’t Rabbi Abbahu say: In the case of a male who engages in intercourse with another male, and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse, according to the statement of Rabbi Yishmael, who derives these prohibitions from two separate verses, from: “And you shall not lie with a man as with a woman” (Leviticus 18:22), and from: “There shall not be a sodomite of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which is referring to one who engages in homosexual intercourse passively, one who transgresses both of these prohibitions in a single lapse of awareness is liable to bring two sin offerings.

Rabbi Abbahu continues: By contrast, according to the opinion of Rabbi Akiva, he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as he derives both prohibitions from one verse: “You shall not lie [tishkhav] with a man,” in the active form, as one can read the verb in this verse, written in the Torah without vowels, as though it stated: Enable your being lain with [tishakheiv], in the passive. Evidently, Rabbi Akiva disagrees with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael with regard to a male who engages in intercourse with another male and a male who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse.

The Gemara suggests: Rather, the first clause is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael, and with regard to one who blasphemes he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Akiva. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If so, let the tanna also teach two additional cases with regard to bestiality: One who copulates with an animal, derived from the verse: “And you shall not lie with any beast” (Leviticus 18:23); and a man who brings an animal upon him for bestiality, derived from: “There shall not be a sodomite of the sons of Israel” (Deuteronomy 23:18), which can be interpreted as applying to all forms of male anal intercourse, including with animals.

The Gemara answers: Didn’t Abaye say: With regard to one who copulates with an animal, and who brings an animal upon him to engage in bestiality, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as when the verse: “There shall not be a sodomite,” is written, it is written with regard to men, i.e., the term sodomite does not include one who engages in bestiality. In conclusion, according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, the mishna is listing prohibitions transgressed by men, and therefore one should remove from the tally the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, and add the case of a man who brings another male upon him to engage in intercourse, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yishmael.

The Gemara cites another interpretation: Rabbi Elazar said in the name of Rav: The mishna is listing prohibitions transgressed by men and not women, but one should not remove from the tally the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality. The reason is that the tanna of the mishna teaches thirty-three prohibitions for which a man brings sin offerings, and he teaches another three instances of karet in order to complete the list of transgressions for which one is liable to be punished with karet. Those three do not meet the same criteria as the other thirty-three, and the case of a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality is one of those three.

What supports this interpretation? As the mishna teaches in the latter clause: And one is liable to receive karet for failure to fulfill the mitzva of bringing the Paschal offering and the mitzva of circumcision, which unlike the cases of prohibitions enumerated in the mishna, are positive mitzvot. Why does the tanna teach the cases of the Paschal offering and circumcision?

And if you say the mishna mentions these positive mitzvot to teach that one brings an offering for unwittingly failing to perform them, does one in fact bring an offering in such a case? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The entire Torah is juxtaposed to idolatry, as it is written: “You shall have one law [torah] for him that does unwittingly. But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from among his people” (Numbers 15:29–30).

The phrase “But the soul that does with a high hand, whether he be home-born or a stranger, he blasphemes the Lord” is referring to one who engages in idol worship, and it is derived from here: Just as idol worship is a situation in which the Torah says to a person: Sit and refrain from action, and one who transgresses this prohibition unwittingly must bring a sin offering, so too, with regard to every transgression in which the Torah says that one must sit and refrain from action, one is liable to bring a sin offering for performing the act. Accordingly, one is not liable to bring an offering for the unwitting failure to perform a positive mitzva, such as bringing the Paschal offering or circumcision.

The Gemara concludes its statement: Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the mishna that the tanna of the mishna taught thirty-three prohibitions for which a man brings sin offerings, which apply to one who acts unwittingly, and he taught another three instances of karet in order to complete the list of transgressions for which one is liable to be punished with karet? These three instances are a woman who brings an animal upon her to engage in bestiality, one who fails to bring the Paschal offering, and one who fails to perform circumcision. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from the mishna that this is the case.

§ The mishna’s list of prohibitions for whose unwitting violation one must bring a sin offering includes one who desecrates Shabbat. The Sages express their surprise at this ruling and say: The primary labors of Shabbat are forty-less-one, and one is liable to bring a sin offering for each primary labor he violates. That alone totals more than the thirty-six cases mentioned in the mishna. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: The tanna taught a case where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he was unaware it was Shabbat, and his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, in that he was aware that the acts he performed were labors that are prohibited on Shabbat. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable to bring only one sin offering, as he committed only a single error.

As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me’aḥat mehena]” (Leviticus 4:2). The expression “me’aḥat mehena” is interpreted in several ways. One of them is: There is an instance of “them [hena],” i.e., many unwitting transgressions, which is like “one [aḥat],” a single unwitting transgression, in that one is liable to bring only one sin offering. How so? When one performed many labors where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat but his action was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, he brings only one sin offering. That is the case referred to in the mishna.

The Gemara challenges: But let the tanna teach a case where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat, i.e., he knew it was Shabbat, but his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, as he was unaware they were prohibited. In that case, the halakha is that he is liable to bring forty-less-one sin offerings, one for each primary category of labor.

The Gemara elaborates that this is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And performs from one of them.” This teaches that there are times when one is liable to bring one sin offering for all of his transgressions, and there are times when one is liable to bring a sin offering for each and every transgression. And it is further taught in a baraita: There is “one [aḥat],” i.e., the transgression of one prohibition, which is like “them [hena],” i.e., many unwitting transgressions, in that one is liable to bring multiple sin offerings. How so? When one performs many labors where his action was intentional with regard to Shabbat but his action was unwitting with regard to the prohibited labors, he brings multiple sin offerings.

The Gemara answers: The tanna prefers to state the case of one who performed many labors where his action was unwitting with regard to Shabbat but it was intentional with regard to the prohibited labors, in order to emphasize that he is not exempt from bringing at least one sin offering, even though he performed the acts of labor intentionally.

The Gemara notes: And likewise, you find that the tanna of the mishna taught in this manner with regard to idol worship, as he teaches liability to bring one sin offering, despite the fact that the sinner may have performed four prohibited rites: Slaughtering, burning incense, pouring libations, and bowing. How so? This was a case where, as with Shabbat, his actions were unwitting with regard to idol worship, as he did not know he was worshipping an idol, but they were intentional with regard to the prohibited rites, i.e., he was aware these rites are prohibited.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of performing an act unwittingly with regard to idol worship? If we say it is referring to a case where he was standing in a house of idol worship and thought that it was a synagogue and bowed there, and it turned out that he bowed toward an idol, in this situation he commits no transgression: Since his heart was directed toward Heaven it is not even an unwitting transgression.

Rather, one might say it is referring to a case where he saw a statue [andarta] in the image of the king and bowed to it. Again, what are the circumstances of this case? If the baraita is referring to a situation where he bowed because he accepted that image upon himself as a god, he engaged in idol worship intentionally and therefore he is subject to death by stoning, and he is not required to bring a sin offering. And if he did not accept that image upon himself as a god and bowed merely in deference to the monarch, it is a meaningless act, not idol worship at all.

Rather, it is referring to a case where one bowed out of love for someone who requested that he bow before the statue, or out of fear of someone demanding of him to do so. He was under the impression that unless he wholeheartedly has the intention to worship the idol there is no prohibition involved. This is an unwitting transgression.

The Gemara comments: This works out well according to Abaye, who says: One who bows to an idol out of love or fear is liable to bring a sin offering. But according to Rava, who says: One who bows to an idol out of love or fear is exempt from bringing a sin offering, what can be said? What are the circumstances of an unwitting transgression with regard to idol worship?