MISHNA: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted, they prohibit the entire mixture of animals in any amount, regardless of the ratio of permitted to prohibited animals. These are the animals whose sacrifice is prohibited: An animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and the set-aside, and one that was worshipped, and an animal that was given as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog, or an animal crossbred from a mixture of diverse kinds, or an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa], or an animal born by caesarean section.

Which is the animal that is set-aside? It is an animal that is set aside for idol worship. The animal itself is prohibited, but that which is upon it, e.g., its jewelry and garments, is permitted to be sold in order to purchase an animal to be sacrificed. And which is the animal that was worshipped? It is any animal that a person worships as an object of idol worship. In this case, the sacrifice of both the animal itself and an animal purchased using the money from the sale of that which is upon it is prohibited. And the consumption of both this, the animal designated for idol worship, and that, the animal worshipped, is permitted.

GEMARA: The Master said in the mishna, with regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, that if they are intermingled with animals whose sacrifice is permitted, they prohibit the entire mixture in any amount. This teaches that they are not nullified by a majority. This is difficult, as we already learn this in a mishna (Zevaḥim 70b): All the sacrificial animals that were intermingled with an animal from which deriving benefit is prohibited, e.g., sin offerings that were disqualified and left to die, or if they were intermingled with an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, even if the ratio is one in ten thousand, deriving benefit from them all is prohibited and they must all die.

And the use of the word “even” in the phrase: Even one in ten thousand, was difficult for us: What is it saying? This word indicates that the novelty of the mishna’s ruling is that even if one permitted animal was intermingled with ten thousand prohibited animals they are all prohibited. Yet, this is less of a novelty than in the reverse case, since if in a situation where a minority of prohibited items became intermingled with a majority of permitted animals they are all prohibited, all the more so when the prohibited items are the majority.

And we explained that this is what the tanna is teaching: With regard to animals that are fit for the altar, if there was intermingled with them an animal from which deriving benefit is prohibited, e.g., one of the five sin offerings that are left to die if they are rendered disqualified, or if they were intermingled with an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, even if one prohibited animal was intermingled in ten thousand permitted animals, deriving benefit from them is prohibited and they must all die. If so, the halakha of the mishna here was already taught in tractate Zevaḥim. Why, then, is its repetition necessary here?

The Gemara answers that it was necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this halakha applies only there, with regard to the specific examples mentioned in the mishna in Zevaḥim, as the five sin offerings that are condemned to die and an ox that is sentenced to be stoned are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited. But here, where the animals are not items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, but are merely prohibited to be sacrificed, you might say: Let them be nullified by a majority of permitted animals. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that even animals that are merely prohibited to be sacrificed prohibit other animals in any amount.

The Gemara asks: But we already learn in a mishna (Zevaḥim 71a) the halakha of an animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality, and the other examples listed in the mishna here as well: If sacrificial animals were intermingled with an animal that copulated with a person, or with an animal that was the object of bestiality, or with the set-aside, with the animal worshipped, or with one of the other animals mentioned here, they shall graze until they become unfit for sacrifice and then sold, and from the money received the owner shall bring another offering with the monetary value of the higher-quality animal among them from the same species as the offering with which they were intermingled. This indicates that even in the case of an animal that may not be sacrificed, but from which one may derive benefit, it nevertheless renders other animals prohibited when intermingled.

Rav Kahana said: I said this halakha before Rav Shimi bar Ashi, and he said to me that it was necessary for the mishna here to repeat this ruling. The reason is that one mishna is referring to a case where the previously fit animals became intermingled while they were still non-sacred, and their owners subsequently consecrated them. And the other mishna in Zevaḥim is referring to a situation where they became intermingled when they were already consecrated, as can be inferred from the opening phrase of that mishna: All the offerings (Zevaḥim 70b), which indicates that they are already offerings.

The Gemara adds: And both mishnayot are necessary, as had the tanna taught us this halakha only with regard to sacrificial animals, one might say that the reason is because they are repulsive, i.e., when the sacrificial animals became intermingled with the other animals they were immediately disqualified from being sacrificed on the altar. But with regard to animals that became intermingled when they were still non-sacred, at which stage they are not considered repulsive to the altar, as the altar does not yet have a claim to them, one might say: Let them be nullified in the mixture, after which all the animals could be dedicated to the altar. Therefore, the mishna here teaches that even if the animals became intermingled when they were non-sacred, nevertheless the entire mixture is prohibited.

The Gemara asks: But we also learn this halakha, that the entire mixture is prohibited with regard to non-sacred items, in another mishna (Avoda Zara 74a): And these are items that are prohibited in themselves and that deem other items prohibited if they became intermingled with them in any amount: Wine used for a libation in idol worship, and an object of idol worship, and birds for the purification of a leper (see Leviticus 14:1–6), and hides with a tear opposite the heart, a sign of the practice of sacrificing hearts of live animals for idol worship.

And in addition, the shaved-off hair of a nazirite (Numbers 6:18); and a firstborn donkey (Exodus 13:13); and meat that was cooked in milk (Exodus 23:19; 34:26; Deuteronomy 14:21), and an ox that is to be stoned; and a heifer whose neck is broken as part of the ritual performed when a murder victim’s body is found outside a town, and it is not known who caused his death (Deuteronomy 21:1–9); and non-sacred meat from an animal that was slaughtered in the Temple courtyard, and the scapegoat of Yom Kippur (Leviticus 16:7–10), all of these are prohibited in themselves and they deem mixtures prohibited in any amount.

Once again the Gemara answers that both mishnayot are necessary, as had the tanna taught us this halakha only there, in tractate Avoda Zara, one would have said that it is only in that case, where they are items from which deriving benefit is prohibited, that they are not nullified; but here, let them be nullified.

And had the tanna taught us this halakha only here, I would have said that the mixture is prohibited in this case, as this mishna is dealing with offerings that have been rendered repulsive to the Most High. But with regard to use by an ordinary person [hedyot], say: Let these other items from which deriving benefit is prohibited be nullified by a majority. Therefore, the mishna in Avoda Zara teaches us that even items not designated for use upon the altar render other items prohibited, and are not nullified by a majority.

§ The mishna’s list of disqualified animals includes an animal that copulated with a person, and an animal that was the object of bestiality. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that these animals are prohibited as offerings to the Most High? The Gemara answers that this is as the Sages taught with regard to the verse: “You shall bring your offering from the cattle, even from the herd or from the flock” (Leviticus 1:2). The limitation indicated by the phrase “from the cattle” serves to exclude an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality from eligibility as an offering.

The Gemara objects: That claim requires elucidation, as couldn’t this be derived through an a fortiori inference: And if a blemished animal, with which no transgression was committed, is disqualified from the altar, with regard to an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality, with which a transgression was committed, is it not logical that they should be prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar?

The Gemara explains: The case of one who violates the prohibition of plowing with an ox and a donkey together (Deuteronomy 22:10) shall prove that the above claim is invalid. This is a case where a transgression was committed with the ox, and yet it is permitted to sacrifice it upon the altar.

The Gemara rejects this response: What is notable about the prohibition of one who plows with an ox and a donkey? It is notable in that one is not liable to die for this violation, and therefore it is logical that this ox is not prohibited to be sacrificed. Will you say the same with regard to the prohibitions of an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality, where the person involved is liable to die? Therefore, the animals should be prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar.

The Gemara explains that this claim is indeed valid, and therefore you should retract from that which you cited as a refutation of the a fortiori inference. In other words, one can learn by a fortiori inference that an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality cannot be used as offerings. Nevertheless, this is applicable only to those animals with which a transgression was committed that was seen by two witnesses, and the transgressor was therefore liable to death by the court, as in this case the proof from one who plows with an ox and a donkey is invalid, as explained in the previous paragraph.

From where is it derived that the same applies if a transgression was committed with them on the basis of the testimony of one witness or on the basis of the admission of the owners? For this purpose, the interpretation of the phrase “from the cattle” is necessary.

Rabbi Shimon says: I infer an a fortiori inference in the following manner: And if a blemished animal, concerning which the testimony of two witnesses does not disqualify it from being eaten by an ordinary person, and nevertheless the admission of one witness, i.e., the Sage who rules that its blemish disqualifies it for the altar, disqualifies it from sacrifice, with regard to an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality, concerning which the admission of two witnesses disqualifies it from being eaten by an ordinary person, is it not logical that the admission of one witness should disqualify it from sacrifice?

Therefore, the verse states: “From the cattle,” to exclude an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality from eligibility as offerings. The Gemara asks: But why is this derivation necessary? This halakha was just inferred through an a fortiori inference, by Rabbi Shimon. The Gemara explains that in fact the halakha of an animal that copulated with a person and an animal that was the object of bestiality cannot be inferred by a fortiori inference according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Shimon.