and afterward his wife, who was the daughter of the father-in-law, died, which means that the witness is no longer related to the party involved; or when he was able to hear, and then became a deaf-mute, and again became able to hear; or when he could see, and subsequently became blind, and afterward could see again; or when he was halakhically competent, and then became an imbecile, and again became halakhically competent; in all these cases he is fit to testify.This is the principle: Any individual whose beginning and end is in a state of qualification to serve as a witness is qualified to testify, even if he was unfit in the interim. Evidently, it is not derived from the verse: “And he is a witness,” that the witness must be fit from the beginning to the end.

The Gemara explains: The halakha is different there, with regard to testimony, as the verse states: “He is a witness, whether he has seen…if he does not utter” (Leviticus 5:1). This formulation indicates that the Merciful One renders the matter of testimony dependent on seeing and recounting the content of his testimony. And in this instance there is both valid seeing and valid recounting, despite the fact that the witness was disqualified in the interim. The Gemara asks: But if so, why do I need the exclusion of the verse: “And he is a witness”?

The Gemara answers: The limiting clause is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: If someone saw a crowd of people standing, and his witnesses were among them, and he said: I hereby administer an oath to you, if you know any testimony relating to me, that you will come and testify for me, one might have thought that this form of address suffices to single out the witnesses. This would mean that if the witnesses take a false oath that they do not know testimony with regard to the person who addressed them, they would be obligated to bring an offering of an oath of testimony. Therefore, the verse states: “And he is a witness,” to emphasize that the offering applies only to one who is singled out as a witness, and in this case the individual did not single out his witnesses, as he addressed a whole crowd of people. Consequently, the witnesses are exempt.

The baraita continues: One might have thought that even if this individual said to the crowd: I adjure whoever knows testimony relating to me that he will come and testify for me, that even in the case of this more specific address the witnesses are likewise exempt from the offering of an oath of testimony. Therefore, the verse states: “And he is a witness,” and by clarifying his appeal the individual did single out his witnesses. Consequently, in this situation the witnesses would be obligated to bring the offering.

§ The mishna teaches: But with regard to the offerings of a leper that is not so. If the leper is destitute, even if his father died and left him ten thousand dinars, the Temple treasury has no share in it. The Gemara raises a difficulty: If his father already died and left him ten thousand dinars, he is wealthy. How could he be considered destitute at all? Rabbi Abbahu said that one should say instead: His father is dying and leaving him ten thousand dinars, but he has not yet died.

The Gemara raises a further difficulty: If so, it is obvious that with regard to the Temple treasury he remains destitute, as at the time he is in fact destitute. The Gemara answers: The halakha was stated with regard to a case where his father is moribund. Lest you say that as the majority of moribund people proceed to die the son should be considered wealthy even before the father dies, the mishna therefore teaches us that the son retains his status as destitute until the father actually dies.

The mishna likewise teaches: If his ship is at sea and merchandise valued at ten thousand dinars is coming into his possession, this money is not taken into consideration by the Temple treasury. The Gemara asks: But isn’t he wealthy? Rav Ḥisda said: The mishna is referring to a case where his ship was leased or rented to others, and therefore the merchandise it contains belongs to someone else. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there the rent money that will be paid to the leper? The Gemara answers: Rent is paid only at the end of the rental period, which means that the owner is destitute in the meantime.

The Gemara raises another difficulty: But let the mishna derive and determine that the leper is wealthy due to the fact that he owns a ship. The Gemara answers: In accordance with whose opinion is this statement in the mishna? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains that with regard to determining one’s obligation to bring an offering as a wealthy or destitute individual, the property that he uses for business is not taken into account. As we learned in a mishna (23b): When someone’s property is repossessed in order to pay his debt to the Temple treasury, Rabbi Eliezer says: If he was a farmer, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his pair of oxen with which he plows the field. If he was a donkey driver, the treasurer gives him permission to keep his donkey.

MISHNA: The sum fixed by the Torah based on the years of age is in accordance with the age of the subject of the vow; how so? A youth who valuated an elder gives the valuation of an elder, and an elder who valuated a youth gives the valuation of a youth. And the distinction based on sex that is written in the halakhot of valuations is stated with regard to the one valuated; how so? A man who valuated a woman gives the valuation of a woman, and a woman who valuated a man gives the valuation of a man.

And the different valuation based on the age of the one valuated is determined at the time one takes the vow of valuation; how so? If one valuated another when he was less than five years old, when his valuation is five shekels, and before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow became more than five years old, when his valuation is ten shekels; or if one valuated another when he was less than twenty years old, when his valuation is ten shekels, and before payment to the Temple treasury the subject of the vow became more than twenty years old, when his valuation is fifty shekels, in all these cases he gives payment according to the age of the subject of the valuation at the time of the valuation.

GEMARA: With regard to the statement of the mishna: And the valuation is determined at the time one takes the vow of valuation, the Sages taught in a baraita: You have compared pledges of assessments for the Temple treasury, i.e., one who takes a vow to donate a certain person’s assessment, to vows of valuations. This comparison applies with regard to a pearl belonging to light people, i.e., the poor. In other words, just as the assessment of a pearl is determined by the pearl’s location in a village of the poor rather than by the potential price of the pearl in the city market, so too, the valuation of a person is determined at the time of the valuation. And similarly, the comparison teaches that the court is required to assess the value of the limb by its significance, i.e., in the case of a limb that is vital to one’s survival, the valuation of the limb is equivalent to the valuation of the whole person.

One might have thought that we should compare valuations to assessments in that the one pledging must give a person’s valuation not corresponding to his value at the time of the pledge but in accordance with his value at the time of giving, as is the case with regard to vows of assessments. To counter this suggestion the verse states: “According to your valuation it shall stand” (Leviticus 27:17), which teaches that the one making the valuation gives his donation only according to the valuation of the person at the time of the valuation, as stated in the mishna.

MISHNA: The Torah provides three age categories that determine the amount of the valuation: From the age of one month until age five, from age five until age twenty, and from age twenty until age sixty. For anyone less than one month old there is no valuation. The halakhic status of the thirtieth day is like that of the period preceding thirty days, and therefore the one who took the vow is exempt. Likewise, the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them. As it is stated: “And if it is from sixty years old and upward” (Leviticus 27:7), and we derive all the other age categories from the sixtieth year: Just as the halakhic status of the sixtieth year, where upward is written, is like that of the period preceding it, so too, the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them.

The mishna asks: Is that so? Can one derive a halakha in this manner? If the Torah rendered the halakhic status of the sixtieth year like that of the period preceding it in order to be stringent and require one who valuated a sixty-year-old person to pay his valuation to the Temple treasury, shall we render the halakhic status of the fifth year and the twentieth year like that of the period preceding them in order to be lenient and pay a lower sum?

Therefore, the verse states “year” with regard to the fifth and twentieth years (see Leviticus 27:3–6), and “year” with regard to the sixtieth year (Leviticus 27:7), for a verbal analogy. Just as the halakhic status of the year stated with regard to the sixtieth year is like that of the period preceding it, so too, the halakhic status of the year stated with regard to the fifth year and the twentieth year is like that of the period preceding them, both in order to be lenient and in order to be stringent. Rabbi Eliezer says: Their halakhic status remains like that of the period preceding it, until they will be aged one month and one day beyond the fifth, twentieth, and sixtieth years.

GEMARA: The Gemara notes: Evidently, the verbal analogy in the mishna is free, i.e., in each verse the word “year” is superfluous, and therefore can be used in the verbal analogy. This means that the halakha derived from the verbal analogy is considered as though it is written explicitly in the Torah. The significance of this fact is that if a verbal analogy is not free, it can be refuted by logical reasoning. In this case the refutation would be as we refuted it in the mishna, that if the fifth year and the twentieth year are considered the same as the respective periods preceding them, this generates a leniency. The Gemara confirms: The verbal analogy is free, as both the first written mention of “year” and the second written mention of “year” are superfluous.

The Gemara suggests: Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as, if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, doesn’t he say that the word “until” means until and including? With regard to valuations, the Torah states: “From twenty years old until sixty years old…And if it is from five years old until twenty years old…And if it is from one month old until five years old” (Leviticus 27:3–6). Accordingly, in the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi there should be no need for a verbal analogy to include the fifth year and the twentieth year in the periods preceding them.

The Gemara provides the source of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s opinion. As it is taught in a baraita concerning the festival of Passover: The verse states: “For whoever eats leavened bread from the first day until the seventh day” (Exodus 12:15). One might have thought that the prohibition against eating leaven applies from the first day and onward but the first day is not included, and likewise that the prohibition continues until the seventh day but the seventh day is not included.