the head of a pigeon burnt offering that does not have on it an olive-bulk of flesh, but the salt that adheres to it, after it was salted in accordance with the requirement to salt it (see Leviticus 2:13), completes the measure to make an olive-bulk, what is the halakha? Is one liable for offering it up outside?

Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi: Is this not identical to the dispute between Rabbi Yoḥanan and Reish Lakish with regard to a bone attached to sacrificial flesh? Rav Ashi responded: No. The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan and the dilemma can be raised according to Reish Lakish.

The Gemara elaborates: The dilemma can be raised according to Rabbi Yoḥanan: Perhaps Rabbi Yoḥanan states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it contributes to the measure of an olive-bulk as it is of the same kind that flesh is, i.e., they are both animal parts. But in the case of salt, which is not of the same kind as a pigeon, perhaps it would not contribute to the measure. And the dilemma can also be raised according to Reish Lakish: Perhaps Reish Lakish states his opinion only there, with regard to a bone, claiming that it does not contribute to the measure of an olive-bulk, as if the bone separates from the flesh, there is no mitzva to offer the bone up on the altar. But here, with regard to salt, concerning which if it separates from the pigeon there is a mitzva to offer it up, he would not rule as he does concerning a bone attached to flesh. Or perhaps there is no difference between the cases.

The Gemara concludes: The dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna teaches: Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: If he slaughtered an offering inside the courtyard and then offered it up outside the courtyard, he is liable. But if he slaughtered it outside, thereby rendering it unfit, and then he offered it up outside, he is exempt for the offering up, as he offered up only an item that is unfit, and one is liable only for offering up an item that is fit to be offered up inside the Temple. The Rabbis said to him: According to your reasoning, even in a case where he slaughters it inside and offers it up outside, he should be exempt, since he rendered it unfit the moment that he took it outside the courtyard. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for offering it up. So too, one who slaughters an offering outside and then offers it up outside is liable.

While a defense of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion is not presented in the mishna, various possibilities are recorded in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that the offering had a period of fitness. Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the offering never had a period of fitness? It was disqualified as soon as it was slaughtered and so it is reasonable that one is not liable for offering it up.

Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, responded to this challenge on behalf of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili: What is notable about slaughtering an offering inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside? It is notable in that even though the offering was taken outside the courtyard and thereby disqualified, if it is, albeit unlawfully, placed on the altar, the sanctity of the altar renders the offering acceptable and it should not be removed from the altar because the disqualification occurred in sanctity, i.e., during the course of the Temple service (see 84a). Can you say the same about slaughtering an offering outside and then offering it up outside, where the disqualification did not occur in sanctity and so the sanctity of the altar does not render the offering acceptable? Therefore, even if it were placed there, it must be removed.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two responses? Ze’eiri said: The practical difference between them is a case of slaughtering an offering at night inside the courtyard and then offering it up outside. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s response, one would be exempt, as slaughtering at night disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

Rabba said: The practical difference between them is a case in which, after slaughtering the offering in the courtyard, the collection of the blood was done there in a non-sacred vessel and then the animal was offered up outside the courtyard. According to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s defense, one would be exempt, as collecting the blood in a non-sacred vessel disqualifies the offering from its very outset; whereas according to the response of Rabbi Elazar, one would be liable as this is a disqualification that occurs in sanctity.

§ The mishna teaches: One who is ritually impure who ate sacrificial food, whether it was ritually impure sacrificial food or ritually pure sacrificial food, is liable to receive karet if he did so intentionally, and to bring a sliding-scale offering if he did so unwittingly. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: An impure person who ate pure sacrificial food is liable. But an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is exempt, as he merely ate an impure item, and the prohibition against eating sacrificial food while one is impure applies only to pure sacrificial food. The Rabbis said to him: According to your logic, even in a case of an impure person who ate what had been pure sacrificial food, once he has touched it, he has thereby rendered it ritually impure. Yet, in such a case, he is certainly liable for eating it. So too, an impure person who ate impure sacrificial food is liable.

The Gemara notes: The Rabbis are saying well to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili; why does Rabbi Yosei HaGelili disagree?

Rava said in elaboration of the dispute: Wherever one is first rendered impure with impurity of the body and then afterward the sacrificial meat is rendered impure, everyone agrees that he is liable if he eats the meat. This is because the prohibition due to the impurity of one’s body, which carries the punishment of karet, took effect while the meat was still ritually pure, and so this prohibition is not abrogated even when the meat is later rendered impure.

When they disagree is in a case where first the meat is rendered impure and then afterward the person’s body is rendered impure. In general, once an item has become subject to a prohibition, it cannot then become subject to an additional prohibition. In this case, once the meat is rendered impure, it is prohibited for anyone to eat it, even if that person is ritually pure. If that person is later rendered impure, the meat should not become subject to the additional prohibition against a ritually impure person eating sacrificial meat.

Rava explains that Rabbi Yosei HaGelili and the Rabbis disagree as to whether this case is an exception to that principle, as the Rabbis hold that we say that since the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of one’s body is a more inclusive prohibition, as it prohibits that person from eating all sacrificial meat, both pure and impure, it therefore takes effect also with regard to this meat, even though it was already rendered impure before the person was. And Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition, it takes effect.

The Gemara asks: But even according to Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, granted that we do not say that since it is a more inclusive prohibition it will take effect. But still, the prohibition due to the impurity of a person’s body, which is a more stringent prohibition as it carries the punishment of karet, should come and take effect upon the prohibition due to the ritual impurity of the meat itself, as that prohibition is less stringent as it carries only the punishment of lashes. One exception to the principle that a second prohibition does not take effect is that even if an item or person is already subject to a prohibition, a more stringent prohibition will still take effect with regard to it.

Rav Ashi said: From where is it apparent that the prohibition due to the impurity of the person’s body is more stringent? Perhaps the prohibition due to the impurity of the meat is more stringent, as impure meat does not have the possibility of purification in a ritual bath, whereas a ritually impure person does. Since the prohibition due to the person’s impurity is not more stringent in every regard, it cannot take effect upon meat that is already prohibited due to its own impurity.

MISHNA: There is a greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside the Temple courtyard than with regard to offering up outside, and there is a greater stringency with regard to offering up outside than with regard to slaughtering outside.

The mishna elaborates: The greater stringency with regard to slaughtering outside is that one who slaughters an offering outside the Temple courtyard even for the sake of an ordinary purpose, not for the sake of God, is liable. But one who offers up an offering outside the courtyard for the sake of an ordinary purpose is exempt. The greater stringency with regard to offering up outside is that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are exempt. But if two grasped a limb from an offering and together offered it up outside, they are liable.

If one unwittingly offered up part of an offering outside the courtyard and then in a different lapse of awareness offered up other parts of that offering and then again, in another lapse of awareness, offered up yet other parts, he is liable to bring a sin offering for each act of offering up; this is the statement of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Yosei says: He is liable to bring only one sin offering.

Rabbi Yosei adds: And one is liable for offering up an offering outside the courtyard only once he offers it up at the top of an altar that was erected there. Rabbi Shimon says: Even if he offered it up on a rock or on a stone, not an altar, he is liable.

GEMARA: The Gemara analyzes the first halakha of the mishna: What is different about one who offers up outside for the sake of an ordinary purpose, that he is exempt? As it is written: “And he will not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting, to sacrifice it to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:9), which indicates that the liability applies only to offering up for the sake of the Lord. The Gemara questions this: But with regard to slaughtering, isn’t it also written: “Or that slaughters it outside the camp, and he did not bring it to the entrance of the Tent of Meeting to sacrifice an offering to the Lord” (Leviticus 17:3–4)?

The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that slaughters it outside the camp” (Leviticus 17:3). The amplification indicated by the phrase “ish ish” teaches that one is liable even for slaughtering for the sake of an ordinary purpose. The Gemara challenges: But also with regard to offering up it is written: “Any man [ish ish] of the house of Israel…that offers up a burnt offering” (Leviticus 17:8). The Gemara explains: That amplification is necessary to teach that two people who offered up a limb of an offering together outside the courtyard are liable.

The Gemara asks: If so, here too, with regard to slaughtering, the phrase “ish ish” should be used to teach that two people who grasped a knife and together slaughtered an offering outside the courtyard are liable, contrary to the ruling of the mishna. Why are the two parallel phrases expounded in different ways? The Gemara explains: It is different there, with regard to slaughtering, as the verse states: “And that man shall be cut off from among his people” (Leviticus 17:4). The term “that man,” which is in the singular, indicates that only one who acts alone is liable, but not two who act together.

The Gemara challenges: But if so, also with regard to offering up, isn’t it written: “That man shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 17:9)? Why isn’t that term also expounded to teach that only one who acts alone is liable? The Gemara explains: That term is necessary