according to the statement of Rabbi Shimon, they may not be redeemed as long as they are unblemished, since they retain the status of offerings. But according to the statement of the Rabbis, they may be redeemed even when they are unblemished, as the court initially stipulates that if they are not needed they will not assume the status of an offering. Apparently Rabbi Shimon does not accept the notion that the court can stipulate that there be a delay in the consecration of communal offerings, and the baraita can be adduced as evidence that offerings atone for transgressions committed after their designation as offerings.

And furthermore, continued Rav Yosef, son of Rav Shmuel, one can otherwise infer from the goats sacrificed on Shavuot that an offering can atone for transgressions committed after designation; as Rabbi Yirmeya asked Rabbi Zeira: If the goats sacrificed on Shavuot were slaughtered simultaneously and their blood was collected in two cups, and the blood of the first goat was sprinkled, for what sin is the second goat brought? There was no time in the interim for other transgressions to occur. Rabbi Zeira answered: It atones for any incident involving impurity that occurred between the sprinkling of the blood of that first goat and the sprinkling of the blood of this second goat.

One can infer: Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemma only about whether or not an offering atones for the violation of a positive mitzva committed after its slaughter and before the sprinkling of the blood. But with regard to the violation of a positive mitzva that one committed after the designation of the offering, before its slaughter, he did not raise the dilemma. Apparently, it was obvious to him that the offering atones for such a violation.

The Gemara rejects this proof: Perhaps Rabbi Yirmeya’s dilemma was also with regard to the violations committed after designation. He phrased his question to apply to violations committed after slaughter because he was saying: Even if you say that an offering atones for violations committed after designation, does it atone for those violations committed after slaughter? It may be that neither issue was clear to him.

§ It was stated with regard to a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering: Rabba says that it is fit and satisfies its owner’s obligation, and Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit in this regard.

Rabba says it is fit because the thanks offering was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering. Rav Ḥisda says it is unfit because it must be slaughtered for the sake of his own peace offering.

Rabba said: From where do I say that it is fit? It is as it is taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And the meat of the sacrifice of his thanksgiving peace offering…on the day that he presents his offering it shall be eaten” (Leviticus 7:15–16). Abba Ḥanin said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The verse comes to teach that a thanks offering that one slaughtered for the sake of a peace offering is fit, whereas a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit. And what is the difference between this offering and that offering? A thanks offering is called a peace offering in the verse, but a peace offering is not called a thanks offering.

Rabba explains: The baraita indicates that a peace offering that was slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, but a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of some other thanks offering is fit. What, is it not referring to the thanks offering of another, teaching that it satisfies its owner’s obligation?

The Gemara responds: No, it is referring to another thanks offering of his own, which he designated to give thanks for another incident of deliverance.

The Gemara asks: But if one slaughtered his thanks offering for the sake of another’s thanks offering, what is the halakha? Is it unfit, i.e., it does it not satisfy the owner’s obligation? If so, rather than teaching that a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit, let the baraita teach that a thanks offering that was slaughtered for the sake of another’s thanks offering is unfit, and one could infer that all the more so a peace offering slaughtered for the sake of a thanks offering is unfit.

The Gemara answers: It was necessary for the baraita to specify a case where a peace offering was slaughtered for the sake of his own thanks offering. Otherwise, it might enter your mind to say that since a thanks offering is called a peace offering, a peace offering is called a thanks offering as well, and therefore when one slaughters a peace offering for the sake of a thanks offering it should be fit. Therefore the baraita teaches us that this is not the case.

§ Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for the sake of another sin offering he was obligated to bring is fit; but if one slaughtered it for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

What is the reason for this distinction? The Merciful One states in the Torah: “And slaughter it for a sin offering” (Leviticus 4:33), and therefore, as long as the sin offering was slaughtered for the sake of a sin offering, even another sin offering, it is fit. But if it was slaughtered for the sake of a burnt offering it is unfit.

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner, but who nevertheless was obligated to bring a sin offering, is unfit. But if one slaughtered it for one who was obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit.

What is the reason for this distinction? The Torah states: “And he shall be forgiven” (Leviticus 4:26), indicating that it must be specifically he, the owner, who shall be forgiven, and not another person. The other person to whom this is referring, with regard to whom the offering is disqualified, is presumably similar to the owner in that he is also obligated to achieve atonement similar to the owner’s by bringing a sin offering. Whereas if the other person is obligated to bring a burnt offering, and not a sin offering, this disqualification does not apply.

And Rava says: A sin offering that one slaughtered for a person who is not obligated to bring anything is unfit, as there is no person among the Jewish people who is not obligated to bring an offering for violating a positive mitzva. Therefore, the one for whom he slaughtered the offering is considered one who was obligated to bring a sin offering.

And Rava says that a sin offering atones for those obligated to bring a burnt offering for violating a positive mitzva, due to an a fortiori inference: If a sin offering atones for those who are liable for transgressions for which one receives excision from the World-to-Come if he performs them intentionally, all the more so is it not clear that it atones for those liable for failing to fulfill a positive mitzva?

The Gemara asks: Is this to say that the violation of a positive mitzva is of the same type as the sins atoned for by a sin offering? But doesn’t Rava say that a sin offering that one slaughtered for a person other than its owner but who was obligated to bring a sin offering is unfit, but if it was slaughtered for a person who is obligated to bring a burnt offering, it is fit, as he is not obligated to provide a similar atonement? Given that burnt offerings atone for violations of positive mitzvot, apparently such atonement is of a different type than atonement for the transgression of prohibitions.