And what does it mean that the stolen object is not subject to restitution? It means that it is not subject to the halakhot of restitution, because it is not technically a theft.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of that halakhic statement: If another descendant of Noah came and took the stolen item from him, he is also executed for it. Granted, with regard to the first clause it can be explained that although there is no obligation to return the item, the gentile is executed because he caused the Jew distress; but with regard to the latter clause, what did he do? He did not cause the Jew distress, and since the item is worth less than one peruta, one is not obligated to return it unless he stole it from a gentile. Consequently, the second theft should not be considered a legally significant act.

Rather, should one not conclude from it that one pulling an item acquires it in a transaction performed by a gentile? Accordingly, the actions of both the first and second gentiles are legally significant acts of theft, for which they are liable to be executed. The Gemara affirms: Conclude from it that this is so.

§ The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I sell this land, I will sell it to you, and they performed a formal act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person. Rav Yosef said: The first one has acquired it.

Abaye said to him: But he did not fix a price with him for it. And from where do you say that wherever the people involved in the transaction did not fix a price, the buyer has not acquired the item, even if they performed a formal act of acquisition? It is from that which we learned in the mishna: In the case of a Jew who sells his wine to a gentile, if he fixed a price before he measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, deriving benefit from the money paid for the wine is permitted. But if the Jew measured the wine into the gentile’s vessel, thereby rendering it forbidden, before he fixed a price, the money paid for the wine is forbidden.

The Gemara asks: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The Gemara interjects: What is meant by the question: What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter? The conclusion is as we have stated, that it is evident from the mishna that the acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed. The Gemara explains its question: Perhaps due to the stringency of the prohibition of wine used for a libation, the case of the mishna is different and is not characteristic of the halakha in monetary matters.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof that an acquisition goes into effect only after the price is fixed, as Rav Idi bar Avin said: There was an incident that came before the school of Rav Ḥisda, and Rav Ḥisda brought it before the school of Rav Huna, and Rav Huna resolved it from that which we learned in a baraita: If one bought from another produce that was loaded on the seller’s donkeys or carried by his laborers, and the purchaser drew the seller’s donkey drivers or laborers laden with produce and brought them into his house, in this case, whether the seller fixed a price before he measured the produce or whether he measured the produce before he fixed a price, the purchaser has not acquired the produce, and both of them, the purchaser or the seller, can retract the transaction, as no act of acquisition took place.

The baraita continues: But if the purchaser unloaded the produce and brought it into his house, this constitutes an act of acquisition, and therefore if he fixed a price before he measured the produce, neither of them can retract, but if he measured the produce before he fixed a price, both of them can retract. This illustrates that even if there was an act of acquisition, they can retract the transaction until the price has been fixed, in accordance with the statement of Abaye.

§ There was a related incident involving a certain man who said to another: If I will desire to sell this land, I will sell it to you for one hundred dinars, and they performed an act of acquisition to ratify the agreement. He went and sold it to another person for one hundred and twenty dinars. Rav Kahana said: The first one has acquired it. Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod objects to this: Those twenty additional dinars compelled him to sell it to the second purchaser. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Ya’akov of Nehar Pekod.

§ If the seller said to the purchaser: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, even if two out of the three agreed to a certain assessment, the seller must accept this price. If he said: I will sell you this merchandise in accordance with the price that is stated by three people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all three. If he said: As it is assessed by four people, he is not held to their assessment unless it is stated by all four; and all the more so in a case where he said to him: In accordance with the price that is stated by four people.

If the seller said to the buyer: I will sell you this merchandise as it is assessed by three people, and three people came and assessed it, and the other one, the purchaser, said: Let three other people, who are more proficient in their assessment, come and assess the merchandise, Rav Pappa said: The halakha is that he can prevent the price from being set until more proficient people assess the merchandise. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, objects to this: From where can he know that those other three are more proficient in their assessment? Perhaps these, the first three, are more proficient. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua.

MISHNA: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug, if there is a remnant of wine left in the funnel, the wine measured into the Jew’s jug is forbidden, as some of the wine that was measured into the gentile’s jug is mixed in it. In the case of one who pours wine from one vessel into another vessel, the wine left in the vessel from which he poured is permitted, but the wine in the vessel into which he poured is forbidden.

GEMARA: We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Teharot 8:9): A stream of water, and water descending an incline [vehakatafres], and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity. These liquids do not constitute a connection that transmits impurity, e.g., if impure water is in one place and becomes attached to water above it, the water above is not considered attached to the impure water and is not rendered impure. They also do not constitute a connection for purification, e.g., if two collections of water are attached via the pouring of a stream, they do not join together to form the amount of water necessary to form a valid ritual bath, through which people and items can become ritually pure. A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity.

Rav Huna says: A stream of water, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist constitute a connection with regard to the matter of wine used for a libation.

Rav Naḥman said to Rav Huna: From where do you derive this? If we say it is derived from that which we learned in the mishna: A stream, and water descending an incline, and liquid that rendered an item moist do not constitute a connection between liquids, neither with regard to ritual impurity nor with regard to purity, and it is inferred that it is with regard to impurity and with regard to purity that it does not constitute a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it does constitute a connection, then say the latter clause: A pond constitutes a connection between liquids with regard to impurity and with regard to purity. It can be inferred from here that with regard to impurity and with regard to purity it is a connection, but with regard to wine used for a libation it is not a connection, contrary to the halakha inferred from the former clause. Rather, clearly no inference is to be learned from this mishna.

The Gemara attempts to bring proof for Rav Huna’s opinion from that which we learned in the mishna here: In a case where a Jew took a funnel and measured wine into a gentile’s jug, and then measured wine with the same funnel into a Jew’s jug,