But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden because the offspring were involved in the act of bestiality, albeit in their fetal state. And here too, the case of the wheat is similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, because the flour was also worshipped, albeit in the form of a stalk of wheat.

There are those who say that Mar Zutra himself quoted Rav Naḥman’s statement: The dispute is with regard to a case where it became prohibited to use the animals as offerings because a person engaged in bestiality with them and later they became pregnant. But if they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them, all agree that the offspring are forbidden. And these stalks of wheat, as well, are similar to the case where they became pregnant and later a person engaged in bestiality with them.

The Gemara asks: How can these cases be compared? There, in the case of offspring that it is prohibited to bring as an offering, it was initially an animal, in its fetal state, and now it is still an animal. A fetus is treated as a full-fledged animal, and the opening of the womb is compared to a closed door that holds it in its place. Here, in the case of the flour, it was initially wheat and now it is flour; it is in a totally new form. Therefore, no proof can be derived from the mishna.

§ Reish Lakish raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a palm tree, what is the halakha with regard to its lulav? Is it permitted to use a lulav cut from it for the mitzva or not?

The Gemara narrows down the dilemma: With regard to a tree that one initially planted for such an idolatrous purpose, do not raise the dilemma. In that case the halakha is clear, as it is prohibited to use it even for an ordinary, non-mitzva, purpose. Rather, raise the dilemma with regard to a tree that one planted and subsequently worshipped.

And do not raise the dilemma according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who holds that even for an ordinary purpose it is forbidden (see 45b). Rather, when should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that such a tree does not become forbidden: What is the halakha with regard to using a lulav from such a worshipped tree for a mitzva? Is it nevertheless forbidden because it is considered repulsive to use such a lulav for the Most High, i.e., for a mitzva, or not?

When Rav Dimi came from Eretz Yisrael to Babylonia, he presented a different understanding of Reish Lakish’s dilemma. He said: Reish Lakish raises the dilemma with regard to an ashera whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked. His dilemma is as follows: Is there disqualification with regard to mitzvot or is there no disqualification with regard to mitzvot? This lulav was once unfit for the mitzva, since it was worshipped while attached to the tree. Is it permanently disqualified, i.e., can it never be rendered fit? Or is the halakha that there is no permanent disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and consequently when the tree’s status as an object of idol worship was revoked, the lulav became fit for the mitzva?

The Gemara suggests: Resolve the dilemma from that which we learned in a mishna (Ḥullin 37a): With regard to one who slaughtered an undomesticated animal or a bird and is obligated to cover the blood, if he covered the blood and it was then uncovered he is exempt from the obligation to cover it a second time. But if the wind blew dust and covered the blood and no person was involved, he is obligated to cover it. And Rabba bar bar Ḥana says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The mishna taught that one is obligated to cover the blood after the wind covered it only in a case where the blood was then exposed. But if it was not then exposed, he is exempt from the obligation to cover it.

And we discussed this issue and asked: When the blood was then exposed, what of it? Why is one obligated to cover it a second time? Once it was disqualified, it should remain disqualified. When the wind covered the blood, the person was exempted from covering the blood. If so, even if the blood is subsequently uncovered, he should remain exempt. Why, then, is he obligated to cover the blood in that case?

And Rav Pappa says: That is to say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. Once the cause of the exemption from the obligation is removed, one is once again obligated to fulfill the mitzva. If so, Reish Lakish’s dilemma is resolved.

The Gemara rejects this suggestion: It is with regard to Rav Pappa’s resolution itself that Reish Lakish raised the dilemma. Is it obvious to Rav Pappa, based on the discussion with regard to the blood, that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot; and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to leniency, as in the case of the worshipped tree whose status as an object of idol worship was revoked, thereby permitting its lulav branch to be used for a mitzva, and there is no difference whether that ruling leads to stringency, as in the case of the blood, where one is obligated to cover it anew?

Or perhaps is he uncertain, and therefore, when that ruling leads to stringency, we say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot, and one must perform the mitzva. But when that ruling leads to leniency, we do not say that there is no disqualification with regard to mitzvot. The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.

§ Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to an animal, what is the halakha with regard to its wool? May it be used for the sky-blue wool?

The Gemara asks: The sky-blue wool in question is for which mitzva? If it is the sky-blue wool for the ritual garments worn by priests, then Rav Pappa’s dilemma is the same as the dilemma raised by Rami bar Ḥama earlier (46b) with regard to the use in the Temple of worshipped items that have since changed in form. And if the sky-blue wool in question is for the mitzva of ritual fringes, this is the same as the dilemma raised by Reish Lakish with regard to the use of a branch of a worshipped palm tree for performing the mitzva of lulav.

The Gemara answers: Yes, it is indeed so that Rav Pappa did not need to raise this dilemma, as it was previously addressed. And the reason that he raises this dilemma is due to other matters that he needed to clarify, concerning the use of parts of a worshipped animal in the Levites’ ritual song. With regard to its wool, what is the halakha concerning using it for sky-blue wool used in the performance of a mitzva? With regard to its horns, what is the halakha concerning their use for trumpets? With regard to the bones of its thighs, what is the halakha concerning their use for flutes? With regard to its innards, what is the halakha concerning their use for harp strings [leforot]?

According to the opinion of the one who says that the primary element of song in the Temple is the accompaniment by musical instruments, do not raise the dilemma, as it is certain that use of a worshipped animal is prohibited, because the musical instruments are items used to facilitate an offering.

When should you raise the dilemma? Raise it according to the opinion of the one who says that the primary element of song in the Temple is singing with the mouth, and that the musical instruments are used merely to sweeten the sound, i.e., to accompany and enhance the singing. And accordingly, can one bring musical instruments made of a worshipped animal’s parts, as they are not an essential element of the Temple service? Or perhaps is it nevertheless forbidden since it is repulsive to use such instruments in the course of the Temple service? The Gemara concludes: The question shall stand unresolved.

§ Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of one who bows to a spring of water, what is the halakha with regard to using its water for libations? The Gemara asks: What is the dilemma he is raising? If we say that the dilemma concerns whether he is bowing to his own reflection or perhaps he is bowing to the water, why then is this a dilemma only with regard to libations in the Temple? Let him raise the dilemma with regard to the use of a pail of water that a person bowed to, even for ordinary purposes.

The Gemara answers: Actually, it is clear that he is bowing to the water. And this is the dilemma Rava raises: Is he bowing to the water before him, and therefore it follows that the first waters, i.e., those that were present at the time of his bowing, are gone, and the water that is currently flowing is permitted, or perhaps is he bowing to the flow of the water, which would render it prohibited to use all the water that flows in that spring for libations.

The Gemara asks: And is the water actually rendered forbidden by his worship? But doesn’t Rabbi Yoḥanan say in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yehotzadak: Water that belongs to the public cannot become forbidden? The Gemara answers: No, the dilemma is not with regard to a public spring. Rather, it is necessary with regard to a spring that flows from the ground in one specific location that is privately owned.

MISHNA: In the case of one whose house was adjacent to a house of idol worship and the dividing wall fell, it is prohibited to rebuild it. What should he do? He should withdraw into his own property four cubits and build the wall there.

In talmudic times, external walls to homes were often built in two parts, with a functional space between them. If the space between the two parts of the wall belonged to him and to the house of idol worship,