But the one who teaches it in reference to the latter clause maintains that specifically here, in this case, an oath of inducement is administered to the defendant, as he admits that there is a matter of financial association between them; but there, in the case of the first clause, where the defendant maintains that the claim is baseless, and there is no matter of financial association between them, the court does not administer to him an oath of inducement.

§ The Gemara asks: Practically speaking, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law, i.e., an oath of inducement? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to the transfer of an oath to the other party. In a case where the defendant suggests that instead of taking an oath himself, the claimant should take an oath and collect that which he claims, if the oath is administered by Torah law, we do not transfer the oath to the claimant; the defendant must either take an oath himself or pay. If the oath is administered by rabbinic law, we do transfer the oath.

The Gemara asks: And according to Mar bar Rav Ashi, who says that we transfer an oath that is administered by Torah law as well, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law? The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to whether or not the court enters the property of the defendant to collect payment if he refuses to take an oath. With regard to an oath administered by Torah law, we enter his property, and with regard to an oath administered by rabbinic law, we do not enter his property.

The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference according to Rabbi Yosei, who says that even with regard to a debt that is owed by rabbinic law, we enter the property of the debtor to collect the debt?

As we learned in a mishna (Gittin 59b): A lost item found by a deaf-mute, an imbecile, or a minor is not acquired by him, since he lacks the legal competence to effect acquisition. Nevertheless, taking such an item from him is considered robbery on account of the ways of peace. Although these individuals lack halakhic competence and are unable to acquire lost items by Torah law, taking such items from them is considered robbery. Rabbi Yosei says: This is full-fledged robbery. And Rav Ḥisda says that Rabbi Yosei means that it is full-fledged robbery by rabbinic law. Accordingly, what is the practical difference between the opinion of the first tanna and Rabbi Yosei’s opinion there? The difference is that according to Rabbi Yosei, if one refuses to return the stolen item, it is appropriated by the judges and returned to the one who found it. The Gemara completes its question: Since according to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei the court enters one’s property to appropriate even an item that is owed by rabbinic law, what difference is there between an oath administered by Torah law and an oath administered by rabbinic law?

The Gemara answers: The practical difference between them is with regard to a case where the one opposing the claimant, the defendant, is suspected with regard to oaths. With regard to an oath administered by Torah law, if the one opposing the claimant is suspected with regard to oaths, we transfer the obligation to take an oath and impose it on the other litigant, i.e., the claimant, who may take an oath and collect that which he claims he is owed. With regard to an oath administered by rabbinic law, the court does not transfer the oath, as transference of an oath is by rabbinic ordinance, and we do not institute one rabbinic ordinance upon another rabbinic ordinance.

The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis who disagree with Rabbi Yosei, as they say that with regard to an item that is owed by rabbinic law, we do not enter his property to collect the item, what do we do to one who refuses to take an oath of inducement? The Gemara answers: We excommunicate him until he takes an oath.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This sanction is no less severe than entering his property and collecting the debt; it is like grabbing him by his testicles [bekhuveseih] until he surrenders his cloak. Rather, what do we do to him? Rav Ashi said to him: We excommunicate him until the time to flog him comes, i.e., for thirty days, and if he still refuses to take an oath or reach a settlement with the claimant, we flog him and then leave him alone.

§ Rav Pappa said: With regard to one who produced a promissory note against another in court, and the defendant said to him: The debt in the note is already repaid, but for some reason I did not get the promissory note returned to me when I paid you, we say to the defendant: It is not in your power to deny the debt; go pay. But if the defendant said: Let him take an oath to me that I did not repay him, we say to the claimant: Take an oath to him.

Rav Aḥa, son of Rava, said to Rav Ashi: But what is the difference between this case and the case of one who vitiates his promissory note by acknowledging that he has received partial payment? In the latter case, the Sages instituted that the creditor can collect the remainder of the debt only after taking an oath that he was not repaid more than the amount he admitted receiving. According to Rav Pappa, an oath can be administered to any creditor who produces a promissory note, even if he did not vitiate it.

Rav Ashi said to him: There, in the case of a creditor who vitiated his promissory note, even if the defendant does not himself make a claim demanding that the creditor take an oath, we, the court, make such a claim on his behalf. Here, in a case where the creditor did not vitiate his promissory note, we say to the defendant: Go pay him the debt, but if the defendant demands an oath, saying: Take an oath to me, we say to the creditor: Go take an oath to him. And if he is a Torah scholar [tzurva merabbanan], we do not administer an oath to him.

Rav Yeimar said to Rav Ashi: Can a Torah scholar uncloak people? Does his being a Torah scholar give him the right to collect money that the defendant claims he does not owe? Rather, if he is a Torah scholar we do not attend to his case.

§ The mishna teaches that if the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the defendant initially acknowledged the debt, but when he claimed the money the next day the defendant said that he already repaid him, the defendant is exempt from taking an oath. Rav Yehuda says that Rav Asi says: In the case of one who lends money to another in the presence of witnesses, the latter is required to repay him in the presence of witnesses. Therefore, if there are no witnesses to the fact that he repaid him, he is liable. Rav Yehuda continues: When I said this in the presence of Shmuel, he said to me that the debtor can say to the claimant: I repaid you in the presence of so-and-so and so-and-so, and they went overseas.

The Gemara raises an objection to Rav Asi’s statement: We learned in the mishna that in a case where the claimant said: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the latter said to him: Yes, and the next day the claimant said to him: Give the money to me, if the defendant responded: I gave it to you, he is exempt. The Gemara infers: And here, since the claimant claimed the debt from the defendant in the presence of witnesses, and the latter admitted the debt, he is similar to one who lent him the money in the presence of witnesses, and nevertheless, the mishna teaches that the defendant is exempt.