shall the daughters take all of the estate, even if it is more than is required for their sustenance? Rather, Rava said: The court appropriates sustenance for the daughters until they reach their majority, and the remainder is given to the sons.

§ The Gemara comments: It is obvious that if the estate was large and became small, the heirs, i.e., the sons, already acquired it when it was large. It remains in their possession, and they must provide for the daughters from it. The Gemara asks: If the estate was small, and was therefore not inherited by the sons, and then it became large, what is the halakha? Does even a small estate remain in the possession of the heirs, while the court reserves it for the daughters’ sustenance, and therefore it appreciated in the possession of the heirs and they receive the appreciation in the estate’s value? Or perhaps the heirs are totally removed from possession of a small estate, and the appreciation in value is to the benefit of the daughters receiving sustenance.

The Gemara answers: Come and hear a proof, as Rabbi Asi says that Rabbi Yoḥanan says: In the case of orphans who preemptively sold land from a small estate left to them by their father, before the court appropriated it for the daughters’ sustenance, concerning that which they sold, the sale is valid, even though they acted improperly. One can infer from this that a small estate remains in the possession of the heirs even when they are not authorized to derive benefit from it, and therefore the appreciation in its value belongs to them.

§ Rabbi Yirmeya was sitting before Rabbi Abbahu and raised the following dilemma before him: What is the halakha with regard to the sustenance to which the deceased’s widow is entitled? Does it reduce the value of the estate when evaluating whether the estate is categorized as a large estate or a small estate? Do we say that since she has a right to receive sustenance, it reduces the value of the estate? Or perhaps we say that since if she remarries she does not have a right to sustenance, now as well, for the purposes of determining the value of the estate, she is considered as if she does not have a right to sustenance, and therefore it does not reduce the value of the estate.

Furthermore, if you say that since, if she remarries she does not have a right to sustenance, now as well she is considered as if she does not have a right to sustenance, and it is not taken into account when evaluating the estate, then another dilemma can be raised: What is the halakha with regard to the sustenance one pledged to give, for a certain number of years, to the daughter of his wife from a previous marriage, i.e., his step-daughter, which is an obligation not affected by his death or by her marriage? Does it reduce the value of the estate? Do we say that since, when she marries she also has a right to sustenance, it reduces the value of the estate? Or perhaps we say that since, if she dies she does not have a right to sustenance, it does not reduce the value of the estate.

And if you say that since, if she dies she does not have a right to sustenance, therefore it does not reduce the value of the estate, what is the halakha with regard to a debt owed to the deceased’s creditor? Does it reduce the value of the estate? Do we say that since, when the creditor dies he also has a right to the money owed him, and it is collected by his heirs, therefore it reduces the value of the estate? Or perhaps we say that since it has not yet been collected, it does not reduce the value of the estate.

And there are those who say that Rabbi Yirmeya raised the dilemmas in the opposite direction, i.e., in the reverse order: What is the halakha with regard to a debt owed to a creditor? Does it reduce the value of the estate?