I was sitting before Rav Naḥman when he said that mistaken forgiveness is valid, and I wanted to raise an objection to him from the halakha of exploitation, and he observed me, anticipated my objection, and showed me that he was correct based on the halakha of a sexually underdeveloped woman who is incapable of bearing children [ailonit]. The Gemara explains: Rava wanted to ask: But there is the case of exploitation, where the price paid in a sale was in excess of the market value (see 50b), which is a case of mistaken forgiveness at the time of the sale, and yet it is not considered forgiveness. The seller must return the excess money paid. And he observed me and showed me the halakha of an ailonit. Doesn’t the case of an ailonit involve mistaken forgiveness, and yet it is valid forgiveness?

Rava explains: As we learned in a mishna (Ketubot 100b): In the case of a minor girl married off by her mother or brother who refuses to continue living with her husband, and in the case of a woman who is a secondary forbidden relative, and in the case of an ailonit, each of these women is not entitled to payment of a marriage contract, and they are not entitled to remuneration for the produce that the husband consumed from her property while they were together, and they are not entitled to sustenance, and they are not entitled to their worn clothes that were brought into the marriage as part of their dowry and became worn out during the marriage. The ailonit granted the rights to the profits the husband earned from her property while under the mistaken premise that she was married. Yet after the marriage was determined to have been contracted in error, the husband does not have to return these profits.

The Gemara comments: But that is not so; the halakha of exploitation is not a refutation of Rav Naḥman’s opinion, nor does the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman support his opinion, as there are differences between the cases.

The Gemara clarifies: Exploitation is not a refutation of his opinion, as the buyer does not know that there is exploitation at the time of the sale that would enable him to forgive him the amount he was overcharged, and therefore there is no forgiveness in this case at all. Nor does the case of a sexually underdeveloped woman support his opinion, as it is amenable to her for her husband to receive the profits in order that she receive the name of a married woman. She wants to be known as a woman who was once married, and therefore she willingly relinquishes her rights to the profits from her property during her marriage even if it will be found to have been contracted in error. There is no mistaken forgiveness in that case.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who said to a certain man: Go purchase land for me from my relatives. He went and purchased land for her. The relative who sold her the property said to the man acting as her agent: If I will have money in the future, will you give the field back to me? The agent said to him: You and she [venavla] are relatives, and I assume that you will be able to come to an arrangement between the two of you.

The Gemara discusses the halakhic significance of this response. Rabba bar Rav Huna said: In the case of any expression such as: You and she are relatives, that the agent says, the seller relies on the assumption that he will be able to come to an agreement with his relative, and therefore he does not conclusively resolve to enable the other to acquire the field.

The Gemara comments: In that case, the land itself must be returned to its owner, but what is the halakha with regard to the produce consumed by the buyer in the interim? Is it deemed fixed interest, prohibited by Torah law, and can it be removed from the buyer by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges? Or perhaps it is considered like a hint of interest, prohibited by rabbinic law, and therefore it cannot be removed from the buyer by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges?

Rabba bar Rav Huna said: It stands to reason that it is like a hint of interest, and it cannot be removed from the buyer by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges. And Rava similarly said: It is like a hint of interest, and it cannot be removed from the buyer by means of legal proceedings adjudicated by judges.

Abaye said to Rava: With regard to a mortgage, if the borrower pledged a field to the lender, who worked the field and consumed its produce during the term of the loan without any agreement allowing him to do so, what is the halakha? There, in the previous case, what is the reason it is merely a hint of interest? Is it because the seller did not fix a particular sum for the buyer as interest? Here too, the lender did not fix a particular sum for the borrower, and accordingly, this would also be merely a hint of interest. Or perhaps the key issue is that there, it is a sale, whereas here, it is a loan, with regard to which there is a greater concern about interest.

Rava said to him: There, what is the reason it is merely a hint of interest? It is considered a hint of interest because the seller did not fix a particular sum for the buyer as interest. Here too, the lender did not fix a particular sum for the borrower, and therefore this is not fixed interest.

Rav Pappi said: Ravina performed an action with regard to a case like this, and he calculated and removed from the lender the value of the produce he had consumed in the interim. This decision was not in accordance with the opinion of Rabba bar Rav Huna.

Mar, son of Rav Yosef, said in the name of Rava: With regard to this following type of mortgage, in which the lender holds part of the borrower’s land and may consume its produce, the halakha depends on the local custom. In a place where the custom is that the borrower can repay the loan at any time and the court removes the lender from the land once the loan is repaid, then once the lender consumed a measure of produce equivalent to the amount of money that he lent, we remove him from the land at that point, as the produce consumed is considered repayment of the loan.

If the lender consumed a measure of produce worth more than the value of the loan, we do not remove the value of the excess produce from him, as that which he consumed is already gone. And similarly, we do not calculate any extra produce as payment from one document to another. If the same borrower owed the lender an additional sum from another debt recorded in a different document, we do not consider the additional produce he consumed as part of the payment for the second document; rather, each loan is treated on its own terms.

And if the field belonged to orphans, once the lender consumed a measure of produce equivalent to the amount of money he was owed, we remove him from the field. And if he consumed a measure of produce worth more than the value of the loan, we take the additional amount from him; and we do calculate extra produce as payment from one document to another. The reason is that the owner of the field generally forgives payment for the extra produce the lender consumed, but minor orphans are too young to forgive a debt, and the case is therefore judged according to the letter of the law.

Rav Ashi said: Now that you have said that if he consumed more than the value of the loan we do not take it from him, as it is considered merely a hint of interest, it follows that if he consumed a measure of produce equivalent to the amount of the money owed him, we also do not remove him from the land without the borrower’s paying him money. What is the reason for this? To remove him from the land without the borrower’s paying him money is like taking money from him, and this consumption of the produce is only a hint of interest, and the halakha is that a hint of interest cannot be removed by legal proceedings adjudicated by judges.

The Gemara relates: Rav Ashi performed an action in a case of this kind even involving minor orphans,