Lest you say that in doing so his original intention is completely nullified, since when he carries it out he is no longer conscious of the reason that he stored it, the tanna of the mishna teaches us that anyone who performs an action with an object with which he had dealings in the past, performs the action with the original intention in mind.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: Rabbi Meir deemed liable one who carried out even a single wheat seed for sowing on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: This is obvious. We learned in the mishna that the measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for sowing on Shabbat is any amount. Since the principle is that an unattributed mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir, clearly Rabbi Meir would deem him liable for carrying out one seed. He would even deem him liable for carrying out less than one seed. The Gemara answers that Shmuel’s statement was necessary. Lest you say that when the mishna employs the term any amount it is to exclude the standard measure for carrying out food on Shabbat, a dried fig-bulk; and actually one is only liable if there is at least an olive-bulk of whatever he is carrying out. Therefore, Shmuel teaches us that any amount refers to even a single seed. Rav Yitzḥak the son of Rav Yehuda strongly objects to this: But now, based on the approach that the measure of liability depends solely on the intention of the person carrying out the object and not on objective measures, one who planned to carry out the contents of his entire house at once, so too, is he only liable when he carries it out at once? The Gemara answers: There is no comparison. There, with regard to a person who plans to carry out the contents of his entire house, his intention is rendered irrelevant by the opinions of all other people, as most people do not conduct themselves in that manner.

We also learned in the mishna: And any other person is only liable for carrying it out on Shabbat if he carries out its measure for liability. The Gemara comments: The mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar stated a principle: Anything that is not fit to be stored, and therefore people do not typically store items like it, but it was deemed fit for storage by this person and he stored it, and another person came and carried out the object that was stored, that person, who carried it out, is rendered liable by the thought of this person, who stored it.

Rava said that Rav Naḥman said: If one carried out on Shabbat a dried fig-bulk of seeds for eating, and along the way he reconsidered and decided to use them for sowing; or, alternatively, if one intended to carry them out for sowing and reconsidered and decided to use them for eating, he is liable. The Gemara wonders: This is obvious. Whichever way you view this case, he is clearly liable. Go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability. The Gemara replies that Rav Naḥman’s statement teaches a novel concept. Lest you say that in order to be deemed liable for carrying out an object on Shabbat, we require that the lifting and placing of the object be performed with a single, identical, intention, and that is not the situation here, i.e., that the change in his intention transforms his action into two separate half-labors, therefore Rav Naḥman teaches us that it is considered a single prohibited act, and the person who performed it is liable.

On the basis of this halakha, Rava raised a dilemma: With regard to one who carried out half a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of sowing, which is less than the measure that determines liability, and in the meantime the seeds became moist and expanded to a dried fig-bulk, and he reconsidered his plans for the dried fig-bulk of seeds and decided to use it for eating, what is the halakha? The two sides of the dilemma are: If you say that there, in the first case, he is liable because go here and examine his initial intention, there is a measure that determines liability; and go here and examine his ultimate intention, there is a measure that determines liability; but here, in this case, since at the time that he carried it out there was not a measure that determines liability for one who carries out seeds for the purpose of eating, then he is not liable. Or, perhaps, since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, then now too, he is liable because, even based on his reconsidered intention, he completed the prohibited labor of carrying out.

And if you say that since had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, he would be liable for the intention of carrying it out for the purpose of sowing, now too, he is liable, if he carried out seeds in the measure of a dried fig-bulk for the purpose of eating, and they shriveled until there was less than that measure, and he reconsidered and decided to use them for the purpose of sowing, then what is the halakha? Here, certainly had he been silent and had no intention with regard to the seeds at all, for the original intention he is not liable because there remains less than the measure for liability; or perhaps we follow his intention at present and he is liable. And if you say that we follow his intention at present, and he is liable, the dilemma arises: If one carried out a dried fig-bulk of seeds for the purpose of eating, and it shriveled until there was less than that measure, and then it expanded to a fig-bulk, what is the halakha? Is there disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat? Since at a certain point there was less than the measure that determines liability, he can no longer be held liable for carrying it out even if it expands. Or, perhaps there is no disqualification with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat. The crucial moments that determine liability for carrying an object are the moment that it is lifted and the moment that it is placed. At both of those junctures, the measure for liability was whole. No resolution was found to any of these dilemmas. Therefore, let them stand unresolved.

Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If one threw an olive-bulk of teruma into an impure house, what is the halakha? The Gemara attempts to clarify the question. With regard to what matter was this dilemma raised? If it was raised with regard to Shabbat, the measure that we require to determine liability for carrying out is a dried fig-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that. And if it was raised with regard to ritual impurity, the measure that we require to determine impurity for food is at least an egg-bulk, and an olive-bulk is smaller than that as well. The Gemara answers: Actually, this dilemma was raised with regard to Shabbat. And it is referring to a case where there is less than an egg-bulk of food in the house, and this olive-bulk that was thrown into the house completes the measure of the food in the house to an egg-bulk. The dilemma is: What is the halakha in that case? Is it from the fact that the olive-bulk joins together with the food in the house with regard to ritual impurity that he is also liable with regard to Shabbat? Or perhaps, all matters concerning carrying out on Shabbat require a dried fig-bulk in order to be liable. Rav Naḥman said to him: We already learned the resolution to that dilemma in a baraita: Abba Shaul says: The measure that determines liability for carrying out the wave-offering of the two loaves of bread and the showbread that were in the Temple is a dried fig-bulk. The Gemara asks: And why is that their measure? Let us say: From the fact that with regard to the matter of