The Gemara asks: But according to Rav Sheshet, with regard to the one who says that in a case where the debtor says: Here you are, he is exempt from taking an oath, why was it necessary for the verse to exclude a claim of land ownership from the defendant’s obligation to take an oath when he admits part of the claim? The exclusion of land is derived from the verse: “For any matter of trespass, for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment, for any lost item about which one shall say: This is it, the claims of both of them shall come before the judges” (Exodus 22:8). But all cases involving one who admits to part of the claim involving land are cases where the defendant effectively says: Here you are, as land always remains in its location. Therefore, the derivation from the verse appears to be unnecessary.

The Gemara answers that Rav Sheshet could have said to you: The verse was necessary in a case where the defendant dug pits, ditches, and caves in the land that he is returning to the plaintiff. Since the land has been damaged and is no longer in its prior state, the defendant is not effectively saying: Here you are.

Alternatively, there is the case where one claimed that another owed him vessels and land, and the defendant admitted to the claim involving the vessels and denied the claim involving the land. The verse teaches that although the defendant denied part of the claim and did not effectively say: Here you are, he is not obligated to take an oath with regard to the land.

Come and hear a proof for Rabbi Ḥiyya’s opinion, as Rami bar Ḥama teaches a baraita: All four types of bailees mentioned in the Torah require denial of part of the claim and admission of part of the claim in order to incur liability to take an oath when someone claims to have given them an item as a deposit. This applies to an unpaid bailee, who receives no payment in exchange for safeguarding the item, and a borrower, who does not pay the owner in exchange for the right to use the item, as well as a paid bailee, who receives payment in exchange for safeguarding the item, and a renter, who rents an item in order to use it and pays the owner in exchange for that right.

The Gemara elaborates: What are the circumstances in which the bailees both deny part of the claim and admit to part of the claim? Is it not referring to a case where the bailee said to the one who deposited the item: With regard to the items that I admit to having received from you: Here you are, and as to the rest, I never received them and I am therefore not obligated to return them? This supports Rabbi Ḥiyya’s opinion that one who says: Here you are, is obligated to take an oath.

The Gemara rejects this: No, Rami bar Ḥama is referring to a different case, for example, a case where the depositor said to the unpaid bailee: I gave you three cows and they all died due to your negligence. You are therefore liable to pay for them. And the bailee said to him: With regard to one cow, this matter never happened. In other words, I received only two cows, not three. And one of the cows died due to an unavoidable accident, and I am exempt from paying for it. And the other one died due to my negligence, for which I need to pay you. In that case, although he admits to part of the claim, it is not a case of: Here you are, as he is not returning the cow itself.

§ Come and hear a challenge to the first halakha of Rabbi Ḥiyya, as the father of Rabbi Aptoriki taught in a baraita: If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and the other says: Nothing of yours is in my possession, and the witnesses testify that he has fifty dinars in his possession that he owes the plaintiff, one might have thought that he should take an oath about the remainder.

To counter this, the verse states with regard to bailees: “For any matter of trespass, for an ox, for a donkey, for a sheep, for a garment, for any lost item about which one shall say: This is it, the claims of both of them shall come before the judges” (Exodus 22:8). This indicates that you obligate the defendant to take an oath based on the admission to part of a claim by his mouth, but you do not obligate him to take an oath based on the testimony of witnesses.

The Gemara rejects this challenge: Are you raising an objection to the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya from a baraita? Rabbi Ḥiyya himself is a tanna, and as such, he has the authority to dispute the determination in a baraita.

The Gemara asks: But doesn’t that tanna cite a verse? The Gemara answers: According to Rabbi Ḥiyya, that verse teaches that one who admits to part of the claim is obligated to take an oath.

And Rabbi Aptoriki’s father could have said to you that both halakhot are derived from the expression “This is it.” Since “this” is written and “it” is also written, it is interpreted that one word is stated to teach that one who admits to part of the claim is obligated to take an oath, and one word is stated to teach that in a case that involves the testimony of witnesses, one is exempt from taking an oath.

The Gemara asks: And how does the other Sage, Rabbi Ḥiyya, interpret the double qualification in the verse? The Gemara answers: In his opinion, one word is stated to teach that one who admits to part of the claim is obligated to take an oath, and one word is stated to teach that one is obligated to take an oath only if he admits that he owes an item that is of the same type as the subject of the claim. If the plaintiff claims one type of item and the defendant admits to owing a different type of item, he is not obligated to take an oath.

And the other Sage, Rabbi Aptoriki’s father, does not accept the principle that one is required to take an oath only if he admits that he owes an item that is of the same type as the subject of the claim, but he holds like Rabban Gamliel in this matter. As we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one claimed that another owes him wheat, and the defendant admitted to owing him barley, which is less expensive than wheat, he is exempt from taking an oath despite his admission to part of the claim, as his admission does not correspond to the claim. And Rabban Gamliel deems him liable to take an oath.

§ The Gemara relates: There was a certain shepherd to whom people would give their animals for safekeeping every day in the presence of witnesses. One day, they gave him their animals without witnesses. At the end of the day he said to the owners of the animals: This matter never occurred; I never received the animals. Witnesses came and testified against him that he ate two of them. Rabbi Zeira said: If Rabbi Ḥiyya’s first halakha is so, the shepherd must take an oath with regard to the remainder, or else he must pay the value of the animals to their owners.

Abaye said to him: If Rabbi Ḥiyya’s first halakha is so, the shepherd takes an oath? Isn’t he a robber? The witnesses established through their testimony that he took and ate some of the animals, and consequently his oath lacks credibility. Rabbi Zeira said to him: I did not mean that the shepherd takes an oath; I was saying that the party opposing him takes an oath and collects payment.

The Gemara comments: Now, too, if it is so that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ḥiyya, and testimony supporting part of the claim does not obligate the defendant to take an oath with regard to the rest, the court should still obligate the shepherd to take an oath due to the ordinance of Rav Naḥman, and since his oath is not deemed credible the plaintiff should take an oath and collect payment.

As we learned in a mishna (Shevuot 38b): If one says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession, and that person replies: Nothing of yours is in my possession, he is exempt from taking an oath. And Rav Naḥman says: Nevertheless, the judges administer an oath of inducement to him. Rav Naḥman instituted an ordinance that even if the defendant completely denies the claim, he is obligated to take an oath that the claim is false. Consequently, the shepherd is obligated to take that oath.

The Gemara responds: This halakha of Rav Naḥman is a rabbinic ordinance and not an oath required by Torah law,