Unspecified wood exists for fuel, i.e., charcoal, so its benefit follows its consumption.

Rav Kahana says: And the matter of whether kindling wood, whose benefit follows its consumption, is subject to the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year is a dispute among the tanna’im, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Shevi’it 6:25): One may not transfer Sabbatical Year produce, e.g., wine, to another person; neither for soaking flax to prepare it for spinning, as the benefit derived from the flax follows its soaking, when the soaked and spun thread is woven into a garment; nor for laundering with it, as the benefit derived follows the laundering when one wears the clean clothes. Soaking the flax or laundering the garment in wine is considered the consumption of the wine, as it is no longer potable. And Rabbi Yosei says: One may transfer to another Sabbatical Year produce for soaking and for laundering.

The Gemara asks: What is the reasoning for the statement of the Rabbis? The verse states with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: “For food” (Leviticus 25:6), from which it is inferred: But not for soaking; “for food,” but not for laundering. And Rabbi Yosei says that it is permitted, as the verse also states: “For you,” from which it is inferred: For you, for all your needs, even for soaking and for laundering.

The Gemara asks: And according to the Rabbis as well, isn’t it written: “For you”? How do they explain that term? The Gemara answers: From that term “for you” it is derived: “For you,” similar to “for food,” i.e., the sanctity of the Sabbatical Year takes effect with regard to those items whose benefit and whose consumption coincide, which excludes soaking and laundering, where the items’ benefit follows their consumption.

The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Yosei as well, isn’t it written: “For food”? Rabbi Yosei could have said to you: That term is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita, as it is taught: The verse states: “For food,” but not for a poultice [melogema]. The baraita continues: Do you say “for food” but not for a poultice, or perhaps it is only “for food” but not for laundering? When the verse says: “For you,” laundering is already stated as permitted since it includes all of one’s bodily needs. How do I realize the meaning of that which the verse states: “For food”? It is “for food” but not for a poultice.

The baraita continues. Should one ask: And what did you see that led you to include the use of Sabbatical Year produce for laundering and to exclude the use of Sabbatical Year produce as a poultice? Perhaps the opposite should be said. The baraita answers: I include the use for laundering, which applies equally to every person, as everyone needs clean clothes, and I exclude the use as a poultice, which does not apply equally to every person; it is only for the ill or wounded.

In accordance with whose opinion is that which is taught in a baraita with regard to Sabbatical Year produce: “For food,” but not for a poultice; “for food,” but not for sprinkling wine in one’s house to provide a pleasant fragrance; “for food,” but not to make an emetic [apiktevizin] from it to induce vomiting? In accordance with whose opinion is this baraita? It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, as, if it were in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, is there not also soaking and laundering that should have been excluded from the baraita, as in the Rabbis’ opinion the use of Sabbatical Year produce for those purposes is forbidden?

§ The mishna (100b) teaches that if the owner gave wool to a dyer to dye it red and instead he dyed it black, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the dyer’s expenses, the owner of the wool gives the dyer the expenses. If the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. The Gemara provides a mnemonic device, the acrostic saban, for the names of the Sages involved in the following incident; each letter in the acrostic represents the middle letter of one of the names: Samekh, Rav Yosef; beit, Rabbi Abba; nun, Rav Huna.

The Gemara relates: Rav Yosef was sitting behind Rabbi Abba, and they were both sitting before Rav Huna. And Rav Huna was sitting and saying: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa and the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda.

Rav Yosef turned his face in disdain of Rav Huna’s statement. He said: Granted, stating that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that there is a principle that when there is a dispute between an individual and the many, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of the many. Rav Huna therefore teaches us that in this case the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa, despite the fact that he is an individual.

The Gemara interrupts Rav Yosef’s remark and asks: What is the ruling of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa to which Rav Huna is referring? It is as it is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says that with regard to a loan with a promissory note, one may not collect the loan from gentiles near the time of their holidays, but with regard to a loan by oral agreement, one may collect from gentiles even near the time of their holidays, because the creditor is considered as one who salvages money from their possession.

But with regard to the statement that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, why do I need it? This is an example of the Mishna recording a dispute, and afterward recording only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion. And the principle is that when the Mishna records a dispute, and afterward records only one side of that dispute as an unattributed opinion, then the halakha is in accordance with the unattributed opinion.

The Gemara identifies the dispute and the unattributed mishna. The dispute is found in tractate Bava Kamma: If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him and instead he dyed it black, or to dye it black and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner of the wool the value of his wool. Rabbi Yehuda says: If the value of the enhancement exceeds the expenses, the owner of the wool gives the expenses to the dyer. And if the expenses exceed the enhancement, he gives him the value of the enhancement. And the unattributed mishna appears in tractate Bava Metzia, as we learned in a mishna there (76a): Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges from an agreement is at a disadvantage. This unattributed mishna accords with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, who holds that a craftsman who deviates from his assignment receives either the expenses or the enhancement, whichever is of lesser value.

The Gemara asks: And being that this is a dispute and afterward an unattributed opinion, why did Rav Huna find it necessary to state that the halakha follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda? It is necessary, as it would enter your mind to say that the Mishna is not sequential and, in fact, this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute. And why does Rav Yosef disagree? He disagrees because if that is so, then with regard to every case where a dispute is recorded and afterward an unattributed opinion is recorded, let us say: The Mishna is not sequential, and this is a case of an unattributed ruling followed by a dispute.

And Rav Huna would respond: The situation where we do not say that the Mishna is not sequential, i.e., where we say that the Mishna is sequential, is only when both mishnayot appear in one tractate, but when they appear in two different tractates we say that the Mishna is not sequential. Since these mishnayot are found in two different tractates, Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia, the assumption is that the Mishna is not sequential. And Rav Yosef would respond: All of Nezikin, i.e., Bava Kamma, Bava Metzia, and Bava Batra, is one tractate.

And if you wish, say that even if Bava Kamma and Bava Metzia are to be considered two separate tractates, Rav Yosef would still hold that Rav Huna’s statement was unnecessary because it is taught as one of a pair of established halakhot: Whoever changes from the terms of an agreement is at a disadvantage, and whoever reneges on an agreement is at a disadvantage. Since this ruling was taught with another, established halakha, it is apparent that this is also an established halakha.

§ The Gemara notes another dispute concerning one who deviates from the terms of an agreement. The Sages taught in the Tosefta (Bava Metzia 4:20): One who gives money to his agent