the core of their existence, i.e., Torah study, which is the source of life. “The way”; this is referring to acts of kindness. “They must walk”; this is referring to visiting the sick. “Wherein”; this is referring to the burial of the dead. “The work”; this is referring to conducting oneself in accordance with the law. “That they must do”; this is referring to conducting oneself beyond the letter of the law. This indicates that the Torah mandates that people conduct themselves beyond the letter of the law.

The Gemara relates: Reish Lakish presented a dinar to Rabbi Elazar so that the latter would assess it. Rabbi Elazar said: It is a proper coin. Reish Lakish said to him: Realize that I am relying on you. Rabbi Elazar said to him: What is the purpose of stating that you are relying on me? Is it so that if this dinar is later found to be bad, I will be required to exchange it for you with a good dinar? But it is you who said that it is Rabbi Meir who is of the opinion that there is liability for damage caused by indirect action, even if he did not directly cause damage to the property. What, is it not that you intended to say: This is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, but we do not hold in accordance with his opinion?

Reish Lakish said to him: No, I intended to say that this is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and we do hold in accordance with his opinion.

The Gemara asks: Which statement of Rabbi Meir is Rabbi Elazar referring to? If we say it is this statement of Rabbi Meir, that is difficult. Parenthetically, the Gemara states that the letters dalet, lamed, mem, peh serve as a mnemonic device for the four statements of Rabbi Meir that will be cited. It stands for: Judged [dan], to dye [litzboa], covers [mesakekh], and broke open [pirtza].

The Gemara returns to the matter at hand. As we learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 28b): If a judge issued a judgment and erred, and he acquitted one who was in fact liable, or deemed liable one who should have in fact been acquitted, or if he ruled that a pure item is impure, or ruled that an impure item is pure, and by doing so he caused a litigant a monetary loss, what he did is done, i.e., the judgment stands, and the judge must pay damages from his home, i.e., from his personal funds. He is therefore liable to pay the damages even though he caused the loss indirectly.

The Gemara explains why this cannot be the statement of Rabbi Meir that Shmuel was referring to: But wasn’t it stated with regard to that mishna that Rabbi Ile’a says that Rav says: And this mishna is discussing a case where the judge not only issued a ruling, but actively took the money from the one whom he found liable, and gave it to the other party by his own hand. This is not a case of causation but of direct action.

Rather, Rabbi Elazar must be referring to this statement of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (100b): If one gave wool to a dyer to dye it red for him, and he dyed it black, or to dye it black, and he dyed it red, Rabbi Meir says: The dyer gives the owner the value of his wool. The Gemara responds: This too does not prove that according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir one is liable even if the loss was brought about by causation, since there he does cause damage through direct action.

Rather, Rabbi Elazar must be referring to this statement of Rabbi Meir, as we learned in a mishna (Kilayim 7:4): One who drapes his grapevine atop another’s grain has rendered them forbidden due to the prohibition against growing diverse kinds in a vineyard, and he is liable to pay the owner of the grain for the damage. The Gemara responds: This too does not prove that according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir one is liable even if the loss was brought about by causation, since there too he does cause damage by direct action.

Rather, it must be referring to this statement of Rabbi Meir, as it is taught in the Tosefta (Kilayim 3:4): If there was a partition of a vineyard that is adjacent to a wheat field, and that partition broke open,