סקר
האם אתה לומד עם גמרא מפורשת/מבוארת?






 

Steinsaltz

is liable to pay all of the five types of indemnity.

The Gemara explains: In this case of one who injured his parent but did not bruise him, what are the circumstances? Is it not a case where he struck him on his hand, and it will eventually return to its original health? And with regard to this case that mishna teaches: He is liable to pay all of the five types of indemnity. If so, this resolves Rabba’s dilemma.

The Sages object and say: Here we are dealing with a case where he deafened his parent by striking him, but did not bruise him. Since his father’s hearing loss is permanent, he is liable to pay all five types of indemnity, and this is not relevant to Rabba’s dilemma. The Gemara objects: But doesn’t Rabba himself say: One who deafens his father is executed, even though no bruise is visible, because it is impossible for deafening to occur without a bruise? It is certain that a drop of blood fell into his ear from the blow, even if it is not visible from the outside.

Rather, it must be that here we are dealing with a case where he shaved his father’s hair without causing a bruise. In a case where he shaved him, his hair will return, and this is an example of our dilemma, i.e., of an injury to a limb that will return to its original health. If so, this resolves Rabba’s dilemma.

The Sages object and say: It is possible that here we are dealing with a case where he smeared his father with a depilatory agent [nasha] that caused his hair to fall out, so that his hair will not return.

The Gemara explains how one could be liable for each of the five types of indemnity by smearing a depilatory agent: The father experiences pain in a case where he has fissures on his head and has pain from those fissures. He incurs medical costs because he requires healing for the fissures. He incurs loss of livelihood in a case where he would dance in taverns to earn money, which requires him to make various gestures with his head and his hair while dancing; and now he cannot gesture because of those fissures on his head. He experiences humiliation, because there is no humiliation greater than losing one’s hair.

The Gemara comments: And the matter that is a dilemma for Rabba is obvious to Abaye on this side of the dilemma, and to Rava on that side of the dilemma; they each resolved the dilemma but with opposing conclusions. As it was stated: If one struck another on his hand and the hand was weakened, but it will ultimately return to its original health, Abaye says: He gives him compensation for his major loss of livelihood, i.e., the decrease in his value, due to his temporary paralysis, as measured by his price on the slave market; and his minor loss of livelihood, i.e., the money he would have earned while idle during his recovery. And Rava says: He gives him only the value of his loss of livelihood for each and every day, and he does not give him the full value of his hand.

§ The Gemara presents another dispute between Abaye and Rava. It was stated: With regard to one who severs the hand of a Hebrew slave who belongs to another, Abaye says: He gives compensation for the major loss of livelihood to the slave, and compensation for the minor loss of livelihood to the master. Rava says: All the compensation shall be given to the slave, and land shall be purchased with the money; and the master garners the profits from the land for the duration of the slave’s term of slavery.

The Gemara comments: It is obvious that if one injured a slave and thereby reduced the slave’s value for the slave himself, but he did not reduce the slave’s value for his master; the Gemara interjects: What are the circumstances where this is possible? This is possible in a case where he split the tip of his ear or the tip of his nostril, which does not impact the slave’s ability to perform labor. The Gemara returns to continue the statement: In such a case, all of the compensation goes to the slave himself. If the injury reduced the slave’s value for his master, then this is the case of the dispute of Abaye and Rava.

§ The mishna teaches: How is payment for humiliation assessed? It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated. The Gemara asks: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and it is not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Rather, it is the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

These opinions are as we learned in a baraita: And in all of those cases of Jews who were humiliated, regardless of their individual stature, they are viewed as though they were freemen who lost their property and were impoverished, and their humiliation is calculated according to this status, as they are the sons of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and are all of prominent lineage. Humiliation is assessed according to a standard formula, regardless of who was humiliated. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: The court views each person according to his stature, the great person according to his greatness, and the small person according to his smallness. Rabbi Shimon says: In a case of wealthy people, the court views them as though they were freemen who lost their property; in a case of poor people, the court views them as the least among the poor. This lessens the payment of compensation for the one who caused humiliation.

The Gemara explains: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? Now, if it is the opinion of Rabbi Meir, the mishna teaches: It all depends on the stature of the one who humiliates the other and the one who is humiliated, and Rabbi Meir holds in the baraita that all of those who were humiliated are considered alike to one another. And if it is the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, a mishna teaches (86b): One who humiliates a blind person is liable, whereas Rabbi Yehuda says in a baraita: A blind person does not have humiliation. Rather, is the opinion expressed in the mishna not that of Rabbi Shimon?

The Gemara rejects this conclusion: You can even say that the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. When Rabbi Yehuda said that a blind person does not have humiliation, he meant with regard to another taking compensation for humiliation from him. A blind person is not fully aware of what he does, and one can be rendered liable for causing humiliation only if he intended to humiliate the other. But with regard to giving him compensation for humiliation, he is given compensation.

The Gemara challenges this explanation of the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda: But from the fact that the latter clause of that mishna teaches that one who humiliates a sleeping person is liable but a sleeping person who humiliates another is exempt, and does not teach that a blind person who humiliates another is exempt, by inference, the mishna teaches that there is no difference this way, and no difference that way; whether a blind person humiliates another or is humiliated, the one who causes humiliation is liable to pay compensation. Rather, it is clear that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

§ The Gemara analyzes a related baraita in light of the three opinions cited earlier. Who is the tanna who taught this baraita, as the Sages taught: If one intended to humiliate a small man [katan] and instead humiliated a great man [gadol], he gives the money he would have owed for the small man’s humiliation to the great man. If one intended to humiliate a slave and instead humiliated a freeman, he gives the money he would have owed for the slave’s humiliation to the freeman. Whose opinion is this? It is not the opinion of Rabbi Meir, and not the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and not the opinion of Rabbi Shimon.

The Gemara explains why this is not in accordance with the opinion of any of these tanna’im: It enters your mind to say that when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means that he is small in terms of his property, i.e., he is poor; and when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means that he is great in terms of his property, i.e., he is wealthy. If this baraita is stating the opinion of Rabbi Meir, doesn’t he say in the baraita that all of those who were humiliated are considered similar to one another? And if it is stating the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, doesn’t he say: Slaves have no humiliation; whereas the baraita discusses the compensation owed to a slave. And if it is stating the opinion of Rabbi Shimon, doesn’t he say: If one intended to humiliate this one, and instead humiliated that one, he is exempt?

The Gemara explains Rabbi Shimon’s statement: What is the reason for exempting one who humiliated a person whom he did not intend to humiliate? The halakha of humiliation is like the halakha of killing. Just as in a case of killing, the murderer is not executed unless he intended to kill the victim specifically, as it is written: “And he lies in wait for him, and rises up against him” (Deuteronomy 19:11), which means he is not liable unless he intended to kill him specifically, so too, in a case of humiliation, the one who humiliated is not liable unless he intended to humiliate him specifically, as it is written: “And she put forth her hand, and took him by his genitals” (Deuteronomy 25:11); this teaches that one is not liable for humiliation unless he intended to humiliate him specifically.

The Gemara returns to analyzing the baraita: Actually, the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and when Rabbi Yehuda said: Slaves have no humiliation, he meant that one would not be liable to give them compensation for humiliation; but if the court needs to appraise compensation for the humiliation of others according to their humiliation, and thereby determine the compensation one owes to a freeman when he intended to humiliate a slave, then we do appraise according to their humiliation.

The Gemara presents an alternative explanation of the baraita: And if you wish, say instead: You can even say that the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir. Do you maintain that when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means he is great in terms of his property, and when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means he is small in terms of his property? No, rather, when the baraita is referring to a gadol, it means an actual adult [gadol]; and when the baraita is referring to a katan, it means an actual minor [katan].

The Gemara asks: But is a minor subject to humiliation? The Gemara answers: Yes, as Rav Pappa said with regard to another halakha: The case involves a minor who has reached a stage in which when others humiliate him he feels humiliation; here, too,

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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