is because I had not eaten ox meat. In other words, I was fasting yesterday and was unable to concentrate properly.

Rava responded to him: But if the Torah requires even a partial payment of the fourfold or fivefold payment, what is different in the first clause, in which the son must pay, and what is different in the latter clause, where he is exempt?

Rav Naḥman said to him: In the first clause, where the father’s animal was stolen and slaughtered in his lifetime, I read about this case the verse: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it” (Exodus 21:37), which indicates that the thief slaughtered the ox or the sheep entirely in a prohibited manner. In the latter clause, where the animal was slaughtered after the father’s death, I do not read about this case the verse: “And slaughter it,” which describes a slaughter that was performed entirely in a prohibited manner, because the animal already partially belonged to him, and his own portion of the ox was slaughtered in a permitted manner.

§ The mishna teaches: A thief who slaughters the animal but it was found to be a tereifa, and likewise a thief who slaughters a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard, pays the fourfold or fivefold payment. Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: Conclude from the mishna that the act of slaughtering is considered to have been performed only at the end of the slaughtering process.

Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza explains: As, if you say that the act of slaughtering lasts from beginning to end, i.e., the halakhic ramifications of slaughtering are in effect throughout the process, one could raise a question with regard to the case of one who slaughters a non-sacred animal in the Temple courtyard: Once he slaughtered the animal a bit, at the very start of the act of slaughter, he has prohibited the animal, with regard to deriving benefit, as a non-sacred animal slaughtered in the Temple courtyard. When he slaughters the other part, it is already prohibited with regard to deriving benefit, which means that it is not an animal that belongs to its owner that he slaughters. Since deriving benefit from the animal is prohibited, it has no value; therefore, there is no ownership.

Rav Huna, son of Rava, said to Rav Ḥavivi in response: It is possible to explain the mishna even if one maintains that the halakhic ramifications of slaughtering are in effect throughout the slaughter. As, when does the thief become obligated to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment? It is when he performs that first bit of slaughter in the beginning, before the animal becomes forbidden. Rav Ashi said to Rav Huna: Do not dismiss Rav Ḥavivi’s objection with this explanation. The verse: “If a man steal an ox or a sheep, and slaughter it” (Exodus 21:37), indicates that to impose liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment we require that the thief slaughtered it completely, and after having slaughtered it just a bit there is no complete slaughter yet.

Rav Huna said to Rav Ashi: But if you are correct, the mishna is difficult according to the one who maintains that the halakhic ramifications of slaughtering are in effect throughout the slaughter. Rav Ashi said to Rav Huna: This is what Rav Gamda said in the name of Rava, concerning this question: The mishna is discussing a case where the thief slaughtered, i.e., severed, part of the two organs that must be severed in ritual slaughter, i.e., the trachea and the esophagus [simanin], outside the Temple, and finished slaughtering them inside the Temple. Therefore, the animal became prohibited with regard to deriving benefit only at the final stage of slaughter, concomitant with the liability to pay the fourfold or fivefold payment.

There are those who teach that the preceding exchange took place with regard to the following dispute: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish says in the name of Rabbi Levi the Elder: The act of slaughtering is considered to have been performed only at the end of the slaughtering process. And Rabbi Yoḥanan says: The act of slaughtering lasts from beginning to end. Rav Ḥavivi of Meḥoza said to Rav Ashi: Shall we say that Rabbi Yoḥanan holds that the prohibition against deriving benefit from non-sacred animals that were slaughtered in the Temple courtyard is not by Torah law?