The Gemara asks: But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If a dog or a goat jumped, regardless of whether they jumped from above to below or from below to above, their owners are exempt from all liability? Rav Pappa interpreted it in the following way: Their manners of movement were changed from the typical manner of movement for their species. The dog moved by leaping [bizkira], while the goat moved by climbing [bisrikha]. The Gemara asks: If that is so, why are the owners exempt from liability? After all, they still caused damage. The Gemara answers: The baraita does not intend to say that they are completely exempt, but that they are exempt from paying the full cost of the damage; they are, however, liable to pay half the cost of the damage, as is the halakha in any case of damage caused by atypical behavior, as such acts are classified as Goring.

§ The mishna teaches: With regard to a dog that took a cake that had been baked directly on hot coals, and went to a stack of grain to eat it, and it ate the cake and at the same time ignited the stack of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake, and he must pay for half the cost of the damage to the stack of grain.

With regard to damage caused by a fire lit by one person spreading to a location other than where it was lit, the Gemara cites a dispute among the amora’im: It was stated: Rabbi Yoḥanan says: His liability for damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, meaning that damage caused by a fire in a location other than where it was lit is comparable to damage caused by an arrow shot at a distant target. And Reish Lakish says: His liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his property; he is responsible for this damage just as he is responsible for damage caused elsewhere by any of his possessions, e.g., one of his animals.

The Gemara asks: And what is the reason that Reish Lakish did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that fire is not comparable to an arrow, as an arrow proceeds as a result of his direct force, while this fire does not proceed as a result of his direct force, but requires a wind to carry it from the location where it was lit to the location of the damage. The Gemara asks about the other opinion: And what is the reason that Rabbi Yoḥanan did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Reish Lakish? The Gemara answers: He could have said to you that one’s fire is not comparable to his possessions, as property is a tangible substance but this fire is not a tangible substance.

The Gemara attempts to settle the dispute: We learned in the mishna: With regard to a dog that took a cake that had been baked directly on hot coals, and went to a stack of grain to eat it, and it ate the cake and at the same time ignited the stack of grain with a coal that it had taken along with the cake, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake, and he must pay for half the cost of the damage to the stack of grain. Granted, according to the one who says that one’s liability for damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, this fire is similar to the arrows of the dog, and therefore he must pay for half the cost of the damage caused by the dog’s force, as in a case of pebbles.

But according to the one who says that one’s liability for damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his property, this fire is not the property of the owner of the dog; rather, it is the property of the owner of the cake, so why is the owner of the dog liable?

The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the dog took the coal and did not place the cake on the stack, rather it threw it onto the stack. The ruling of the mishna is: For the cake which the dog ate, the owner must pay the full cost of the damage, and for the specific spot on the stack of grain that was damaged by the throwing of the coal there, the owner must pay for half the cost of the damage as in a case of pebbles. And for the stack of grain as a whole, he is exempt, because his liability for damage caused by the spread of the fire is due to its similarity to his property, and in this case it was not his property.

But Rabbi Yoḥanan can explain the mishna in a more straightforward manner. It is discussing a case where the dog placed the cake with the coal directly on the stack of grain in order to eat the cake. Accordingly, the owner of the dog must pay the full cost of the damage for the cake and for the specific spot where the coal was put down, as these cases of damage were caused directly by the dog. And for the rest of the stack of grain, he must pay for half the cost of the damage, because in Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion one is liable for the damage caused by fire due to its similarity to arrows shot by his force. The damage to the rest of the stack of grain is an indirect result of the dog’s force, and therefore his liability is according the halakhot of pebbles.

The Gemara suggests: Come and hear a proof from a mishna (62b): In the case of a camel that was laden with flax and was passing through the public domain, and its flax extended into a store at the edge of the public domain, and the flax caught fire from a lamp in the store belonging to the storekeeper, and as a result of the burning flax the camel set fire to the building together with all its contents, the owner of the camel is liable for the damage. But if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside in the public domain, thereby causing the flax on the camel to catch fire, and consequently the building was set on fire, the storekeeper is liable. Rabbi Yehuda says: In a case where the lamp placed outside was a Hanukkah lamp, the storekeeper is exempt from liability, as there is a mitzva to place a Hanukkah lamp outside.

Granted, according to the one who says that one’s liability for the damage caused by his fire is due to its similarity to his arrows, the fire in the store is similar to the arrows of the camel, and that is why the camel’s owner is liable. But according to the one who says that liability for the damage is due to its similarity to his property, this fire is not the property of the owner of the camel. The Gemara answers: Reish Lakish could have said to you: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the camel moved the burning flax around and ignited the entire building, lighting one spot after another. The fire did not need to spread since the camel directly set the building on fire in each of those spots, and therefore this case is comparable to that of a dog who moved the coal around from place to place.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If the storekeeper placed his lamp outside, the storekeeper is liable. And if the case is one where the camel ignited the entire building, spot by spot, why is the storekeeper liable? His fire did not spread through the building; it was the camel that moved it around from one place to another. The Gemara answers: The case is one where the camel did not move around, but rather stood still, but since there was an extremely large load of flax on its back, once it caught fire it ignited the entire building simultaneously.

The Gemara asks: If the camel stood without moving from place to place, but did shift the load on its back and thereby ignited the entire building, all the more so it should be that the storekeeper should be exempt from any liability and the owner of the camel should be liable, as it was his responsibility to move the camel away from there. Rav Huna bar Manoah said in the name of Rav Ika: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a case where the camel stood still in order to urinate and while doing so set the building ablaze; in that case the incident is deemed an accident as the owner could not have moved the camel from the spot.