סקר
איך אתה לומד דף יומי?






 

Steinsaltz

let Ravina answer Rava’s objection by saying: This baraita, which states that an offering of lesser sanctity is the property of its owner and may be sold even when the Temple stands, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili, and it is referring to a case where the animal is still alive. And that qualification of the mishna by Rav Naḥman, that the sale of an unblemished firstborn animal when the Temple is standing is invalid, is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who dispute Rabbi Yosei HaGelili’s opinion.

The Gemara answers: He said to him that this is not difficult: Do you speak of gifts to which members of the priesthood are entitled, of which a firstborn animal is an example? Gifts of the priesthood are different from other offerings of lesser sanctity, as when the priests receive their portions, they receive them from the table of the Most High. Rabbi Yosei HaGelili claims that the act of consecration of an animal as an offering of lesser sanctity does not nullify one’s ownership of the animal. The sanctity of a firstborn offering takes effect with its birth, so it may be that it was never owned; rather, it is reasonable that the Torah provided the priest only with the right and the obligation to partake of it after it is sacrificed.

§ The Gemara considers the matter itself: The baraita teaches: Concerning one who steals another’s property and takes a false oath denying he has done so, incurring the obligation to bring a guilt-offering, the verse states: “And commits a trespass against the Lord, and deals falsely with his neighbor” (Leviticus 5:21). The verse serves to include a case in which one denies having in his possession offerings of lesser sanctity, which are the property of their owners, and are included in the phrase “and deals falsely with his neighbor.” This is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. Abba Yosei ben Dostai says: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering.

The Master said in the baraita: Ben Azzai says: This phrase serves to include peace-offerings. The Gemara asks: Ben Azzai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to peace-offerings, is to exclude what?

If we say it is to exclude a firstborn offering, because he holds that a firstborn is not the property of the priest, one could reject this, as the sanctity of a firstborn offering is a lesser sanctity than that of a peace-offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to peace-offerings, which have a higher degree of sanctity such that they require placing hands on the head of the offering and are accompanied by libations and the waving of their breast and the right hind leg by the priest and owner together, you nevertheless say that it is the property of the owners, is it necessary to state that with regard to a firstborn offering, for which these halakhot do not apply, that the priest has ownership of it?

Rather, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Azzai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering, i.e., every tenth animal of one’s flock that is designated as tithe for those ten animals and is sacrificed as an offering of lesser sanctity. Animal tithes are excluded because ben Azzai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it.

Ravina taught the preceding discussion with regard to the last clause of the baraita: Abba Yosei ben Dostai says that ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara asks: Abba Yosei ben Dostai’s interpretation of the phrase, limiting its interpretation to a reference only to a firstborn offering, is to exclude what?

If we say it is to exclude peace-offerings, because he holds that they are not the property of the one who consecrated them as offerings, one could reject this, as the sanctity of peace-offerings is a lesser sanctity than that of a firstborn offering, as follows: Now, just as with regard to a firstborn offering, which is already sanctified upon its emergence from the womb yet nevertheless is the property of the priest, is it necessary to state that peace-offerings are the property of those who consecrated them, where the animals were already the property of its owner before they were consecrated?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Abba Yosei ben Dostai mentioned peace-offerings in order to exclude an animal tithe offering. Animal tithes are excluded because Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that an animal tithe offering is not the property of the owner of the flock.

This is as it is taught in a baraita: With regard to a firstborn offering it is stated: “You shall not redeem” (Numbers 18:17), indicating that the owner can never fully redeem the offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the firstborn offering can be sold when it is unblemished and alive, or when it is blemished and alive, or blemished and slaughtered. With regard to animal tithe offerings, it is stated: “It shall not be redeemed” (Leviticus 27:33), indicating that the one who designated it can never fully redeem an animal tithe offering, thereby removing its sanctity. And the animal tithe offering cannot be sold, not when it is alive and not when it is slaughtered, not when unblemished and not when blemished. The fact that the sale of an animal tithe offering is invalid demonstrates that it is not the property of the one who designated it.

The Gemara asks: How can one claim that Abba Yosei ben Dostai holds that peace-offerings are also owned by those who consecrated them? Doesn’t Abba Yosei ben Dostai say: Ben Azzai said this only with regard to a firstborn offering. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

§ The Gemara cites an alternative explanation of the mishna’s statement: Rava said: What does the mishna mean when it says: One is liable only for damage caused to property for which, were one to use it for a mundane purpose, one would not be liable for the misuse of consecrated property? It is referring to property that is not at all subject to the halakhot of misuse of consecrated property, and what is that? It is referring to any property of an ordinary person, which has no sanctity at all.

The Gemara asks: But then let the mishna teach explicitly: One is liable only for damage caused to property of an ordinary individual. The Gemara concedes: This is difficult.

§ Rabbi Abba says: With regard to the case of an innocuous animal that was consecrated as a peace-offering and that caused damage, the injured party collects damages from its meat, i.e., from the portion of the offering that would have been eaten by its owners. This is in accordance with the general halakha that the payment for damage caused by an innocuous ox is collected exclusively from the proceeds of the sale of the body of the ox and not from any other property of its owner. But he does not collect the damages from the sacrificial portions.

The Gemara asks: Isn’t it obvious that one collects exclusively from the meat portion and not from the sacrificial portions, as those are to be offered up to God?

The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that there is no collection from the owner’s meat portions corresponding to the sacrificial portions. Payment for damage caused by an innocuous animal is half the amount of the damages, and can be no more than the value of the animal itself. Rabbi Abba is teaching that when assessing the damage to determine the amount to be paid, one deems the owner responsible only according to his share of the animal, i.e., the meat portions, in relation to the animal as a whole.

Rabbi Natan and the Rabbis engage in a dispute concerning the halakha in a case in which an ox pushed another animal into a pit (see 53a). If it were an innocuous ox, for which the Torah limits the owner’s liability to half the damages, the Rabbis rule that liability is incurred exclusively by the owner of the ox, i.e., he pays half the value of the damage, and the owner of the pit is entirely exempt. Rabbi Natan holds that since the damage was caused jointly by the ox and the pit, the owner of the ox need pay only half of what he would pay if his animal had been solely responsible, i.e., a quarter of the damages. Rabbi Natan further rules that the remaining sum can then be fully recovered from the owner of the pit, i.e., he pays the remaining three-quarters of the damages. The Gemara asks: In accordance with whose opinion, of those tanna’im, does Rabbi Abba state his ruling?

If it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, then it is obvious and there is no need to state it, as didn’t the Rabbis say: Whenever, for whatever reason, the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this party, it is not recovered from that party, i.e., even though the injured party suffered the loss of the full value of his animal and recovered only half its value from the owner of the ox, he may not demand the remaining sum from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, where the injured party cannot collect damages from the sacrificial portions, he cannot recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering.

And if it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Natan, doesn’t he say: Whenever the full cost of the damage cannot be recovered from this one, it is recovered from that one, i.e., since the owner of the ox pays only a quarter of the damages, the remaining sum can be recovered from the owner of the pit. So too, in this case, since the injured party cannot collect payment from the sacrificial portions, he should be able to recover that loss from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering, in contrast to the ruling of Rabbi Abba.

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan, and if you wish, say his ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis.

The Gemara explains: If you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with the Rabbis, as one might have thought that this matter, the ruling of the Rabbis, applies only where the damage is caused by two bodies, such as an ox and a pit. But where the damage is caused by one body, as in the case of damage caused by a an animal consecrated as a peace-offering, the injured party can say to the owner of the animal: From anywhere that I want to, I will recover my losses, and accordingly, the injured party could collect the full cost of the damage from the meat portions of the one who brought the offering. Therefore, it is necessary for Rabbi Abba to teach that this is not the halakha.

And if you wish, say Rabbi Abba’s ruling is in accordance with Rabbi Natan: It is only there that the owner of the damaged ox can say to the owner of the pit: Since I found my ox in your pit, ultimately you bear responsibility for any damage, and therefore whatever I cannot recover from the other one, i.e., the owner of the ox, I will recover from you.

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
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