with one Paschal offering? Although it is impossible for all of the Jewish people to each eat an olive-bulk from one offering, they nevertheless fulfill their obligation to sacrifice the Paschal offering by sacrificing one animal, as it is stated with regard to the Paschal offering: “And the whole assembly of the congregation of Israel shall slaughter it in the afternoon” (Exodus 12:6). Is it so that the whole assembly slaughters it? But only one person from each group slaughters. Rather, it can be derived from here that all of the Jews can fulfill their obligations with one Paschal offering, despite the fact that not everyone will be able to eat from it. Since Rabbi Yonatan derives from this verse that one offering suffices, from where does he derive the halakha of agency with regard to offerings?

The Gemara answers: He derives it from that very same verse, as it can be seen that one person slaughters the animal on behalf of the rest of the assembly. The Gemara rejects this: But perhaps it is different there, since the one slaughtering the animal has partnership with them in the offering. This does not prove that there is agency when the agent has no share in the offering.

Rather, he derives agency with regard to offerings from here: “And they shall take to them every man a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses, a lamb for a household” (Exodus 12:3). This demonstrates that one person takes a lamb and slaughters it on behalf of the entire family. The Gemara asks: But perhaps there too there is agency since the one slaughtering the animal has partnership with them? The Gemara rejects this: If so, why do I need two verses to teach the same halakha? If the halakha stated in this verse is not applicable for where it belongs, i.e., with regard to an agent who is a partner in the offering, apply it to where it does not belong, so that even one who does not have a share in the offering can act as an agent.

The Gemara rejects this: This verse is required for him to teach another halakha, that of Rabbi Yitzḥak, as Rabbi Yitzḥak says: This verse is the source for the halakha that a man, i.e., an adult, can acquire an item on behalf of others, but that a minor cannot acquire an item on behalf of others. The Gemara answers: That halakha, that only an adult can acquire an item on behalf of others, is derived from the verse: “According to every man’s eating you shall make your count for the lamb” (Exodus 12:4). By employing the term “man,” which indicates an adult, the verse teaches that only an adult can acquire an item on behalf of others.

The Gemara asks another question: And still the verse “according to every man’s eating” is required for him to teach the halakha that one may slaughter a Paschal offering for an individual. It does not have to be “a lamb, according to their fathers’ houses,” as implied by the previous verse. A lamb may be slaughtered even by one person, i.e., “every man” for himself. The Gemara answers: Rabbi Yonatan holds in accordance with the opinion of the one who says that one may not slaughter a Paschal offering for an individual.

The Gemara asks a question from a different source: But consider that which Rav Giddel says that Rav says: From where is it derived that the legal status of a person’s agent is like that of himself? It is as it is stated with regard to the division of Eretz Yisrael among the Jewish people: “And you shall take one prince of every tribe, to take possession of the land” (Numbers 34:18). This indicates that the prince of each tribe acted as the agent to claim the land for each member of his tribe. Let the halakha of agency be derived from here; why is there a need to have the sources quoted above? The Gemara answers: And how can you understand that this process of the princes claiming the land was due to agency? But minors cannot be involved in agency, and the princes claimed the land for all members of their tribe, adults and minors alike.

Rather, the distribution of the land by the princes follows a different principle, like that statement of Rava bar Rav Huna, as Rava bar Rav Huna says that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: From where is it derived that one can act in a person’s interest in his absence? It is as it is stated: “And you shall take one prince.” The princes were not appointed as agents and could act for the benefit of the minors. The Gemara asks: And how can you understand that it is a benefit? But it was also to their disadvantage, as there is one person for whom it is preferable to him to receive a portion on a hill and it is not preferable to him to receive a portion in a valley, and there is one person for whom it is preferable to him to receive a portion in a valley and it is not preferable to him to receive a portion on a hill. The prince might claim land for members of his tribe that they do not want, and one cannot act to another’s disadvantage in his absence.

Rather, the verse is required to teach a different halakha, like that statement of Rava bar Rav Huna, as Rava bar Rav Huna says that Rav Giddel says that Rav says: From where is it derived that if orphans came to divide their father’s property, that the court appoints a steward for them, both to their disadvantage and to their benefit? Before the Gemara completes the quote, it analyzes the statement: Why would the court appoint a steward to their disadvantage? Rather, it means to their disadvantage in order to achieve their eventual benefit. Once a steward has been appointed to control the orphans’ estate, he has the authority to act to their temporary disadvantage if they are ultimately likely to benefit from the action. And the source of this halakha is as the verse states: “And you shall take one prince of every tribe” (Numbers 34:18).

§ With regard to the halakhot of stewardship, Rav Naḥman says that Shmuel says: If orphans came to divide their father’s property, the court appoints a steward for them, and they select for them, i.e., for each of the orphans, a fine portion. And when they have grown up, the orphans can protest the division and demand redistribution of the property. And Rav Naḥman said his own statement: When they have grown up, they cannot protest, as if so, what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? In other words, to strengthen the authority of the court, it is required that its decisions not be questioned later on.

The Gemara asks: And is Rav Naḥman of the opinion that there is a consideration of: If so, what advantage does the court have over an ordinary person? But didn’t we learn in a mishna (Ketubot 99b): The halakha with regard to the appraisal by the judges of the value of a piece of property in order to sell it is as follows: Where they decreased the price by one-sixth of its market value or added one-sixth to its market value, their sale is void. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: Their sale is valid. And Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: If so, if the sale is void, then what advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person? And Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: The halakha is in accordance with the statement of the Rabbis. This indicates that Rav Naḥman does not accept the consideration of: What advantage is there to the power of the court over an ordinary person?

The Gemara answers: This is not difficult.