“Her brother-in-law will engage in sexual intercourse with her and take her to him as a wife, and perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that intercourse renders her his wife. The Gemara asks: But one can say that with regard to all matters she is like a wife, and therefore she can also be acquired with money or a document like any other woman. The Gemara answers: It could not enter your mind to say this, as it is taught in a baraita: One might have thought that money and a document can complete the acquisition of a yevama and cause her to be married, in the manner that intercourse completes her acquisition. Therefore, the verse states: “And perform levirate marriage with her” (Deuteronomy 25:5), which indicates that only intercourse completes her acquisition, but money or a document do not complete her acquisition.

The Gemara asks: But one can say: What is the meaning of: “And perform levirate marriage with her”? It teaches that he can perform levirate marriage without her consent, as unlike an ordinary marriage, a levirate marriage does not require the woman’s agreement. The Gemara answers: If so, let the verse say: And perform levirate marriage, and one would understand that the matter depends entirely on him. What is the meaning of: “And perform levirate marriage with her”? Learn two conclusions from this: First, that a levirate marriage can be performed against her will, and second, that the only way to acquire a yevama is through sexual intercourse.

§ The mishna teaches that the yevama acquires herself through ḥalitza. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers: As it is written with regard to levirate marriage, after the yavam has performed ḥalitza: “And his name shall be called in Israel: The house of him who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10). This indicates: Once his shoe is removed by her, she is permitted to all of Israel.

The Gemara asks: This term “Israel,” does it come to teach this halakha? It is required for that which is taught by Rav Shmuel bar Yehuda: The verse says “in Israel” to teach that ḥalitza may be performed only in a Jewish court, but not in a gentile court. The Gemara answers that the phrase “in Israel” is written twice in that chapter: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), and: “To establish a name for his brother in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:7). A different halakha is derived from each of these instances.

The Gemara asks: But still, we also require the additional term “in Israel” for that which is taught in a baraita, that Rabbi Yehuda said: Once we were sitting before Rabbi Tarfon and a yevama came to perform ḥalitza. And Rabbi Tarfon said to us after the ḥalitza: All of you should answer and say: The one whose shoe was removed, the one whose shoe was removed. This indicates that the phrase: “And his name shall be called in Israel” (Deuteronomy 25:10), teaches that the matter must be announced and publicized throughout the nation. The Gemara answers: That halakha is not derived from the phrase “in Israel.” Rather, it is derived from: “And his name shall be called,” which indicates that it must be announced that this is his name.

§ The mishna further teaches that a yevama is released from levirate marriage and may remarry through the death of the yavam. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive this halakha? The Gemara answers that it is an a fortiori inference: If, with regard to a married woman, who is forbidden to other men by a prohibition punished with strangulation, and yet the death of her husband renders her permitted, is it not all the more so that with regard to a yevama, who is forbidden to other men while the yavam is alive by only a mere prohibition, that the death of the yavam should render her permitted?

The Gemara raises a difficulty against this a fortiori inference: What is unique about a married woman is that she can leave through a bill of divorce as well. Will you say the same with regard to this yevama, who does not leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: This is an insufficient refutation of the a fortiori inference, as this yevama also leaves through ḥalitza, which serves the same function as a bill of divorce.

Rather, one can challenge this a fortiori inference in the following manner. What is unique about a married woman is that the one who renders her forbidden to everyone else, i.e., her husband, also renders her permitted when he dies. This is not so with regard to a yevama, as she is rendered forbidden upon the death of her husband. Rav Ashi said: With regard to this yevama as well, he who renders her forbidden is also the one who renders her permitted: The yavam renders her forbidden, because if he was not alive she would automatically be permitted to other men. Likewise, the yavam renders her permitted through ḥalitza.

The Gemara asks: And let a married woman leave a marriage through ḥalitza, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a yevama, who cannot leave through a bill of divorce, can leave through ḥalitza, is it not logical that this married woman, who can leave through a bill of divorce, can likewise leave through ḥalitza? The Gemara answers: The verse states with regard to a married woman: “A scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3), which indicates that a scroll, i.e., a written document, severs her from her husband and nothing else severs her from him. While the husband is alive only a bill of divorce can dissolve a marriage.

The Gemara further asks: And let a yevama leave through a bill of divorce, as derived by an a fortiori inference: If a married woman, who cannot leave through ḥalitza, can leave through a bill of divorce, is it not logical that this yevama, who can leave through ḥalitza, can also leave through a bill of divorce? The Gemara answers: The verse states: “So shall it be done to the man” (Deuteronomy 25:9), with regard to the ḥalitza of a yevama, and “so” precludes another option.

The Gemara asks: And is it true that anywhere that there is a term that precludes another option one cannot learn an a fortiori inference? But there is the case of the designation of the goats on Yom Kippur, as it is written: “The goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord” (Leviticus 16:9), and: “This shall be an everlasting statute to you” (Leviticus 16:34), which indicates that everything stated with regard to the mitzvot of Yom Kippur is critical to the performance of the service of the day.

And it is taught in a baraita that the verse states: “Aaron shall bring forward the goat upon which the lot came up for the Lord, and he shall offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9). The verse indicates that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering.

The baraita continues: A verse is necessary to teach this halakha, as one might have thought that the opposite conclusion is correct: Could this not be derived through an a fortiori inference, as follows: Just as in a case in which the use of a lottery does not effect the consecration of the animals with a specific designation, e.g., with regard to a woman who has given birth and must bring two birds, one as a sin-offering and one as a burnt-offering, and nevertheless a verbal designation of the animals with the required status does effect the consecration of them, so too, in a case in which the use of a lottery does effect the consecration of the animals, is it not logically right that a verbal designation of the animals with the required status should effect the consecration of them?

To counter this reasoning, the verse states with regard to the goat: “He shall offer it for a sin-offering” (Leviticus 16:9), to indicate that the lottery renders it a sin-offering, but a verbal designation of the goat with the status of a sin-offering does not render it a sin-offering. And the reason that a verbal designation is ineffective is that the verse excluded this possibility, from which it may be inferred that if it were not so, one would learn an a fortiori inference, even though it is written with regard to it “statute.” The same logic should apply in the case of ḥalitza, i.e., the term “so” should not prevent one from learning an a fortiori inference, and therefore it might be argued that a yevama can be released through a bill of divorce.

Rather, the Gemara explains that here too, there is a limitation derived from a verse. The verse states with regard to a bill of divorce: “And write for her a scroll of severance” (Deuteronomy 24:3). “For her” is a limitation, which teaches: A bill of divorce is effective for a regular woman but not for a yevama. The Gemara asks: But one can say that the phrase “for her” indicates that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake.

The Gemara answers: “For her” is written twice (Deuteronomy 24:1, 3), and therefore both halakhot can be derived. The Gemara asks: And still, one instance of: “For her” is required to teach that the bill of divorce must be written for her sake, and the other “for her” is needed to teach: For her and not both for her and for another, i.e., her rival wife. One bill of divorce cannot be used for two women.

Rather, the Gemara suggests a different explanation as to why a bill of divorce is ineffective for a yevama. With regard to a yevama the verse states: “The house of him who had his shoe removed” (Deuteronomy 25:10), which teaches: If she is released by the ḥalitza of the shoe, yes, she is released from the yavam, but if she was released by means of something else, no, she is not released.

The Gemara asks: But this term “shoe,” does it come to teach this? It is necessary for that which is taught in a baraita: The verse said: “And remove his shoe” (Deuteronomy 25:9). I have derived only that his shoe may be used. From where do I derive that the shoe of any person may also be used for ḥalitza?

The verse states “shoe,” and states again in the next verse “shoe,” which includes any other shoe. If so, what is the meaning when the verse states “his shoe,” which is apparently referring to the shoe of that particular man? This teaches that it must be his shoe that is fit for him, excluding a shoe so large that he cannot walk in it, and excluding a shoe so small that it does not cover most of his foot, and excluding