The Gemara asks: What is different about the former clause, which states that he in only liable to bring one sin-offering for each Shabbat, and the latter clause, which states that he is liable for each and every primary category of labor that he performed? Rav Safra said: Here, where he is unaware that the day was Shabbat, when he realizes that he sinned, it is due to awareness of Shabbat that he desists. When he is told that it was Shabbat, he stops immediately. And here, where he is unaware that the labors are prohibited, it is due to awareness of the labors that he desists. When he is told that this labor is prohibited, he stops immediately. Rav Naḥman said to Rav Safra: Does he desist due to Shabbat for any reason other than because he knows that the labors are prohibited? If he did not know that the labor is prohibited, telling him that it is Shabbat would not cause him to desist. And similarly, does he desist from performing the labors when told that it is prohibited for any reason other than because he knows that it is Shabbat? If he did not know that it was Shabbat, there would be no reason for him to desist from labor. Ostensibly, attributing the distinction between the two parts of the mishna to what eventually became known to him in the different cases is incorrect. Rather, Rav Naḥman said: The offering that the Torah obligated him to bring; for what is he so obligated? It is for performing an unwitting transgression. There, where he was unaware that the day was Shabbat, he was unwitting with regard to one matter; here, where he was unaware of the prohibited labors, he was unwitting with regard to multiple matters, and he is liable to bring sin-offerings in accordance with the number of matters of which he was unaware.

We learned in the mishna that one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each prohibited labor that he performs on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: From where do we derive the division of labors? What is the source of the halakha that if one performs numerous prohibited labors on Shabbat in the course of one lapse of awareness, each prohibited labor is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment? Shmuel said that the verse says: “And you shall observe the Shabbat, for it is holy to you; he who desecrates it shall surely die [mot yumat]” (Exodus 31:14). We learn from the double language, mot yumat, that the Torah amplified multiple deaths for a single desecration. Although several violations were committed in the course of a single lapse of awareness, each is considered a separate offense with regard to punishment. The Gemara asks: That verse was written with regard to intentional transgression. The Gemara is seeking a source for multiple sacrifices brought for unwitting transgression. The Gemara answers: If it does not refer to the matter of intentional transgression, as the verse does not teach a halakha applicable to intentional acts, as it was already written: “Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God; all who desecrate it shall die” (Exodus 35:2), refer it to the matter of unwitting transgression. The verse teaches that that which was written with regard to the death penalty for desecration of Shabbat in general applies to all halakhot of Shabbat, including cases of unwitting transgression. And what, then, is the meaning of the term: Shall die, in the verse? Does it mean that one who commits an unwitting transgression is punishable by death? It means that he shall die by payment of money. Death is used in the sense of punishment; he will be forced to pay for numerous sacrifices to atone for his sins.

The Gemara asks: And let him derive division of labors from where it was derived according to Rabbi Natan, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Natan says that it is written: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). Why does the verse state this halakha? The prohibition against kindling is included in the general prohibition against performing labor on Shabbat. Rather, it should be understood as follows. Since it is already stated: “And Moses gathered the entire assembly of the children of Israel and said to them: These are the things [eleh hadevarim] that God has commanded to perform them. Six days you shall perform work, and on the seventh day it shall be holy to you, a Shabbat of rest to God” (Exodus 35:1–2), and Rabbi Natan derives as follows: “These are the things,” which refers to the halakhot of Shabbat, there are emphases in this phrase that are superfluous in the context of the verse. The Torah could have simply stated: This is a thing [davar]. When it states: Things [devarim] in the plural, it teaches at least two points. The addition of the definite article: The things [hadevarim], adds at least a third point. The numerological value of letters of the word eleh: Alef, one; lamed, thirty; and heh, five, is thirty-six. The total numerical value, three plus thirty-six, derived from the phrase: “These are the things.” This alludes to the thirty-nine prohibited labors that were stated to Moses at Sinai.

I might have thought that if one performed them all in the course of one lapse of awareness, forgetting that they are prohibited, he would be liable to bring only one sin-offering? Therefore, the verse states: “Six days you shall work, and on the seventh you shall rest; in plowing time and in harvest time you shall rest” (Exodus 34:21), indicating that there are prohibitions specific to both plowing and harvesting. And still I can say: For plowing and for the harvesting he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as they were stated explicitly. However, for performing all the other prohibited labors, he is liable for only one. Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not kindle fire in all your dwellings on the day of Shabbat” (Exodus 35:3). This is derived in the following manner: Kindling was included in the general prohibition prohibiting all labors, and why was it singled out and prohibited explicitly? It was singled out in order to equate the other labors to it and to tell you: Just as kindling is a primary category of prohibited labor, and one is liable for performing it on its own, so too, with regard to every primary category of prohibited labor, one is liable for performing it on its own.

Rabbi Natan cited a source proving that there is liability for performance of each prohibited labor of Shabbat on its own. Why doesn’t Shmuel derive that halakha from the same source? The Gemara answers: Shmuel holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, who disagreed with Rabbi Natan’s interpretation of the verse, as Rabbi Yosei said: The prohibition against kindling on Shabbat was singled out to teach that one who lights a fire on Shabbat merely violates a prohibition. Performing other primary categories of prohibited labor is punishable by stoning or karet. In contrast, one who lights a fire on Shabbat has merely violated a prohibition, as it was taught in a baraita: The prohibition of kindling was singled out as a prohibition; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei. Rabbi Natan says: Kindling is like any other labor prohibited on Shabbat. It was singled out to divide the various labors and to establish liability for performance of each of them.

The Gemara raises an additional challenge to Shmuel’s opinion. If he holds in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yosei with regard to the explicit prohibition of kindling, let him derive the division of labors from where Rabbi Yosei derives it. As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yosei says, it is stated: “Speak to the children of Israel, saying: A soul that sins in error, from all the commandments of God that may not be performed, and performs from one of them [me’aḥat me’hena]” (Leviticus 4:2). Rabbi Yosei interprets the verse that at times one is liable to bring one sin-offering for all of his transgressions, and at times one is liable to bring a sin-offering for each and every transgression. And Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Ḥanina, said: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei? He interprets the unique phrase employed in that verse: From one of these. The Torah could have merely stated: One [aḥat]. Instead, it stated: From one [me’aḥat]. It could have merely stated: Them [hena]. Instead, it stated: Of them [me’hena]. Rabbi Yosei derives that there are cases of one transgression that, with regard to punishment, are them, i.e., many. And there are cases of them, several transgressions, that, with regard to punishment, are one.

Furthermore: The term one refers to a full-fledged transgression of Shabbat, e.g., one who intended to and wrote a complete name, Shimon. The term from one refers to a case where he performed only part of the transgression, e.g., one who wrote