everyone agrees that it is valid. And the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. As if you wish, say that the mishna is referring to a case where the qualification is written before the essential part of the bill of divorce, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis. And if you wish, say that it is referring to a case where the qualification is written after the essential part, and everyone, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, agrees with regard to its ruling.

And Rava said: The dispute between Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi and the Rabbis is with regard to a case where the condition is written after the essential part, as Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi holds that we issue a decree rendering the bill of divorce invalid due to a case where the condition is written before the essential part, and the Rabbis hold that we do not issue a decree due to a case where it is written before the essential part. But if it is written before the essential part, everyone agrees that it is invalid.

And accordingly, the mishna, which teaches that if he wrote his qualification in the bill of divorce it is invalid, and we established that it is referring only to a case of an exception, but a condition does not render the bill of divorce invalid, does not contradict this baraita. It is referring to a case where he wrote the condition after the essential part, and it is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that a condition written after the essential part does not render the bill of divorce invalid.

The father of Rabbi Avin taught a baraita before Rabbi Zeira: If one wrote a conditional bill of divorce, everyone agrees that it is invalid. Rabbi Zeira asked him: Everyone agrees that it is invalid? But don’t they disagree about this?

Rabbi Zeira therefore modified the baraita in accordance with his opinion: Rather, say that everyone agrees that it is valid. And what are the circumstances in which both sides agree that it is valid? It is referring to a case where the condition is written after the essential part of the bill of divorce.

The Gemara counters: Let Rabbi Zeira say an alternative modification of the baraita: It is invalid, omitting the words: Everyone agrees, and this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. The Gemara answers: The tanna taught him that everyone agrees, which is a conspicuous statement. Although he may conceivably confuse the word valid with invalid, he certainly does not confuse the phrase: It is, with the phrase: Everyone agrees. Therefore, Rabbi Zeira modified the baraita the way he did.

MISHNA: If a man says to his wife while handing her a bill of divorce: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except to marry my father or to marry your father, to marry my brother or to marry your brother, to marry a slave or to marry a gentile, or to marry anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, the divorce is valid. Since these men cannot betroth her anyway, his qualification is meaningless.

If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man, except for when doing so violates the following: The prohibition against a widow being married to a High Priest; the prohibition against a divorcée or a yevama who performed ḥalitza [ḥalutza] being married to a common priest; a mamzeret or a Gibeonite woman being married to an Israelite man; an Israelite woman being married to a mamzer or to a Gibeonite man; or marrying anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, even if this betrothal would be a transgression, such as in the aforementioned cases; in all of these cases the divorce is invalid. His statement renders it a partial divorce, as the woman is still not permitted to marry any man who is eligible to betroth her.

GEMARA: The stating of the generalization in the first clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she cannot legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable to receive karet for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, who are not listed explicitly in the mishna. The stating of the generalization in the last clause of the mishna: Anyone to whom she can legally become betrothed, serves to include the rest of those liable by a prohibition for engaging in sexual intercourse with her, such as an Ammonite and a Moabite, a Gibeonite, an Egyptian, and an Edomite (Deuteronomy 23:4, 8–9). Although they are all prohibited from engaging in sexual intercourse with her due to a prohibition or a positive mitzva, she can legally become betrothed to them.

§ Rava raised a dilemma before Rav Naḥman: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for a betrothal to so-and-so, who is a minor boy at that time, what is the halakha? Do we say that now, since he is in any event not eligible for betrothal, as a minor boy cannot betroth a woman, the husband’s qualification does not prohibit his wife to anyone, and it is a complete act of severance? Or perhaps, since he will reach eligibility for betrothal, is the husband’s qualification considered as prohibiting her to someone to whom betrothal could apply?

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned the solution to this dilemma in a baraita: A minor girl can get divorced from her husband even if she was betrothed to him through her father’s betrothal, i.e., her father betrothed her to her husband (see Deuteronomy 22:16).

Why can she? But don’t we need there to be a broad similarity between the halakhot of divorce and betrothal, as derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: “And she departs,” and the clause: “And becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), which serves as the basis for the comparison of the halakhot of divorce and betrothal? Accordingly, since she will not be eligible to receive her own betrothal until she reaches majority, she should not be able to receive her bill of divorce. Rather, evidently, since she will eventually reach the age of eligibility to receive her own betrothal she is considered essentially eligible for betrothal now as well. Here also, since the minor boy, whom the husband prohibited the wife from marrying, will reach the age of eligibility for betrothal, the divorce is invalid.

Rava raised another dilemma: If the husband says that she is permitted to marry any man except for those who will be born in the future, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event they are not yet born, the qualification is void, as it pertains to people who do not exist? Or perhaps they are considered forbidden to her as they will be born in the future.

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid; if it is so that future situations are taken into account, a slave and a gentile are also likely to convert. Therefore, the husband is prohibiting her from marrying a man whom she might be able to marry in the future, which should render the divorce invalid. Evidently, only the present situation is taken into consideration.

The Gemara rejects this solution: Those people do not stand before the court ready to convert. It is only a possibility that they will convert, as there is no reason to assume that they will do so. By contrast, these people who will be born stand ready to be born. Therefore, this solution cannot be inferred from the mishna.

Rava raised another dilemma: If he permits her to marry any man except for her sister’s husband, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that now, since in any event she is not yet fit for him, as sexual intercourse between them is punishable by karet, the divorce is valid? Or perhaps should it be reasoned that sometimes a woman’s sister dies and she is thereby fit to marry her husband?

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned the solution to your dilemma in the mishna, which states that if the husband says that she is forbidden to marry a slave or to marry a gentile the divorce is valid. And a slave and a gentile are also potentially fit to marry her as they are likely to convert. Evidently, only the current situation is taken into account. The Gemara rejects this; whereas conversion is uncommon, death is common.

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to any man except for your licentiousness, meaning she may get married to any man but she may not engage in sexual intercourse outside of a second marriage, as she is still rendered a married woman in that regard, what is the halakha in this case? Is the divorce valid? Should it be reasoned that with regard to marriage he did not leave anything out of the divorce, as she is permitted to marry any man, or perhaps he left out part of the divorce with regard to sexual intercourse?

Rav Naḥman said to him: You learned the solution in the mishna: If the husband says while handing her the bill of divorce: You are hereby forbidden to my father or to your father, the divorce is valid. And with regard to what action is this stated? If we say that it is with regard to marriage, are my father and your father eligible for marriage? Her betrothal to them would not take effect. Rather, is it not with regard to them engaging in licentiousness with her? And it may be inferred from the mishna that only if he renders her forbidden to my father or to your father is it not considered as if he left out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid; but if he renders her forbidden to engage in licentiousness with another man, it is considered as if he left out part of the divorce, and it will not take effect.

The Gemara rejects this: Perhaps the mishna is referring to marriage, where the father transgresses the prohibition and marries her anyway. Therefore, the halakha with regard to licentiousness cannot be inferred from here.

Rava raised another dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to any man except for engaging in intercourse in an atypical manner, i.e., anal intercourse, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to typical sexual intercourse he did not leave out part of the divorce, rendering the divorce valid? Or perhaps from the fact that the expression: “Cohabitations of a woman” (Leviticus 20:13), is written in the plural, it is derived that typical and atypical sexual intercourse have the same status, and accordingly this is considered a partial divorce, and it will not take effect.

The Gemara raises a similar dilemma: If he says to her that she is permitted to marry any man: Except for the halakhot of the nullification of your vows, i.e., no man who marries her can nullify her vows other than her ex-husband, who retains his power to do so, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: “Her husband may sustain it, or her husband may nullify it” (Numbers 30:14), that a husband’s power to nullify his wife’s vows is an intrinsic component of being married, and therefore this divorce is not a complete severance?

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your partaking of teruma, i.e., if she marries a priest she will not be able to partake of teruma, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps is it derived from that which is written: “The purchase of his money, he may eat of it” (Leviticus 22:11), indicating that a priest’s wife partakes of teruma because she is his acquisition, and that if she is prohibited from partaking of teruma, then his acquisition of her is not complete?

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your inheritance, i.e., her future husband will not be considered her husband with regard to the halakhot of inheritance, what is the halakha? Should it be reasoned that with regard to her ability to enter into marriage, he did not leave out anything from his act of severance? Or perhaps since it is derived that a husband inherits from his wife, who is considered his next of kin, from that which is written: “To his kinsman that is next to him of his family and he shall possess it” (Numbers 27:11), then if a husband does not become his wife’s beneficiary, is their marriage not complete?

The Gemara raises another dilemma: If he says to her: You are hereby permitted to marry any man except for your ability to enter betrothal by receiving a document, i.e., if another man betroths her by giving her a document of betrothal, the betrothal will not take effect, what is the halakha? Do we say that since one can still betroth her with money or with sexual intercourse, the act of severance is complete? Or perhaps is it derived from the juxtaposition between the clause: “And she departs” and the clause: “And becomes” (Deuteronomy 24:2), that the different ways of becoming a wife are compared to each other, so that the inability to perform one of them renders the severance incomplete?

The Gemara comments: These dilemmas shall all stand unresolved.

MISHNA: The basic, essential, element of a bill of divorce is: You are hereby permitted to marry any man.