they instituted parallel to Torah law, and they did not innovate novel halakhic models.

And the other Sage, Rav Ḥinnana of Vardonia, why was he silent? He holds that when we say: All ordinances that the Sages instituted, they instituted parallel to Torah law, it is with regard to a matter that is rooted in the Torah, and upon which the Sages instituted an ordinance. However, with regard to a matter that is not rooted in the Torah, e.g., the halakhot of joining courtyards and merging alleyways, no, they did not institute the ordinances parallel to Torah law.

Rav Avya raises another objection to Shmuel’s opinion, according to Rav Ḥisda’s explanations, that a minor cannot acquire property on behalf of others, based on a mishna in tractate Ma’aser Sheni (4:4): One may employ artifice to exempt himself from the obligation to add one-fifth to the sum when redeeming second tithe, which the owner of the tithe is required to add. How so? A person says to his adult son or daughter, or to his Hebrew slave or his maidservant: Here you are, take money and redeem second tithe with it. After they redeem the second tithe, they give it to their father or master and he eats it without adding one-fifth.

The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances of this maidservant? If she developed two pubic hairs, indicating that she reached majority, what is she doing with the owner of the produce? A Hebrew maidservant is emancipated when she reaches puberty. Rather, is the reference here not to a case where she did not yet develop two pubic hairs? Apparently, a minor can also acquire property on behalf of others. The Gemara rejects this proof: With what are we dealing here? It is with tithes today, which is in effect by rabbinic law, and the Sages ruled leniently in matters of rabbinic law.

The Gemara asks: And is there a Hebrew maidservant today? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: The provision of a Hebrew slave is in practice only during a period when the Jubilee Year is in practice. Therefore, there have been no Hebrew slaves or maidservants since observance of the Jubilee Year ceased, before the destruction of the First Temple. Rather, it must be that the mishna is referring to a case where the produce grew in an unperforated pot, which one is obligated to tithe by rabbinic law.

Apropos the capacity of minors to acquire property, Rava says that there are three stages in the development of a minor: With regard to a minor who is given a pebble and he throws it away but when given a nut he takes it, he acquires property for himself but does not acquire property on behalf of others. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of intellectual development, after the death of her father she can be betrothed by her mother and her brother by rabbinic law, and can opt out of that betrothal through refusal.

At the next stage of development are young children aged approximately six through eight, whose purchase is a purchase and whose sale is a sale, with regard to movable property. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she is divorced by receipt of her bill of divorce, even if it is from betrothal by her father, which is by Torah law.

The third stage of development is when they have reached the age of vows, when their vows are valid vows and their consecration is valid consecration. And with regard to a minor girl with the corresponding stage of development, she performs ḥalitza to free herself from her levirate bond. And with regard to selling his father’s landed property, a minor cannot sell it until he will reach the age of twenty.

MISHNA: In the case of a minor girl who said to an agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me, it is not a valid bill of divorce until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. Therefore, if the husband seeks to retract his decision before his wife receives the bill of divorce, he can retract it, as a minor does not designate an agent. Consequently, the agent is not an agent for receipt, and the divorce does not take effect when the husband hands the document to the agent. The agent is an agent for delivery, and the divorce takes effect when the bill of divorce enters the wife’s possession.

And if her father said to the agent: Go out and receive my daughter’s bill of divorce on her behalf, then if the husband seeks to retract his decision, he cannot retract it. As a father can receive the bill of divorce on behalf of his minor daughter, he can designate an agent for receipt, and the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the document to the agent.

With regard to one who says to an agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife in such and such a place, if the agent deviated and gave it to her in another place the divorce is invalid. However, if he said to the agent: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, she is in such and such a place, without explicitly instructing the agent to give her the document there, and he gave it to her in another place the divorce is valid.

With regard to the woman who when designating her agent for receipt said to her agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, and he received it for her in another place, the divorce is invalid; and Rabbi Elazar deems it valid. If she said to him: Bring me my bill of divorce from such and such a place, and he brought it for her from another place, it is valid. Because he is an agent for delivery, the woman is not particular where he receives the bill of divorce, as the divorce takes effect only when the bill of divorce reaches her possession.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And according to Rabbi Elazar, what is different in the first clause, where the agent deviated from the husband’s instructions and delivered the bill of divorce in a different place, where he does not disagree with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna that the divorce is invalid, and what is different in the latter clause, where the agent deviated from the wife’s instructions and received the bill of divorce in a different place, where he disagrees with the unattributed opinion of the first tanna and deems the divorce valid?

The Gemara answers: He, the husband, who divorces his wife of his own volition, insists that the divorce be effected in a certain place. However, she, the wife, who is divorced even against her will, is in no position to insist with regard to the manner in which the divorce will be effected, and is merely indicating a place for him to give her the bill of divorce.

MISHNA: An Israelite woman married to a priest partakes of teruma. If she says to an agent: Bring me my bill of divorce, designating him as an agent for delivery, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches her possession. However, if she says: Receive my bill of divorce for me, thereby designating him as an agent for receipt, it is immediately prohibited for her to partake of teruma. Since the divorce takes effect when the husband hands the bill of divorce to the agent, the concern is that the agent encountered the husband nearby. If the woman said to the agent: Receive my bill of divorce for me in such and such a place, then even if he received it elsewhere, she continues to partake of teruma until the bill of divorce reaches that place. Rabbi Elazar prohibits her from partaking of teruma immediately.

GEMARA: In this mishna, the first tanna apparently states that if the agent for receipt received the bill of divorce in a place other than the place designated by the woman for receipt, the bill of divorce is valid when the agent brings it to the designated place. The Gemara asks: And in any event, is it a valid bill of divorce? But didn’t you say in the first clause, i.e., in the previous mishna, that if the agent received the bill of divorce in another place, it is not a valid bill of divorce?

The Gemara asks: No, this halakha is necessary with regard to a case where she said to him: Receive the bill of divorce for me in the city of Mata Meḥasya, and sometimes you can find him in the city of Babylon. And this is what she is saying: When taking the bill of divorce, anywhere that you find him, take it from him,