And Rabbi Meir further said to the Rabbis: And what would be if there was the slave of a priest, who fled from his master, or the wife of a priest who rebelled against her husband, are they not permitted to partake of teruma, although not the teruma belonging to the master or husband? They are permitted to partake of teruma. But this slave who was emancipated may not partake of teruma at all, even teruma that belongs to other priests. Evidently, emancipation is to his detriment.

The Gemara asks: If so, then Rabbi Meir is saying and responding well to the Rabbis. How do the Rabbis counter his claim? Rava said: This is what they answered and said to him in the mishna: The master can disqualify his slave from partaking of teruma in any event, because he is his master’s acquisition. The implication of this statement is the following: As, if the master desires to disqualify his slave from partaking of teruma after he has fled, he can take four dinars from any Israelite in exchange for the slave, and he thereby disqualifies him from partaking of teruma anywhere that he is located.

The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Rabbi Meir, his explanation works out well with regard to the slave of a priest whose emancipation causes him to be disqualified from partaking of teruma, and therefore it is possible to argue that his emancipation is to his detriment. However with regard to the slave of an Israelite, what can be said? Rabbi Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak says: Emancipation is even to the detriment of a slave of an Israelite, because by freeing him his master causes him to lose the option of engaging in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant. Until this point it was permitted for him to engage in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant, but once he is emancipated these women are forbidden to him.

The Gemara raises a difficulty: On the contrary, by emancipating him the master renders it permitted for him to engage in sexual intercourse with a free woman. The Gemara answers: In the case of a slave, a life of licentiousness is preferable for him. Therefore, he would rather have the right to engage in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant, as she is lowly to him, she is available for him, she is unrestricted for him. None of these descriptions apply to a Jewish woman, and therefore he loses out on the benefit he could have received from being permitted to engage in sexual intercourse with a Canaanite maidservant. Consequently, Rabbi Meir maintains that his emancipation is to his detriment.

MISHNA: In the case of one who says: Give this bill of divorce to my wife, or: Give this bill of manumission to my slave, and then he dies, one does not give it after his death. The reason for this is that bills of divorce and manumission must be transferred by the husband or the master. Once he has died the document can no longer be given, and the agency he appointed for this purpose is likewise canceled. However, if he said: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so, and then he died, one does give the recipient the money after his death.

GEMARA: Rav Yitzḥak bar Shmuel bar Marta says in the name of Rav: And this ruling, that one gives the one hundred dinars after the death of the owner, is the halakha only when those dinars are piled up and placed in a corner at the time of the command.

The Gemara asks: With what are we dealing? If we say that we are dealing with a healthy person who instructs others to give one hundred dinars, then when they are piled, what of it? After all, the recipient did not pull the money, and one must perform an act of acquisition to take possession of movable property. Rather, say that we are dealing with a person on his deathbed, in which case verbal instructions suffice. However, if that is so, why does this halakha apply specifically when the money is piled? The same should be the case when the coins are not piled as well, as we maintain that the statement of a person on his deathbed who distributes his property is considered as though it were written and delivered. If so, no other act of acquisition should be necessary.

Rav Zevid says: Actually, the mishna is dealing with a healthy person, and this ruling is in accordance with that which Rav Huna says that Rav says. As Rav Huna says that Rav says: With regard to one who says to another: I have one hundred dinars in your possession; give it to so-and-so, if this occurred in the presence of all three parties, that third person has acquired it. This type of acquisition applies only to money that is similar to a deposit, e.g., piled money.

Rav Pappa said: Actually, the mishna is dealing with a person on his deathbed, and it is in accordance with another ruling of Rav, as Rav says: With regard to a person on his deathbed who said: Give one hundred dinars to so-and-so from my property, the halakha depends on his precise wording. If he said: Give him this one hundred dinars, where the money is in a particular place, one gives the money to him. However, if he merely said: One hundred dinars, without specification, one does not give it to him.

Why does one not give the one hundred dinars if he did not add further specification? We are concerned that perhaps he spoke about a buried one hundred dinars. In other words, he might have been referring to a specific one hundred dinars whose location is unknown, and he did not intend to give him any other money. For this reason, Rav explains that the mishna is referring to money piled up in a designated place, which the one who gives the instruction is referring to explicitly.

The Gemara comments: And the halakha is that we are not concerned about a buried sum of one hundred dinars, i.e., the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rav. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav Pappa did not say an explanation that is in accordance with that of Rav Zevid with regard to Rav’s statement?