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בעקבות מסכת שקלים - האם תרצה ללמוד עוד מסכת מהתלמוד הירושלמי?





 

Steinsaltz

when they are unallocated and not when they are allocated. Consequently, the same should apply to one whose father separated money for a regular sin-offering, i.e., he should be able to use them for his own sin-offering. Therefore, the verse states: “His offering” (Leviticus 4:32), which serves to emphasize: He fulfills his obligation with his own offering, but he does not fulfill his obligation with the money separated for his father’s offering.

The baraita continues this line of argument: One might have thought that he does not fulfill his obligation with the money that his father separated if it is from money the father set aside to atone for a minor transgression and the son atones for a minor one, or from money the father set aside to atone for a major transgression and the son atones for a major one. However, the son may fulfill his obligation with the offering he separated for himself. From animals he set aside to atone for a minor transgression, he many atone for a major one, or from animals he set aside to atone for a major transgression he may atone for a minor one. Therefore, the verse states: “Then he shall bring for his offering a goat, a female without blemish, for his sin” (Leviticus 4:28), which indicates that he does not fulfill his obligation unless his offering is for the sake of his particular sin, not for some other transgression.

One might have thought that he does not fulfill his obligation with the animal he separated for himself, from animals he set aside to atone for a minor transgression to atone for a minor one; or from animals he set aside to atone for a major transgression, to atone for a major one; or even when from animals he set aside to atone for a minor transgression to atone for a major one; or from animals he set aside to atone for a major transgression to atone for a minor one.

The reason is that if he separated an animal to bring as an offering for unintentionally eating forbidden fat and he instead brought that sin-offering for unintentionally consuming blood, or if he separated an animal to bring as an offering to atone for blood and instead brought it for eating forbidden fat, in that case he has not misused consecrated property, as the animal cannot lose its consecrated status. And just as it cannot lose its consecrated status, so too it cannot be redesignated to atone for a different sin, and therefore this animal also does not atone for him.

However, one might think that he fulfills his obligation with the money he separated for himself, from money he set aside to atone for a minor transgression to atone for a different minor transgression; or from money he set aside to atone for a major transgression to atone for a different major transgression; or from money he set aside to atone for a major transgression to atone for a minor one; or from money he set aside to atone for a minor transgression to atone for a major one.

The reason is that if he separated money for himself to purchase a sin-offering to atone for unintentionally eating forbidden fat and he instead brought a sin-offering with that money for unintentionally consuming blood, or if he separated money to purchase a sin-offering to atone for consuming blood and with that money he instead brought a sin-offering for unintentionally eating forbidden fat, in that case he has misused consecrated property if he uses that money for a non-sacred purpose, as money can lose its sacred status when misappropriated. And just as it can lose its consecrated status, it can be redesignated to atone for a different sin; therefore this money atones for him if it was used to purchase an offering for a different transgression.

Therefore, the verse states: “For his sin” (Leviticus 4:35), which indicates that he does not fulfill his obligation unless his offering is for the sake of his particular sin, and he is not permitted to use money he consecrated for one type of sin to atone for a different sin. This concludes the baraita.

Rava now asks his question: In any event, the baraita teaches that a son may not use an animal separated by his father for his naziriteship offering. What, is it not referring even to a blemished animal? The fact that the baraita does not differentiate between types of animals indicates that a blemished animal has the status of allocated funds, as opposed to Rav Naḥman’s ruling that this animal is like his father’s unallocated funds, which the son himself may use. The Gemara rejects this: No; the baraita refers solely to an unblemished animal that is fit to be sacrificed; only an animal of this kind is considered allocated.

The Gemara asks: However, according to this explanation, what is the halakha of a blemished animal? Is it considered like an unallocated animal? If so, why does the baraita specifically teach that one may purchase an offering with the unallocated funds that his father separated? Let the baraita teach this halakha with regard to a blemished animal, and one would infer that the same applies to money. The Gemara answers as above: So too, this is the case; there is no difference between the two. The reason is that what is a blemished animal fit for? It is fit for its value, and this value is essentially money. Consequently, this baraita does not contradict Rav Naḥman’s opinion that a blemished animal has the status of unallocated funds.

MISHNA: The previous mishna discussed the case of a husband who nullified his wife’s vow after she separated her offerings of naziriteship. This mishna deals with a husband who nullified his wife’s naziriteship after she had completed her term and brought her offerings to the Temple. If the blood from one of her naziriteship offerings was sprinkled on the altar on her behalf, the husband cannot nullify her vow at this point. Rabbi Akiva says: Even before the sprinkling of the blood, he cannot nullify the vow as soon as any one of the animals for her offerings has been slaughtered on her behalf.

The mishna continues: In what case is this statement, that he can no longer nullify the vow, said? It is when she is bringing the offerings for her shaving of ritual purity, when she has completed her term of naziriteship without becoming ritually impure (see Numbers 6:18). However, if she is sacrificing the offerings for her shaving of impurity, when she became ritually impure during her term of naziriteship, after which she restarts her naziriteship (see Numbers 6:9), her husband can nullify her vow. The reason is that he can say: I do not want a downcast [menuvvelet] wife, who does not drink wine. She would have to refrain from wine for a lengthy period if she were to begin her naziriteship anew. Rabbi Meir says: He can nullify her vow even at the stage of her shaving of purity, after she has begun sacrificing her offerings, as he can say: I do not want a shaven wife, and a nazirite is obligated to shave after bringing his or her offerings.

GEMARA: The Gemara comments: The mishna, which rules that a husband cannot nullify his wife’s naziriteship after the blood of her offering has been sprinkled at the end of the naziriteship term, is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. As, if it followed the ruling of Rabbi Eliezer, didn’t he say that shaving is indispensable for the end of a nazirite’s term, i.e., a nazirite at the end of his naziriteship is prohibited from drinking wine and becoming impure from the dead until he actually shaves? And in this case, since she has not yet shaved, she remains prohibited from drinking wine. And since she becomes downcast through her abstinence from wine, evidently the husband can nullify her vow even after the sprinkling of the blood of her offerings of purity.

Talmud - Bavli - The William Davidson digital edition of the Koren No=C3=A9 Talmud
with commentary by Rabbi Adin Steinsaltz Even-Israel (CC-BY-NC 4.0)
אדם סלומון
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