MISHNA: One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who rest on Shabbat is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from Samaritans [Kutim] because they are also Shabbat observers. One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who eat garlic on Shabbat night is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from benefiting from Samaritans. However, if one takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who ascend to Jerusalem is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, but he is permitted to benefit from Samaritans because they do not ascend to Jerusalem, but rather, to Mount Gerizim.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: What is the meaning of the expression in the mishna: Those who rest on Shabbat? If we say that the one who took the vow intended to render forbidden deriving benefit from those who uphold Shabbat, i.e., who actually observe it, why mention specifically that he is prohibited from deriving benefit from Samaritans; even benefit from other gentiles who are Shabbat observers should also be prohibited? Rather, the intention of the tanna was to refer to a case where one took a vow that deriving benefit from those who are commanded about observing Shabbat is forbidden, and this tanna holds that the Samaritans are considered true converts, commanded to observe Shabbat.

The Gemara asks: If that is so, say the latter clause of the mishna: If he takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who ascend to Jerusalem is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew but permitted to derive benefit from Samaritans. Why? But aren’t Samaritans commanded to ascend just like other Jews?

Abaye said: It is teaching about those who are commanded and actually perform a mitzva, and the mishna is to be understood as follows: In the first two clauses of the mishna, which concern Shabbat observance and eating garlic, both Jews and Samaritans are included because they are commanded and actually perform the mitzva. However, with regard to gentiles, those who perform these mitzvot have the status of those who perform the mitzva but are not commanded to do so. Therefore, the one who took the vow is permitted to derive benefit from them. Concerning the case of those who ascend to Jerusalem, a Jew is commanded to keep this mitzva and performs it, while Samaritans are commanded but do not perform it, so he is permitted to derive benefit from them.

MISHNA: If one says: The property of the descendants of Noah is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is permitted to derive benefit from a Jew but prohibited from deriving benefit from the nations of the world.

GEMARA: The Gemara asks: And is a Jew excluded from the category of the descendants of Noah? They are also descendants of Noah. The Gemara answers: Since Abraham was sanctified and designated to possess a unique role in the world, all his descendants are called by his name and are no longer termed the descendants of Noah.

MISHNA: If one says: The property of the offspring of Abraham is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew but permitted to derive benefit from the nations of the world.

GEMARA: Concerning the mishna’s ruling that the one who takes such a vow is permitted to derive benefit from the nations of the world, the Gemara asks: But isn’t there Ishmael and his descendants, who are also Abraham’s offspring? Why isn’t deriving benefit from them forbidden as well? The Gemara answers: It is written with regard to Abraham: “For in Isaac shall seed be called to you” (Genesis 21:12), which demonstrates that the descendants of Ishmael are not termed the offspring of Abraham. The Gemara asks: But isn’t there Esau and his descendants; they are also offspring of Abraham, since they are descendants of Isaac? The Gemara answers that the words “in Isaac” mean that some of Isaac’s descendants, i.e., the children of Jacob, are included in the offspring of Abraham, but not all the descendants of Isaac.

MISHNA: If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he may purchase items from a Jew for more than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for less than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. If one says: Benefit from me is forbidden to a Jew, he may purchase items from a Jew for less than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for more than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. But although this would be permitted, they do not listen to him, i.e., people will generally not agree to deal with him in a manner that causes them a loss in every transaction. If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from them, and my property is forbidden to a Jew and they will not benefit from me, in this case he may benefit from the nations of the world but not from a Jew, and a Jew may not benefit from him.

GEMARA: Shmuel said: In the case of one who takes a vessel from a craftsman to examine it, and an accident occurs to it while it is in his hand, e.g. it broke, the one who examined it is liable to pay for the damages. Since the one examining the item could have completed the sale at any time, he is treated like a borrower while he examines it, as all the benefit is his. The Gemara comments: Apparently, Shmuel holds that in every sale the primary benefit belongs to the buyer. The buyer benefits much more than the seller, and therefore he must pay for accidents.

The Gemara raises a difficulty with Shmuel’s statement: We learned in the mishna that if one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he may sell items to a Jew for less than the market price. The Gemara infers: He may sell at a lesser price, but selling the items at a price equal to the market price is not permitted. But if the primary benefit of the sale is to the buyer, then even selling the items at a price equal to the market price should be permitted. The Gemara answers: The mishna is referring to a sale that lies in his face, i.e., an item that arouses no interest among potential buyers. In that case, the seller benefits from the sale even if the item is sold at market value, and this is prohibited.

The Gemara asks: If so, say the first clause of that halakha: He may purchase items from a Jew for more than the market price. If the mishna deals with a case where the seller is glad to sell, why does the buyer need to pay more? He should be permitted to pay the market value. Furthermore, say the latter clause of the mishna: If one says: Benefit from me is forbidden to a Jew, he may purchase items from a Jew for less than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for more than the market price. But if it is referring to a sale that lies in his face, then even if he sells at the price equal to the purchase price he has more benefit than the buyer, and it should be permitted.

The Gemara answers: The latter clause is referring to the opposite case, in a keen [ḥarifa] sale, i.e., one in which the merchandise arouses keen interest among potential buyers. Therefore, the buyer benefits if he pays the market price. The Gemara asks: If that is so, that the latter clause is referring to such a case, why should the one who took the vow purchase it for less than the market price? Even at the price equal to the purchase price it should be permitted, since the merchandise is selling well and the seller derives no benefit from it. Rather,