Silver, i.e., white, tablecloths [telei] or gold, i.e., colored, tablecloths? Clearly, then, they are not entitled to charity. Rabbi Ḥanina said: This is what Rabbi Elazar said: Come and let us appreciate the swindlers who ask for charity that they do not need, because were it not for them, who command our attention and receive our charity, we would be sinning every day in failing to properly support the truly poor, as it is stated: “Beware that there be not a base thought in your heart, saying: The seventh year, the year of release, is at hand; and your eye be evil against your needy brother, and you will not give him; and he cry to the Lord against you, and it be sin in you” (Deuteronomy 15:9). Because the swindlers take our money in the name of charity, we have an excuse of sorts for failing to fully meet the needs of the truly poor.

And Rabbi Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: With regard to anyone who averts his eyes from the obligation to give charity, it is as if he engages in idol worship. It is written here concerning charity: “Beware that there be not a base [beliya’al] thought in your heart…and you will not give him” (Deuteronomy 15:9), and it is written there concerning idolatry: “Certain base [beliya’al] fellows have gone out” (Deuteronomy 13:14). Just as there, in the latter verse, the word “base [beliya’al]” is referring to idol worship, so too here, this expression indicates a sin on the scale of idol worship.

The Gemara cites a baraita relating to swindlers who collect charity. The Sages taught: One who falsely blinds his eye, and one who bloats his stomach as if he were sick, and one who falsely crushes [mekape’aḥ] his leg, in order to benefit dishonestly from charity, will not depart from the world before he comes to this same plight, and he will truly suffer from the ailment that he feigned. More generally, one who receives charity and does not need it, his end will be that he will not depart from the world before he comes to this state of actually needing charity.

§ We learned in a mishna elsewhere (Pe’a 8:8): Who is entitled to receive charity? Whoever has less than two hundred dinars. However, the administrators of the charities do not require him to sell his house and his accessories to reach the threshold of two hundred dinars. For the purposes of charity, his wealth is calculated based on cash alone. The Gemara asks: And do we not insist that he sell property? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: If he was accustomed to use gold wares, he should now use silver wares. If he was accustomed to use silver wares, he should now use copper wares. This indicates that he is required to sell at least some of his possessions.

Rav Zevid said: This is not difficult. This source, which requires him to sell wares and lower his standard of living, speaks of a bed and a table, and that source, which does not require him to sell his accessories, speaks of his cups and plates. The Gemara asks: What is different about cups and plates, that he is not required to sell them? It is because he says: The cheaper ones are disgusting to me, and I cannot eat with them. The Gemara asks further: If so, with regard to a bed and a table he may also say: I do not accept these lesser wares upon myself, as they are uncomfortable for me. What is the difference between the furnishings and the dishes? Rava, son of Rabba, said: There is no difference; he need not sell furnishings either. The baraita requiring him to sell his property speaks of a silver comb on his table or another comparable novelty or decorative item. Such articles must be sold, but necessities, even luxurious or high quality ones, need not be sold.

The Gemara offers an alternative resolution to the contradiction concerning the requirement to sell property. Rav Pappa said: This is not difficult. Here, the source that does not require him to sell property describes circumstances before he comes to the point of collecting charity. There, the source that requires him to sell property addresses a case that may arise after he comes to the point of collecting charity. If he has more than two hundred dinars and nevertheless collects charity, the court will reclaim from him the charity he has collected. In the event that he does not have enough cash to pay, he is required to sell his property of any type and downgrade to lesser items.

MISHNA: With regard to a minor orphan girl whose mother or brothers married her off, even with her consent to a small dowry, she retains her rights to a proper dowry. And thus, if they wrote for her a dowry of one hundred or of fifty dinars, she may, upon reaching majority, exact from her mother, or brothers, or their respective estates the sum of money that is fit to be given to her as a dowry, which is one-tenth of the family’s estate. Even if she agreed to forgo part of this sum as a minor, she may collect it as an adult.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter before he died, a dowry should be given to the second daughter in the same manner that he gave one to the first daughter. And the Rabbis say: There is no ready standard, since sometimes a person is poor and then becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and then becomes poor, so a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum.

GEMARA: Shmuel said: With respect to her support in the form of the dowry, the court evaluates what she should be given based on the circumstances of the father and gives her the amount that he would have given. The Gemara raises an objection: We have learned: The daughters are sustained and supported from the property of their father. How so? We do not speculate on the basis of his social standing and his previous experience and say: If her father were still alive, he would give her such and such amount. Rather, the court appraises the total worth of the property and gives her a portion of it, without a subjective estimate based on the father. The Gemara analyzes this baraita: What, is it not that the word support is referring to support for the husband, which is the dowry? The Gemara responds: Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: No, it is referring to her own support and the food she receives. That allowance is calculated without considering the father’s practices, but the question of the dowry is still unresolved.

The Gemara asks: But the cited source teaches: They are sustained and supported, which indicates two separate allowances. What, is it not that one term is referring to support for the husband in the form of the dowry and one term is referring to her own support? The Gemara answers: No, this one and that one both refer to her own support for her personal needs. And the use of two terms is not difficult, because this term, sustained, is referring to allowance for eating and drinking, and that term, supported, is referring to clothing and other covering.

We learned in the mishna: And the Rabbis say: Sometimes a person is poor and becomes wealthy, or a person is wealthy and becomes poor, and a family’s allowance for dowries is subject to change. Rather, the court appraises the property and gives her the appropriate sum. The Gemara analyzes this opinion: What is meant by the term poor, and what is meant by the term wealthy? If we say that poor is referring to one who is poor in property, and wealthy is referring to one who is wealthy in property, if so, by inference it seems that the first tanna holds that even if the father was wealthy and then became poor, we give the second daughter a dowry that is like the dowry that he provided originally to the first daughter. But how could we assign such a sum when he does not have enough in the estate?

Rather, is it not that poor means poor in mindset, i.e., he spends his money thriftily as though he were poor, and that wealthy means wealthy in mindset, i.e., he spends money liberally as though he were wealthy? And nevertheless the mishna teaches that even if the father changes his approach to spending, the court appraises the property and gives the dowry to her. Apparently, then, we do not follow the assessment of the father’s intentions but rather give a fixed sum, and this is a conclusive refutation of the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara dismisses the refutation: Shmuel has said his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, as we learned in the mishna: Rabbi Yehuda says: If the father married off the first daughter, a dowry should be given to the second in the same manner that he gave to the first. According to this opinion, the court does assess the father’s tendencies in determining the dowry for the second daughter.

The Gemara asks: And let Shmuel say explicitly that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. Why did he not do so? The Gemara responds: If he had said that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, I would have said that this is specifically when he marries off the first daughter, as he revealed his mind concerning the proper sum of a dowry, but if he did not marry her off before he died, then the court does not assess his disposition to determine the proper amount. Since, however, Shmuel did not merely say that he accepts the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, he teaches us that the reason behind Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion is that we follow the assessment of what the father would have done. It is no different if he married a daughter off, and it is no different if he did not marry one off.

And that which the mishna teaches in Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion: He married off the first daughter, this is to convey to you the far-reaching nature of the dissenting opinion of the Rabbis, who hold that although the father married the first daughter off and revealed his mind with respect to dowries, we still do not follow an assessment of how much the father would have given to the second daughter.

Rava said to Rav Ḥisda: We teach in your name that the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda in this matter. He said to him: May it be God’s will that you will teach in my name all proper statements such as this. Rav Ḥisda agreed with the quote attributed to him.

The Gemara asks: And did Rava actually say this, that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. And Rava said with regard to that baraita: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Evidently, Rava rejects Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion concerning approximating the father’s intent. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. In this instance, Rava adopts Rabbi Yehuda’s opinion because we assessed the father and understood his mindset. In that instance, Rava rules that she should be given one-tenth because we did not assess the father and his mindset could not be determined.

The Gemara notes: So too, it is reasonable, as Rav Adda bar Ahava said: There was an incident, and Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave an orphan one-twelfth of her late father’s property for her dowry. Ostensibly, these amoraic statements are difficult, as they contradict each other. Which portion of the estate did Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi determine should be given for a dowry, one-tenth or one-twelfth? Rather, isn’t it correct to conclude from the discrepancy that the respective circumstances were different? In this ruling, in which Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi gave one-twelfth, it was because we assessed the father, and we knew that to be his intention. In that ruling, he ruled that she should receive the standard one-tenth because we didn’t assess the father and could not determine his intentions. The Gemara accepts the proof: Conclude from this that the matter does depend on the ability to properly assess the father’s intent.

§ The Gemara returns to discuss the matter itself. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: With regard to an orphan daughter who is sustained from the inheritance held by her brothers, she takes one-tenth of the estate for her dowry. They said to Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi: According to your opinion, in the case of one who has ten daughters and a son, the son does not have anything where there are daughters, as each daughter receives one-tenth of the estate. What becomes of the son’s biblically mandated inheritance?

Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said to them: This is what I say: The first daughter to marry takes one-tenth of the estate; the second takes one-tenth of what the first left, rather than one-tenth of the original estate; and the third takes one-tenth of what the second left; and then they later redistribute the portions equally, so that each daughter receives the same amount. In this way, the son retains a portion of the inheritance.