Once again the Gemara explains the sides of the dilemma: Since the Sages penalized the mother and declared that she does not have a marriage contract, the daughter does not have sustenance either, as her sustenance is guaranteed by her mother’s marriage contract. Or perhaps, with regard to her mother, who violated a prohibition, the Sages penalized her by depriving her of her marriage contract, whereas in the case of the daughter, who did not violate a prohibition, the Sages did not penalize her. Once again the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rava raises a dilemma: In the case of the daughter of a betrothed woman, i.e., a man betrothed a woman, fathered a daughter with her, and then died, does the daughter have the right to receive sustenance from his estate, or does she not have the right to receive sustenance? Since the mother has a marriage contract, as in this case the man wrote her a marriage contract after betrothing her, it may be argued that the daughter has the right to receive sustenance. Or perhaps, since the Sages did not enact any requirement for a man to provide his wife with a marriage contract until the time of marriage, the stipulations of the marriage contract do not apply until then, and therefore the daughter of this woman does not have the right to receive sustenance. Again, the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

Rav Pappa raises a dilemma: With regard to the daughter of a raped woman, i.e., a man raped a young woman, married her, had a child, and died, does she have the right to receive sustenance from her father’s estate or does she not have the right to receive sustenance from his estate? The Gemara comments: According to the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, do not raise this dilemma, as he said that a raped woman has a marriage contract of one hundred dinars, and therefore she is entitled to the stipulations of a marriage contract, one of which is that if she has a daughter with her husband, the daughter receives sustenance from the husband’s estate.

Rather, let the dilemma be raised according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the money of her fine fulfilled his obligation to provide her with a marriage contract, i.e., since she has already received the fine in compensation for the rape, she is not entitled to further payment in the form of a marriage contract. According to this opinion, what is the halakha?

The Gemara elaborates: It may be argued that since the mother does not have a marriage contract, the daughter does not have the right to receive sustenance from her father’s estate. Or perhaps one should consider the following: What is the reason that the marriage contract was enacted? So that his wife will not be demeaned in his eyes such that he will easily divorce her. And this one, his rape victim, he cannot divorce her by Torah law, as it is stated: “He may not send her away all his days” (Deuteronomy 22:29). It was therefore unnecessary for the Sages to require that he provide the woman with a marriage contract. However, the reasons for the stipulations included in a marriage contract, e.g., that his daughter receives sustenance from his estate, still apply in this case. Consequently, the Sages stipulated that these provisions still be granted. Yet again the Gemara states that the dilemma shall stand unresolved.

§ The mishna taught that one of the stipulations of a marriage contract is: You will sit in my house and be sustained from my property all your days as a widow. Rav Yosef taught: In my house, and not in my hovel [bikati]. If there is no room for her in his house, the heirs are not obligated to allow her to stay there. However, even in this case, she has the right to receive her sustenance from the heirs. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: She does not even have the right to receive her sustenance, as she is entitled to sustenance only when she lives in her husband’s house. If she resides elsewhere, for whatever reason, she does not receive this payment. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Mar bar Rav Ashi.

§ Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: If a man proposed to marry a widow and she agreed, even if she has not yet married him, she no longer has the right to receive sustenance from the heirs of her previous husband. The Gemara comments: It may be inferred from here that if she had not agreed, even if the man had proposed marriage, she still has the right to receive sustenance. Rav Anan said: It was explained to me personally by Mar Shmuel that the halakha varies in different cases. If she said: I will not marry you due to so-and-so, my deceased husband, i.e., she still feels connected to him, she still has the right to receive sustenance from his estate. However, if she refused the offer because the men who approached her are people who are unsuitable for her, she does not have the right to continue to receive sustenance, as she has shown that in principle she is willing to remarry.

Rav Ḥisda said: If she engaged in licentious sexual relations she does not have the right to continue receiving sustenance from his estate, as she is not acting in a manner befitting a widow. Rav Yosef said: If she painted her eyes and dyed her hair she has clearly done so to attract men for the purposes of marriage, and therefore she does not have the right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate.

The Gemara comments: According to the one who says that a widow who engaged in licentious sexual relations loses her sustenance, all the more so if she painted her eyes and dyed her hair she loses her sustenance, as her intention to marry is evident. However, according to the one who says that if a widow painted her eyes and dyed her hair she forfeits her right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate, this ruling applies only to that particular situation. However, if she engaged in licentious sexual relations she still has the right to receive sustenance from his estate. What is the reason? Her evil inclination forced her, i.e., she did not make a decision to remarry but merely succumbed to temptation.

The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is not in accordance with all of these statements. Rather, the halakha is, in accordance with that which Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: One who claims the payment specified in her marriage contract in court does not have the right to continue receiving sustenance, as she has thereby demonstrated her desire to sever her ties with her late husband.

The Gemara asks: And does she not receive sustenance? But isn’t it taught in a baraita: With regard to one who sold her marriage contract, or used her marriage contract as collateral, or established her marriage contract as designated repayment [apoteiki] for a debt owed to another individual, she does not have the right to receive sustenance from her husband’s estate? The Gemara infers from this baraita: In these cases, yes, she forfeits her right to continue to receive sustenance. However, in the case of a widow who claims her marriage contract, no, she does not lose the right to continue to receive sustenance.

The Gemara answers that this argument is incorrect, and one should make the following inference instead: In these cases listed in the baraita, she forfeits her marriage contract whether she took the action in court or whether she did not do so in court. However, with regard to one who claims her marriage contract, if she issues this claim in court, yes, she loses the right to continue to receive her sustenance, but if her claim was not issued in court, no, she has not forfeited this right.

§ The mishna taught: And the residents of Jerusalem and of the Galilee would write the marriage contract in this manner, i.e., that if the woman is widowed, she may remain in her husband’s house and receive her sustenance from his property throughout her widowhood. Conversely, the residents of Judea would write that she may live in his house and be sustained from his estate until the heirs decide to give her the marriage contract. It was stated that the amora’im argued over this issue. Rav said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of Judea, and Shmuel said that the halakha is in accordance with the custom of the residents of the Galilee and Jerusalem.

The Gemara comments: Babylonia and all of its surrounding towns [parvadaha] act in accordance with the opinion of Rav; Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara relates: There was a certain woman of Meḥoza who was married to a man from Neharde’a. They came before Rav Naḥman to discuss her marriage contract. He heard from her voice that she was from Meḥoza, whose residents had a distinctive accent.

Rav Naḥman said to them: Babylonia and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Rav. They said to him: But she is marrying a resident of Neharde’a. He said to them: If so, Neharde’a and all of its towns act in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel. The Gemara asks: And until where is the boundary of Neharde’a? Up to any place where the kav measurement of Neharde’a is used. The entire area that utilizes the system of Neharde’a measurements is considered part of its surroundings for the purposes of this halakha.

§ It was stated that the amora’im also argued about the halakha of a widow. Rav said: When she receives the payment of her marriage contract, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her and deducts their value from the payment she receives. And Shmuel said that the court does not appraise the clothes that are upon her. Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said: And the reverse is the case with regard to a hired worker. With regard to a hired laborer who lived with his employer and the latter bought clothes for him, Rav and Shmuel disagreed as to whether these garments are appraised and their value deducted from the worker’s salary when he leaves his employer’s service. However, in this case Rav claims that his clothes are not appraised, whereas Shmuel maintains that they are appraised.

Conversely, Rav Kahana would teach: And likewise with regard to a hired worker, their respective opinions are the same in this case as well. Rav rules that one appraises the garments, while Shmuel claims that one does not. And he would apply a mnemonic device for Rav’s opinion: An orphan and a widow, disrobe and remove them. In other words, Rav maintains that both a widow and a hired worker, dubbed an orphan due to his typical poverty, should disrobe, as it were, when the court evaluates the payment to which they are entitled.

Rav Naḥman said: Even though we learned in a mishna in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, the halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav. As we learned in a mishna (Arakhin 24a): With regard to both one who consecrates his property and one who valuates himself by donating his fixed value to the Temple, the Temple treasurer has the right to take neither his wife’s clothing, nor his children’s clothing, nor new dyed clothing that he dyed specially for them, even if they have yet to wear them, nor new sandals that he bought for them. This mishna is apparently in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel that a woman’s garments are not considered her husband’s property.

Rava said to Rav Naḥman: Once we have learned a mishna in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel, why is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rav? He said to him: It would seem [likhora] that this mishna agrees with the opinion of Shmuel when it is skimmed through and read superficially. However, when you examine it you will see that the halakha is in fact in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

What is the reason for this? When he bought her these clothes he did so with the intention that she should stand before him and wear them when she is with him. He did not buy them for her with the intention that she should take them and leave him. The reason for the mishna’s ruling is in fact that the husband acquires the clothes on behalf of his wife, but this applies only if she is living with him. Consequently, if she is living with him, the treasurer has no right to them. However, if she leaves him, she has no right to them, in accordance with the opinion of Rav.

§ The Gemara relates: The daughter-in-law of the house of the son of Elyashiv was claiming payment of her marriage contract from the orphans, and she was in the process of bringing them to the court. The orphans said to her: It is demeaning for us that you should go dressed in this manner, in house clothes. We would rather you come in more suitable attire. She went and dressed and covered herself with all of her clothes. They came before Ravina, who said to them: The halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Rav, who said that with regard to a widow, the court appraises the clothes that are upon her. Therefore, the court takes everything she is wearing into account in the calculation of her marriage contract payment.

The Gemara relates another incident: A certain person said to his heirs, in his will: Give a dowry to my daughter. There was an established custom for the amount of money spent on a dowry, including clothing and jewelry. In the meantime, the cost of a dowry depreciated, i.e., all these items could be acquired with less money. The question arose concerning the difference between the amount the father wished to give her when he wrote the will and the sum they paid in practice. Rav Idi bar Avin said: The profit [purna], i.e., this difference in price, goes to the male orphans, not to the daughter.

The Gemara cites a related incident: A certain person said to his heirs, in his will: