The Gemara asks another question: But say that in a case where she returns to her father’s house, she returns to the previous matter, i.e., her former status, as though she had never left her father’s authority. Rava said: That question has already been resolved by the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael.

This is as the tanna of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught: “But the vow of a widow or of a divorcée, everything with which she has bound her soul shall stand against her” (Numbers 30:10). What is the meaning when the verse states this? Is it not already known that if she is widowed or divorced she has already been removed from the category of one under the authority of her father and she has likewise been removed from the category of one under the authority of her husband? Who, then, could possibly nullify her vows?

Rather, this is referring to a case where the father delivered his daughter to the husband’s messengers or where the father’s messengers delivered her to the husband’s messengers, and she was widowed or divorced on her way to the wedding canopy. How do I consider her? Is she a member of her father’s house, or a member of her husband’s house? Her status is entirely unclear. Rather, this verse comes to tell you: Since she has left her father’s domain for a short time her father is no longer able to nullify her vows, as she is considered a widow or a divorcée in all regards. The same applies to the issue at hand: She retains the status of a married woman even if she returns to her father’s house.

Rav Pappa said: We, too, learn this principle in a mishna (Sanhedrin 66b): One who has intercourse with a young woman betrothed to another is liable to stoning only if she is a virgin, a young woman, betrothed, and she is in her father’s house. The Gemara analyzes this mishna: Granted, the term young woman indicates that this punishment does not apply if she is a grown woman; similarly, this punishment applies only if she is a virgin, but not if she is a non-virgin, and only if she is betrothed, but not if she is a married woman. However, when the mishna states that she is in her father’s house, what does that phrase come to exclude? Does it not serve to exclude a case when the father delivered her to the husband’s messengers, indicating that in such a case the punishment of stoning no longer applies?

Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: We, too, learn this principle in another mishna (Sanhedrin 89a): With regard to one who has intercourse with a married woman, once she has entered her husband’s authority for marriage, even though she has not had intercourse with him, one who has intercourse with her is punished by strangulation, which is the punishment for adultery with a married woman. It is clear that this halakha applies if she merely entered the husband’s authority for the purpose of marriage, even if they have not yet entered the wedding canopy. The Gemara concludes: Indeed, learn from here that this is so.

MISHNA: A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance. This exposition was expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages in the vineyard of Yavne: Since the Sages instituted that after the father’s death, the sons inherit the sum of money specified in their mother’s marriage contract, and the daughters are sustained from their father’s estate, these the two halakhot are equated: Just as the sons inherit only after the father’s death, not during his lifetime, so too, the daughters are sustained from his property only after their father’s death.

GEMARA: With regard to the mishna’s statement that a father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance, the Gemara infers: It is with regard to providing his daughter’s sustenance that he is not obligated, but with regard to providing his son’s sustenance, he is obligated. Furthermore, with regard to his daughter, too, there is no obligation, and therefore the court cannot compel him to provide sustenance for his daughter, but there is a mitzva, i.e., it is proper, for him to do so. With this interpretation in mind, whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? It is not Rabbi Meir, nor Rabbi Yehuda, nor Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

As it is taught in a baraita, it is a mitzva to sustain daughters, and the same applies by an a fortiori inference to sons, who are engaged in the study of Torah. This is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is a mitzva to sustain sons, and the same applies by an a fortiori inference with regard to daughters, due to the dishonor they will suffer if they are forced to go around begging. Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka says: It is an obligation to sustain the daughters after their father’s death; however, during their father’s lifetime both these and those, sons and daughters alike, are not sustained.

The Gemara restates its question: Whose opinion is expressed in the mishna? If you say it is Rabbi Meir, didn’t he say that providing sustenance even to one’s sons is merely a mitzva, not an obligation? If the mishna expresses the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, didn’t he say that providing sustenance to one’s sons is also a mitzva, not an obligation? If it is Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, according to his opinion there is not even a mitzva to provide sustenance for one’s daughters. Consequently, none of opinions of the tanna’im of the baraita fits the ruling of the mishna.

The Gemara answers that the mishna can be explained in several different ways. If you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Meir; if you wish, say that it follows the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda; and if you wish, say it is the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka.

The Gemara explains in detail: If you wish, say it is Rabbi Meir, and this is what he said in the mishna: A father is not obligated to provide his daughter’s sustenance, and the same is true with regard to providing sustenance for his son. This indicates that there is a mitzva, though not an obligation, to provide for his daughter, and by an a fortiori inference it is a mitzva with regard to the sons. And the reason that the mishna teaches only the case of his daughter, and omitted any mention of sons, is not because a father is obligated to feed his sons. Instead, it teaches us this: