Here too, this is the reasoning for the ruling that she does not collect the additional one hundred dinars from the second stipulated time, as he did not write to her in the second marriage contract: I added one hundred dinars to your original marriage contract of two hundred dinars. Evidently, he did not add to the existing marriage contract. Rather, she forgave her rights to the first marriage contract, including the lien on his property from the date it was written, in order to accept the second marriage document.

§ After clarifying Rav Huna’s opinion, the Gemara turns its attention to a more general issue, connected to his last statement. The Master, i.e., Rav Huna, said, as indicated in the above discussion, that if she wishes she can collect the sum specified in this marriage contract, and if she wishes she can collect the sum specified in that marriage contract. The Gemara asks: Shall we say that this opinion disagrees with that of Rav Naḥman? As Rav Naḥman said: With regard to two documents that pertain to the same issue and that are produced one after the other, e.g., a pair of documents that ascribe the transfer of ownership over a particular field to different times, the second, later document nullifies the first. Here too, the second marriage contract should negate the first one entirely.

The Gemara refutes this suggestion: Was it not stated with regard to this halakha of Rav Naḥman that Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added so much as a palm tree in the second document, this shows that he wrote it as an addition, and therefore the second document does not cancel the first, but adds to its sum? Here too, he added something for her, as the sum of money specified in the second marriage contract is larger than that specified in the first.

§ Since the Gemara has mentioned the statement of Rav Naḥman, it discusses this matter itself: Rav Naḥman said: With regard to two documents that are produced one after the other, the second nullifies the first. Rav Pappa said: And Rav Naḥman concedes that if he added a palm tree to it, he wrote it as an addition. The Gemara analyzes this halakha in detail. It is obvious that if the first document was a document of a sale, and the second stated that the same field was given as a gift, the second document does not negate the first, as he wrote the additional document of a gift to improve the rights of the recipient due to the halakha of one whose field borders the field of his neighbor.

And all the more so, this is the halakha if he wrote the first document as a gift and the second in the form of a sale, as we say it was due to the halakha of a creditor that he wrote it in this way. Out of concern that his creditor might come and snatch the field from the recipient and leave him without redress, he writes a document of sale for the recipient, so that he can return and collect this sum from him.

Rather, Rav Naḥman meant that if both of them were documents of sale or both of them were documents of gifts, the second nullifies the first. The Gemara asks: What is the reason for this halakha? Amora’im argued over this matter. Rafram said: Say that the recipient of the field admitted to him that the first document was invalid, e.g., it was forged, and he therefore wrote a second, valid document. Rav Aḥa said: Say that the recipient forgave him his lien from the date of the first document. Consequently, if the seller’s creditors collect this field as payment for the debt owed to them, which necessitates the seller reimbursing the buyer for the purchase price of the field, the buyer has a lien only on property owned by the seller from the time of the second document.

The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two explanations? The Gemara explains: The practical difference between them involves several cases. First, there is the issue of whether this serves to impair the reliability of the witnesses: According to Rafram, who assumes that the first document was of questionable validity, the witnesses who signed on that document are likewise under suspicion, and therefore their testimony and signature in other cases are of questionable value.

And there is also a difference with regard to paying for the produce of the property between the dates specified in the two documents. According to Rafram, the transfer of ownership did not take place at the date specified in the first document. Consequently, the recipient of the field must compensate the original owner for the field’s produce that he consumed between the two dates. According to Rav Aḥa, the transfer of ownership took place at the time specified in the first document. And finally, there is a difference with regard to the payment of the land tax [taska]. If the first document was invalid, the previous owner must pay all taxes due during the period between the two documents.

§ The above discussion came in the wake of the dispute between Rav Huna and Rav Asi with regard to whether the lien on a husband’s property to ensure payment of his wife’s marriage contract applies from the time of betrothal or the time of marriage. The Gemara returns to that issue. What halakhic conclusion was reached about this matter of a marriage contract? The Gemara responds: Come and hear the following ruling, as Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said in the name of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon: The lien on his property with regard to the one hundred dinars or two hundred dinars that comprise the basic sum of a marriage contract applies from the time of the betrothal, and the lien with regard to the additional sum applies from the time of the marriage.

And the Rabbis say: The lien with regard to both this and that takes effect only from the time of the marriage. The Gemara concludes: And the halakha is that with regard to both this and that, the lien takes effect from the time of the marriage, in accordance with the majority opinion of the Rabbis.

MISHNA: In the case of a female convert whose daughter converted with her and later, as a young woman, the daughter engaged in licentious sexual relations when she was betrothed, she is executed by strangulation, not stoning, the method of execution that would be employed had she been born Jewish. She has neither the halakha of being executed at the entrance to her father’s house, as in the case of a woman who was born Jewish who committed this crime, nor does she receive one hundred sela if her husband defamed her by falsely claiming that she had committed adultery. The reason is that the verses state “Israel” (Deuteronomy 22:19, 21) with regard to these halakhot, indicating that these halakhot apply only to those born as Jews.

However, if the daughter’s conception occurred when her mother was not yet in a state of sanctity, i.e., when she was still a gentile, but her birth took place when her mother was in a state of sanctity, as her mother converted during her pregnancy, this daughter is punishable by stoning if she committed adultery as a betrothed young woman. However, she has neither the halakha of being executed at the entrance to her father’s house, nor the right to one hundred sela if it turns out that her husband defamed her. If her conception and birth occurred when her mother was in a state of sanctity, i.e., after she converted, she is like a regular Jewish woman in all matters.

If a young woman who is betrothed commits adultery and she has a father but does not have an entrance to her father’s house, i.e., if her father does not possess a house of his own, or if she has an entrance to her father’s house but does not have a father, as he has passed away, she is nevertheless executed via stoning, as the requirement that she is to be executed at the entrance to her father’s house is stated only for a mitzva but it is not an indispensable requirement.