this principle, that one cannot pay in lieu of execution, applies only when one intentionally killed him in an upward motion, for which no atonement is designated in the Torah for its unwitting performance. However, with regard to one who intentionally killed him in a downward motion, for which atonement, i.e., exile, is designated in the Torah for its unwitting performance, say: Let us take money from him and exempt him. Therefore, the phrase “any ḥerem” teaches us that even in that case there is no payment in lieu of execution.

Rava said to him: That principle is derived from that which the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, as the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught: The verse juxtaposes the cases of one who smites a person, and one who smites an animal (Leviticus 24:21).

Just as in the case of one who smites an animal, you did not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally; between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent; between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion; and in all those cases it is not to exempt him from paying money but rather to obligate him to pay money; so too in the case of one who smites a person: Do not distinguish between one who did so unwittingly and one who did so intentionally; between one who acted with intent and one who acted with no intent; between one who smites in the course of a downward motion and one who smites in the course of an upward motion; and in all those cases it is not to obligate him to pay money but rather to exempt him from paying money. Apparently, one who kills another in any manner is exempt from payment, and therefore no additional verse is required to derive that principle.

Rather, Rami bar Ḥama said that the phrase “any ḥerem” (Leviticus 27:29) is necessary, as it might enter your mind to say that this halakha, that one who is liable to be executed is exempt from payment, applies only in a case where one blinded another’s eye and killed him with that same blow. However, in a case where one blinded another’s eye and killed him by means of a different blow, say: Let us take money from him to pay the damage inflicted to the eye. Therefore, the verse teaches that this is not the case. Rava said to him: This case of one who blinded another’s eye and killed him is also derived from that which another tanna of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught, as the Sage of the school of Ḥizkiyya taught that the verse states: “An eye for an eye” (Exodus 21:24), from which it may be inferred, but not an eye and a life for an eye. When he gives his life for killing another while blinding him, he need not pay the worth of the eye as well.

Rather, after the Gemara rejected the above explanations, Rav Ashi said: The phrase “any ḥerem” is nonetheless necessary, as it might enter your mind to say: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, which is not payment for any damage caused but is a Torah decree, in that case, even though he is killed he pays the fine. Therefore, the verse teaches us that one who is executed is exempt from payment of the fine. The Gemara asks: And according to Rabba, who said that this is indeed the halakha: Since it is a novel element that the Torah introduced with regard to the payment of a fine, even though he is killed he pays the fine, what does he do with this phrase: “Any ḥerem”? The Gemara answers: Rabba holds with regard to this matter in accordance with the opinion of the first tanna, who disagrees with Rabbi Ḥananya ben Akavya and explains that the phrase “Any ḥerem” teaches that the vow one takes to donate the valuation of one being taken to his execution is not binding.

MISHNA: With regard to a young woman who was betrothed and divorced, and then raped, Rabbi Yosei HaGelili says: She does not receive payment of a fine for her rape. Rabbi Akiva says: She receives payment of a fine for her rape and her fine is paid to herself, not her father, as since she was betrothed and divorced she is no longer subject to her father’s authority.

GEMARA: What is the rationale for the opinion of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili? It is as the verse states: “If a man finds a young woman who is a virgin who was not betrothed” (Deuteronomy 22:28), from which it may be inferred: If she was betrothed she does not have a fine for rape. The Gemara asks: And how does Rabbi Akiva explain this verse? The Gemara answers that the verse states: If it is a young woman who was not betrothed, the fine is paid to her father, from which it may be inferred: If she was betrothed, the fine is paid to the betrothed woman herself.

The Gemara asks: But if that is so, that the inference from the verse is that the fine is levied on one who rapes a young woman and not on one who rapes a grown woman, so too, there is the halakha in the latter case that the fine is paid to the grown woman herself. Similarly, with regard to the inference that the fine is levied on one who rapes a virgin and not on one who rapes a non-virgin, so too, there is the halakha that in the latter case the fine is paid to the non-virgin herself. A distinction of that kind has never been encountered. Rather, with regard to a grown woman and a non-virgin, the rapist is completely exempt from paying the fine; here too, with regard to a betrothed woman, the rapist is completely exempt from paying the fine.

The Gemara answers: Rabbi Akiva could have said to you that this verse: “Who was not betrothed,” is required by him to teach another halakha that is taught in a different baraita. “Who was not betrothed” (Deuteronomy 22:28) comes to exclude a young woman who was betrothed and divorced and establish that she does not receive payment of a fine for her rape; this is the statement of Rabbi Yosei HaGelili. Rabbi Akiva says: She receives payment of a fine for her rape, and her fine goes to her father, contrary to the ruling attributed to Rabbi Akiva in the mishna. And ostensibly, no verse is required to derive this halakha, as logic dictates that it is so: Since her father is entitled to the money of her betrothal if she is betrothed before she becomes a grown woman, and likewise her father is entitled to the money of her fine; just as the money of her subsequent betrothal as a young woman, even though she was betrothed and divorced, is paid to her father, so too, the money of her fine, although she was betrothed and divorced, is paid to her father.

If so, and the halakha can be logically inferred, why does the verse state: “Who was not betrothed”? This verse is free, as it is superfluous in its own context, and it is written to liken another case to it, and to derive from it a verbal analogy: It is stated here with regard to a woman who was raped: “Who was not betrothed,” and it is stated below: “And if a man seduce a virgin who was not betrothed” (Exodus 22:15). Just as here, with regard to rape, the Torah specifies that the payment is fifty silver pieces (Deuteronomy 22:29), so too below, with regard to seduction, the payment is fifty. And just as below, with regard to seduction, the payment is in shekels, as it is written: “He shall weigh [yishkol] money” (Exodus 22:16), so too here, the payment is in shekels.

The Gemara asks: And Rabbi Akiva, what did you see that led you to utilize the phrase: “Who was not betrothed” for a verbal analogy, and the term “virgin” to exclude a non-virgin from the fine?