Rather, we are dealing with the treasurer of the Temple, to whom the consecrated building stones were transferred for safekeeping. The reason for the exemption is that anywhere that the stone is resting, it is considered to be resting within his domain. Consequently, he is not liable for picking up the stone or beam, as he is permitted to carry it. However, he does not have permission to give it to someone else, and therefore when he hands it over to someone else he has misused consecrated property. If so, this halakha is also perfectly logical and should not be considered like mountains suspended by a hair.

Rather, the comparison of these halakhot to mountains suspended by a hair is based on the latter clause of that same mishna: If he built the stone into his house, he has not misused consecrated property until he dwells under it an amount of time that is worth a peruta. Since he has changed the stone by incorporating it into his house, what difference is there to me if he dwelt there, and what difference is there to me if he did not dwell there? Apparently, this is the halakha considered like mountains suspended by a hair.

The Gemara rejects this claim. And what is the logical difficulty with this halakha? Perhaps it is stated in accordance with the opinion of Rav. As Rav said: This mishna is referring to a case where he placed the stone over a window, but he did not make any adjustment to the stone itself. If he dwelt in the house, yes, he has misused consecrated property, as he derived benefit from it. If he did not dwell in it, no, he has not misused consecrated property, as he gained no benefit from the stone.

Rather, the reason is actually in accordance with the aforementioned opinion of Rava, who holds that the innovative element of this halakha involves a case where the homeowner remembered, which caused the agent to misuse consecrated property. And with regard to that which posed a difficulty for you, i.e., that the halakha here should be just as it is with regard to one who spends consecrated money for non-sacred purposes, the two cases are not identical. There, in the case that Rava mentioned, the agent knew that he also had consecrated coins and therefore he should have examined carefully whether this money was consecrated. Here, did the agent know that there was a possibility that the money was consecrated? This is why this halakha is like mountains suspended by a hair.

§ The mishna explained that those matters that are like mountains suspended by a hair have little written about them in the Torah, and yet the details of their halakhot are numerous. A Sage taught in the Tosefta: The halakhot of leprosy and the halakhot of ritual impurity imparted by tents in which a corpse lies have little in the Torah and their halakhot are numerous. The Gemara asks: With regard to leprosy, is there little about their halakhot in the Torah? Leprosy is something about which there are numerous details stated in the Torah (see Leviticus, chapters 13–14). Rav Pappa said that this is what the mishna is saying: Leprosy has numerous details in the Torah but relatively few halakhot. In contrast, the case of ritual impurity imparted by tents has little in the Torah but numerous halakhot.

The Gemara asks: And what is the practical difference whether there are numerous or few references to a particular halakha in the Torah? The Gemara answers: If you are uncertain about a matter with regard to the halakhot of leprosy, delve into the verses, as it is treated extensively there. And if you are uncertain about a matter with regard to the halakhot of the ritual impurity imparted by tents, delve into the Mishna, as these halakhot are not sufficiently explicated in the Torah.

§ The mishna taught that monetary law is one of those matters that have something to support them in the Torah. The Gemara asks: Monetary laws are written in the Torah; why does the mishna merely say it has something to support it? The Gemara answers: This is necessary only according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

The Gemara elaborates. As it is taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: “But if any harm follow, then you shall give life for life” (Exodus 21:23). This verse is referring to a payment of money. Do you say money, or perhaps it is solely an actual life that is demanded? The term giving is stated below: “You shall give life for life,” and giving is stated above, in the previous verse: “And he shall give as the judges determine” (Exodus 21:22). Just as there, the giving is in the form of money, so too here, it is referring to a payment of money. Although this halakha is not explicit in the Torah, the verses lend support to it.

§ The mishna stated that the halakhot of sacrificial rites have something to support them. The Gemara asks: Sacrificial rites are written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: It is necessary to state that sacrificial rites have merely something to support them only with regard to the rite of carrying the blood to the altar. As it is taught in a baraita: “And Aaron’s sons, the priests, shall offer the blood” (Leviticus 1:5); this is referring to collecting the blood, which is the stage before carrying the blood to the altar.

And the Merciful One expressed collecting the blood in the language of carrying, i.e., by means of the term offer. As it is written: “And the priest shall offer the whole, and make it smoke upon the altar” (Leviticus 1:13). And the Master said that this term, “offer,” is not referring to sacrificing on the altar, as that is expressed by the phrase: “Make it smoke upon the altar.” Rather, this is referring to carrying the limbs to the ramp next to the altar, from where it is placed on the altar itself.

Evidently, the Torah is referring to collecting the blood with the same terminology it used when referring to carrying. That is to say that carrying should not be excluded from the category of collecting. In other words, all the halakhot that pertain to collecting the blood of offerings, e.g., that it must be performed by a priest with his right hand, apply equally to carrying the blood.

§ The mishna further taught that the halakhot of ritual purity have something to support them. The Gemara again asks: But ritual purity is written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: The observation that the halakhot of ritual purity merely have something to support them is necessary only for the minimum measure of a ritual bath, which is not written explicitly in the Torah. As it is taught in a baraita: “And he shall bathe his flesh in water” (Leviticus 14:9). This means in the water of a ritual bath. And it is stated: “And he shall wash all his flesh in water” (Leviticus 15:16), which indicates that it must contain water in which his whole body can enter. And how much water is this? One cubit by one cubit with a height of three cubits. And the Sages estimated that the measure for ritual bath water is forty se’a.

§ The mishna stated that the halakhot of ritual impurity also have something to support them. Once again the Gemara asks: Ritual impurity is written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: This is necessary only with regard to the size of a lentil-bulk from a creeping animal, which is not written. As it is taught in a baraita with regard to a verse that deals with creeping animals: “Whoever touches them when they are dead shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:31).

One might have thought that only someone who touches an entire, whole creeping animal becomes ritually impure. The verse states: “And upon whatever any of them falls, when they are dead, it shall be impure” (Leviticus 11:32). “Of them” indicates that this halakha applies even if one comes into contact with a part of them. One might have thought that even some of them suffices to impart impurity. The verse states: “Them,” i.e., all of them. This conclusion apparently contradicts the first ruling.

How can this apparent contradiction be resolved? One does not become impure until he touches some of it that is like the whole, i.e., a significant amount. And the Sages estimated this measure as the size of a lentil-bulk. The reason is that in its early stages, the ḥomet, the smallest of these creeping animals, is the size of a lentil-bulk. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says: The size of a lentil-bulk is that of a lizard’s tail, which is considered a part that is like the whole. The tail of a lizard can be cut off easily, and as it continues to twitch even after it has been cut off, it has the appearance of life. Consequently, it is fitting to label it as a part that is like the whole.

§ The mishna further taught that the halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden have something to support them. The Gemara asks: The halakhot of those with whom relations are forbidden are written explicitly in the Torah. The Gemara answers: This is necessary only