that the wall will not be damaged, it is not under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” The water does not have the legal status of water poured for that purpose. This tanna does not consider protecting the wall from dirt as a significant usage. Similarly, protecting the zav from being soiled by the emission would not be considered a significant usage and the pouch used for that purpose would not be considered a significant vessel. The Gemara rejects this: Are these cases comparable? There, he does not need those liquids at all, and therefore the vessel is not considered to have been placed to receive them. However, here he needs this pouch to absorb the emission, to ascertain whether or not he experienced an emission. Although on that particular day he does not require the pouch, the zav typically requires his pouch for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not there is another emission.

Rather, this halakha with regard to the zav is comparable only to the latter clause of the mishna dealing with rainwater, in which we learned: A bowl that the drip of rain from the roof dropped into it, the water that splashes or overflows from the bowl does not have the legal status of water collected for a purpose, and is not under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” And the water that is in the bowl has the legal status of water collected for a purpose and is under the rubric of the verse: “If water be placed.” Although, fundamentally, one has no interest in the drip of water, once the water already dripped, he wants it to remain in the bowl and not dirty the house. That desire is sufficient to accord the water in the bowl the legal status of water placed there willfully. The same is true with regard to the pouch of the zav. In the current situation of the zav, he is interested in keeping the emission in its place, and therefore the original difficulty posed by the contradiction between the two baraitot remains intact.

Rather, it is Abaye and Rava, who both said that this is not difficult. There is no contradiction between the baraitot. This baraita, which deems a zav liable by Torah law for going out with his pouch, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda. His opinion is that one who performs a prohibited labor that is not needed for its own sake, but rather for a different consequence of that prohibited labor, is liable. And that baraita, which deems him exempt, is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Shimon. He holds that one who performs a prohibited labor that is not needed for its own sake is exempt. Since the zav is not at all interested in the flow and the pouch, he is exempt by Torah law for carrying the pouch.

The Sage of the school of Rabbi Yishmael taught in a baraita: A person may go out ab initio donning phylacteries on Shabbat eve at nightfall. Although one does not don phylacteries on Shabbat and going out donning them involves an element of carrying, there is no concern lest he forget and remove them on Shabbat. What is the reason for this? Because Rabba bar Rav Huna said: A person is obligated to touch his phylacteries at all times that he is donning them. This is derived from an a fortiori inference [kal vaḥomer] from the frontplate [tzitz] of the High Priest. Just as with regard to the frontplate, which has only one mention of God’s name, the Torah said: “And it should be always upon his forehead” (Exodus 28:38), which means that the High Priest must always be aware that the tzitz is placed on his head and that he should not be distracted from it; phylacteries that have numerous mentions of God’s name, all the more so one should always be aware of them. Therefore, he remembers that the phylacteries are on his head and is not likely to come to carry them on Shabbat. On a related note, the Gemara mentions that it was taught in a baraita that Ḥananya says: A person is required to feel his clothing on Shabbat eve at nightfall to ascertain whether he forgot an object in his pockets that he might come to carry on Shabbat. And Rav Yosef commented and said: That is a significant halakha for Shabbat, and it is fitting to do so in order to refrain from violating a prohibition.

We learned in the mishna: One may not shake his clothes on Shabbat to rid them of lice; and one may not read a book by candlelight, so that he will not come to adjust the wick of the lamp. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does this mean that one may not shake his clothes even during the day due to the concern lest he kill the louse that he finds in his clothing, and our mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer said: One who kills a louse on Shabbat, even though it is a very small creature, it is as if he killed a camel, and there is no difference in the severity of the prohibition. And what was said in the mishna: And he may not read by candlelight, is due to concern lest he adjust the wick, a totally independent matter. Or, perhaps both of these halakhot are due to the concern lest he adjust the wick, and both halakhot apply exclusively at night. During the day he is permitted to shake his clothes, and there is no concern lest he kill a louse.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in a baraita: One may not shake clothing and one may not read a book by candlelight on Shabbat. The style of the baraita indicates that both actions are prohibited for the same reason. The Gemara rejects this: Is this proof from the baraita a stronger proof than our mishna? In our mishna, both halakhot are also cited together, and that was insufficient proof that they share a common rationale.

Come and hear a resolution to this dilemma from that which was taught in another baraita: One may not shake clothing by the light of the lamp and one may not read by the light of the lamp. These two decrees are among the halakhot that the Sages said in the upper story of Ḥananya ben Ḥizkiya ben Garon. Learn from this that both of the decrees are due to the concern lest he adjust the wick. In both decrees, the prohibition of doing so by the light of the lamp, lest he come to adjust the wick, was mentioned. Indeed, learn from this.

Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: It is prohibited to use candlelight even to distinguish between his garments and the garments of his wife. Because that requires a certain degree of scrutiny, there is concern lest he adjust the wick in order to see better. To qualify this statement, Rava said: We only said this with regard to the garments of the people of the city of Meḥoza, as there the men’s garments are wide and ornamented similar to the women’s garments; however, with regard to farmers and village residents, they know the difference between men’s and women’s garments. There is no concern lest they adjust the wick to distinguish between the garments, as the differences between men’s garments and women’s garments are obvious. Even with regard to the clothing of the people of Meḥoza, we only said that it is prohibited to distinguish between men’s and women’s garments with regard to the garments of old women; however, with regard to the garments of young women, they know the difference and there is no concern lest one adjust the wick to distinguish between them.

The Sages taught: One may not shake clothing to rid them of lice in the public domain in deference to human dignity, as passersby would be offended by this. Similarly, Rabbi Yehuda said, and some say that Rabbi Neḥemya said it: One may not make an appiktoizin, a drug to induce vomiting, in the public domain in deference to human dignity. With regard to the matter of shaking clothing to rid them of lice on Shabbat, the Gemara cites that which the Sages taught in the Tosefta: One who shakes his clothing may squeeze the louse and throw it, as long as he does not kill it. Abba Shaul says: He may take the louse and throw it, as long as he does not squeeze it. In his opinion, killing a louse is prohibited by Torah law. Therefore, even squeezing it is prohibited, lest he come to kill it. Rav Huna said: The halakha is that he may squeeze and throw the louse, and that is the dignified way to get rid of a louse, and even during the days of the week, when it is not Shabbat and there is no concern lest he violate the prohibition of killing a louse. Even then, it is preferable not to kill it because it is disgusting and it is sufficient to simply throw it (Me’iri). The Gemara relates that Rabba would kill the lice. And Rav Sheshet would also kill them. Rava would throw them into a cup [lekna] of water and he would not kill them directly with his hands. The Gemara relates that Rav Naḥman would say to his daughters: Kill them, and let me hear the sound of the combs, meaning, you may kill the lice in the usual manner on the comb.

As far as the basic halakha is concerned, it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagreed with regard to killing a louse on Shabbat: One may not kill a louse on Shabbat, this is the statement of Beit Shammai; and Beit Hillel permit doing so. In their opinion, a louse is unlike the other creatures for which one is liable for killing them on Shabbat.

And Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar would also say in the name of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel: One may not make matches [meshaddekhin] for the children, to betroth them on Shabbat, and one may not enter into an agreement to take the child and teach him to read a sacred book or to teach him a trade, and one may not comfort mourners on Shabbat, and one may not visit the sick on Shabbat, this is the statement of Beit Shammai, as in their opinion, those are weekday activities and not appropriate on Shabbat. And Beit Hillel permit performing all of these activities on Shabbat, as they each include an aspect of mitzva.

The Sages taught in a baraita: One who enters to visit a sick person on Shabbat does not address him in the manner customary during the week; rather, he says: It is on Shabbat that it is prohibited to cry out and ask for compassion, and healing is soon to come. And Rabbi Meir says that it is appropriate to add: The merit of Shabbat is capable of engendering compassion.