as the halakha there is just as it is in the case of one who transfers an object in the public domain. There, even though as long as he takes it and walks and does not place the object he is exempt, is it not the case that when he places it he is liable? Obviously, between the place where he lifted the object and the place where he placed the object, where there is liability, there lies an undefined area where, as long as he continues walking, he is exempt. Here too, it is no different, as in both cases an identical situation exists: If he places the object at the end of his path he is liable, despite the fact that the area in the middle is an exempt place.

The Gemara rejects this comparison: Is this comparable? There, anywhere that he places the object is a place of potential liability. That cannot be described as two places of liability with an exempt domain between them, as the area between them is also a place of potential liability if he were to place the object there. On the other hand, here, if he places it in the colonnade, it is an absolute exempt domain.

Again the question arises: Where is there a precedent of liability for transferring an object through an exempt domain? The Gemara answers: Rather, it is possible to cite a different precedent: The halakha here is just as it is in the case of one who transfers an object in the public domain from the beginning of four cubits to the end of four cubits exactly. There, is it not the case that, even though were he to place it within four cubits of where he stands, he is not liable because within four cubits, the complete prohibited labor of carrying in the public domain was not performed; and nevertheless, when he places it at the end of four cubits he is liable? Here too, it is no different. It can be said that there is a strip of exempt domain between the lifting and the placement.

Again the Gemara rejects the analogy: Is that similar? There, in the public domain, for this man it is an exempt domain, as it is within four cubits of the place that he lifted the object. However, for the entire world, it is a place of potential liability, as the space itself is a public domain and it could be beyond four cubits for someone else who placed it there, and he would be liable. Here, on the other hand, the colonnade is an exempt domain for the entire world. There is no comparison between an absence of liability that stems from the fact that the prohibited labor was not completed and an unconditional exemption dependent solely on the nature of the domain in question.

Rather, it is possible to cite a different precedent: The halakha here is just as it is in the case of one who carries out an object from the private domain to the public domain through the sides of the public domain. The sides of a public domain are narrow strips located adjacent to the houses where the multitudes do not congregate. There, is it not the case that, even though if one were to place an object on the sides of the public domain, he is exempt and, nevertheless, when he places it in the public domain he is liable? If so, here too, it is no different.

Rav Pappa strongly objects to this explanation: Granted, according to the opinion of the Rabbis, who say that the sides of the public domain are a type of independent domain and not considered the public domain, that precedent is similar to our case. However, according to the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov, who said that the sides of the public domain are considered a full-fledged public domain, what is there to say?

Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika, said to him: Say that you heard that Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov said that the sides of the public domain are considered a public domain in a place where there are no stakes [ḥipufei] separating the houses and the courtyards from the actual public domain to prevent the public from damaging the walls of the houses. However, in a place where there are stakes, did you hear him say that the legal status of the sides is that of the public domain itself? Therefore, it is similar to that case of the colonnade, and consequently it serves as a precedent for liability when carrying through an exempt domain.

Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Ben Azzai disagreed with regard to carrying out the object while walking through the colonnade. In his opinion one who carries it out is exempt. Yet, he agrees with the Rabbis that in a case where one throws an object from the private domain to the public domain through a colonnade he is liable, as it is tantamount to carrying out directly from domain to domain. That opinion was also taught in a baraita: One who carries out an object on Shabbat from a store to a plaza via a colonnade is liable. The halakha is identical with regard to all means of transferring an object from domain to domain via a colonnade. The same is true for one who carries out, and one who carries in, and one who throws, and one who extends his hand from domain to domain. Ben Azzai says: One who walks and carries out and one who walks and carries in are exempt, as he is considered to have come to rest in the colonnade. On the other hand, one who extends his hand with the object and one who throws the object, whose actions are uninterrupted, are liable.

In order to explain the essence of the laws of domains on Shabbat, the Gemara cites what the Sages taught in the Tosefta, that there are four domains for the halakhot of Shabbat: The private domain, and the public domain, and two additional domains: The karmelit, which is like neither the public domain nor the private domain, and an exempt domain, which does not fall into the category of domains.

The Gemara elaborates: And what is the private domain? A ditch which is ten handbreadths deep and four handbreadths wide, as well as a fence which is ten handbreadths high and four handbreadths wide; that is a full-fledged private domain. The criteria for a private domain are that it must be an area of four by four handbreadths, with a ten-handbreadth difference in elevation from the surrounding environment.

And what is the public domain? A main street [seratia] and a large plaza as well as alleyways [mevo’ot], which are open on both ends to the public domain, connecting between main streets; that is a full-fledged public domain. With regard to those domains: One may not carry out from the private domain of this kind to the public domain of this kind, and one may not carry in from the public domain of this kind to the private domain of this kind. If he did so unwittingly, he is liable to bring a sin-offering. If he did so intentionally, and there were no witnesses to his act, and he was not forewarned, he is liable to receive the punishment of excision [karet]. If he was forewarned and there were witnesses to his transgression, he is punished with the court-imposed capital punishment and stoned.

However, a sea and a valley and a colonnade and the karmelit all enter into the general category of karmelit, which is neither like the public domain, because the multitudes are not congregated there, nor like the private domain, as it has no partitions. Rather, the Sages instituted that cases like these should be considered an independent domain. One may not carry and place an object in it beyond four cubits, just as it is prohibited to do so in the public domain. And if he nevertheless carried and placed an object in it, he is exempt, as it involves no Torah prohibition. And one may neither carry from it into the public domain nor from the public domain into it, as it is not the public domain. And one may neither carry from the private domain into it nor from it into the private domain, as it is not the private domain. And if he carried out from the private domain or carried in from the public domain, he is exempt, as it involves is no Torah prohibition.

Similarly, there is a type of private domain which, by rabbinic law, has the legal status of a karmelit or a public domain. Courtyards shared by many and alleyways that are not open on both sides are private domains that are somewhat similar to the public domain because many people congregate there. For this reason, the Sages issued a decree prohibiting carrying within them. However, if they placed an eiruv, i.e., a joining of courtyards, to transform a common courtyard into a single domain, or a merging of alleyways to merge a common alleyway shared by several courtyards into a single domain, they are all permitted to carry objects from their houses into the courtyard or from the courtyard into the alleyway, respectively. However, if they did not place an eiruv, they are prohibited to do so.

An example of the fourth domain listed in the baraita, the exempt domain is: A person standing on the threshold may take an object from the homeowner standing in the private domain and may give an object to him. Similarly, while standing there, he may take an object from a poor person standing in the public domain and may give an object to him because there is no element of prohibition or liability in carrying and carrying out in an exempt domain on Shabbat. There is no prohibition as long as he does not take the object from the homeowner in the private domain and give it to a poor person in the public domain, or from a poor person and give to the homeowner, as by doing so he facilitated transfer from domain to domain. And, however, if he took an object from one and gave it to the other, certainly no labor prohibited by Torah law was performed, and all three of them are exempt.

Aḥerim say: Not every threshold is an exempt domain. Some are not sufficiently isolated from the surrounding domains. Sometimes, a threshold serves as two domains; at times the public domain and at times the private domain, as in different circumstances it is subsumed within the adjacent domain. Therefore, when the doorway is open, the threshold is an extension of the house and considered to be a private domain. If the doorway was locked, it is considered like the outside, like part of the public domain. This applies when the threshold is not an independent domain. And if the threshold was ten handbreadths high above the public domain and four handbreadths wide, it is a domain unto itself, i.e., a full-fledged private domain discrete from the house.

It was taught in the Tosefta with regard to the definition of a private domain that the Master said, with added emphasis: This is the private domain. The Gemara asks: What was this emphasis added to exclude? The Gemara answers: To exclude this halakha of Rabbi Yehuda, as it was taught in a baraita: Furthermore, Rabbi Yehuda said: One who has two houses opposite each other on two sides of the public domain, if he chooses, he may create a private domain for himself in the public domain. He may place